“The Legal Case for Israel”.
To my mind he correctly depicted the borders of the Jewish National Home as
embracing all of the Land of Israel west of the Jordan as well as that of present day Jordan.
embracing all of the Land of Israel west of the Jordan as well as that of present day Jordan.
You also informed me that a certain Richard Witty made the following adverse comment about the
borders of the Jewish National Home that were designated for the future independent Jewish State:
borders of the Jewish National Home that were designated for the future independent Jewish State:
"Sadly, there is a LARGE great lie in the lecture [of Professor Kontorovich]. That is the
statement that the entire area of the Palestinian Mandate was to be set aside as “the Jewish
State” (capitals in the original)."
statement that the entire area of the Palestinian Mandate was to be set aside as “the Jewish
State” (capitals in the original)."
According to my intensive study, research and analysis of the legal status of Transjordan under the
Mandate for Palestine (it was never called the “Palestinian” Mandate as Witty wrongly says), there is
no doubt as I see it that the one who is telling the “LARGE great lie” is not Professor Kontorovich but
Richard Witty who, as you point out, seems to be totally ignorant of the fundamentals of Israel’s legal
rights to the entire Land of Israel and former Mandated Palestine under international law. I might add
that he is equally ignorant of the diplomatic history and political steps that were taken in regard to
Transjordan and its continuing legal relationship to the Jewish National Home even after its
provisional severance from it in 1922 until its permanent detachment in 1946.
Mandate for Palestine (it was never called the “Palestinian” Mandate as Witty wrongly says), there is
no doubt as I see it that the one who is telling the “LARGE great lie” is not Professor Kontorovich but
Richard Witty who, as you point out, seems to be totally ignorant of the fundamentals of Israel’s legal
rights to the entire Land of Israel and former Mandated Palestine under international law. I might add
that he is equally ignorant of the diplomatic history and political steps that were taken in regard to
Transjordan and its continuing legal relationship to the Jewish National Home even after its
provisional severance from it in 1922 until its permanent detachment in 1946.
It is an elementary fact that when the Balfour Declaration was issued, “Palestine” in British eyes, as
depicted in two maps of the country they themselves drew up in 1915 and 1917, included both
Cisjordan and Transjordan. All of this territory was to be included in a future independent Jewish State
whatever the future dimensions or boundaries of Transjordan would eventually be as indicated in the
text of Article 25 of the Mandate for Palestine. Article 25 stated that, “In the territories lying between
the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined…” Similar language was
used in the San Remo Resolution and the Treaty of Sèvres which were formulated prior to the
insertion of Article 25 of the Mandate. That was exactly what Prime Minister David Lloyd George,
Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour and other high officials in the British Government originally
envisaged for the Jewish State-to-be, as corroborated by the 1937 Peel Royal Commission Report on
Palestine. The Report stated that “the field in which the Jewish National Home was to be established
was understood at the time of the Balfour Declaration to be the whole of historic Palestine, and the
Zionists were seriously disappointed when Trans-Jordan was cut away from that field under Article
25” [of the Mandate for Palestine]. (Paragraph 42(3) of the Palestine Royal Commission Report).
depicted in two maps of the country they themselves drew up in 1915 and 1917, included both
Cisjordan and Transjordan. All of this territory was to be included in a future independent Jewish State
whatever the future dimensions or boundaries of Transjordan would eventually be as indicated in the
text of Article 25 of the Mandate for Palestine. Article 25 stated that, “In the territories lying between
the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined…” Similar language was
used in the San Remo Resolution and the Treaty of Sèvres which were formulated prior to the
insertion of Article 25 of the Mandate. That was exactly what Prime Minister David Lloyd George,
Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour and other high officials in the British Government originally
envisaged for the Jewish State-to-be, as corroborated by the 1937 Peel Royal Commission Report on
Palestine. The Report stated that “the field in which the Jewish National Home was to be established
was understood at the time of the Balfour Declaration to be the whole of historic Palestine, and the
Zionists were seriously disappointed when Trans-Jordan was cut away from that field under Article
25” [of the Mandate for Palestine]. (Paragraph 42(3) of the Palestine Royal Commission Report).
The inclusion of Transjordan in the Jewish State was the operating assumption of Britain until Lord
George Nathaniel Curzon replaced Lord Balfour as Foreign Secretary in October 1919 and took over
ministerial responsibility for Palestine. Curzon was an avowed anti-Zionist who strongly opposed the
Balfour Declaration but who ironically enough was obliged to defend it against strong French
opposition at the San Remo Peace Conference. True to his original belief, Curzon decided to downsize
the Jewish National Home in December 1920 and sever Transjordan from the Jewish National Home
but did not in fact do so, since jurisdiction over Palestine’s affairs was taken away from him and transferred in January 1921 from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office headed by newly appointed
Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill who assumed office a month later on February 14, 1921.
George Nathaniel Curzon replaced Lord Balfour as Foreign Secretary in October 1919 and took over
ministerial responsibility for Palestine. Curzon was an avowed anti-Zionist who strongly opposed the
Balfour Declaration but who ironically enough was obliged to defend it against strong French
opposition at the San Remo Peace Conference. True to his original belief, Curzon decided to downsize
the Jewish National Home in December 1920 and sever Transjordan from the Jewish National Home
but did not in fact do so, since jurisdiction over Palestine’s affairs was taken away from him and transferred in January 1921 from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office headed by newly appointed
Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill who assumed office a month later on February 14, 1921.
It was exactly at this time that Abdullah, the Emir of the Hedjaz, arrived in Amman in March 1921
with an irregular force of fighters threatening to attack the French position in Syria for expelling his
younger brother, Emir Feisal, from the country and to restore Hashemite rule. The threat by Abdullah
was nothing more than a worthless bluff but it succeeded in inducing Churchill to convene the Cairo
Conference in March 1921 to settle the question of Transjordan, which was no longer under Feisal’s
temporary rule since his expulsion from Syria and to also secure for him the projected kingdom of
Iraq.
with an irregular force of fighters threatening to attack the French position in Syria for expelling his
younger brother, Emir Feisal, from the country and to restore Hashemite rule. The threat by Abdullah
was nothing more than a worthless bluff but it succeeded in inducing Churchill to convene the Cairo
Conference in March 1921 to settle the question of Transjordan, which was no longer under Feisal’s
temporary rule since his expulsion from Syria and to also secure for him the projected kingdom of
Iraq.
Transjordan was certain to be included in the Mandate for Palestine and to be part of the Jewish
National Home as both Lloyd George and Lord Balfour insisted and as agreed to by Feisal himself.
Churchill wanted to pacify the Hashemite family for its loss of Syria and did so at the expense of the
Jewish National Home by removing Transjordan from its scope and applicability. He did this on the
advice of T.E. Lawrence as well as that of Sir Herbert Samuel and other senior officials in the Colonial
Office. Churchill managed to convince the Lloyd George Government to approve his plan to separate
Transjordan from the Jewish National Home as well as his appointment of Abdullah as the
administrator of the territory for a limited period of six months. Please note that he was not appointed
as “Emir” of Transjordan as is commonly believed and is often quoted in the literature. This title he
received from his father Sharif Hussein, King of the Hedjaz.
National Home as both Lloyd George and Lord Balfour insisted and as agreed to by Feisal himself.
Churchill wanted to pacify the Hashemite family for its loss of Syria and did so at the expense of the
Jewish National Home by removing Transjordan from its scope and applicability. He did this on the
advice of T.E. Lawrence as well as that of Sir Herbert Samuel and other senior officials in the Colonial
Office. Churchill managed to convince the Lloyd George Government to approve his plan to separate
Transjordan from the Jewish National Home as well as his appointment of Abdullah as the
administrator of the territory for a limited period of six months. Please note that he was not appointed
as “Emir” of Transjordan as is commonly believed and is often quoted in the literature. This title he
received from his father Sharif Hussein, King of the Hedjaz.
Legally, even after it was separated from the Jewish National Home, Transjordan still remained an
integral part of the Mandate for Palestine subject to its provisions except those relating to the Jewish
National Home. It must be emphasised that Transjordan’s detachment from the Jewish National Home
was only meant to be a provisional or temporary measure as clearly indicated by the words in Article
25 of the Mandate, that the Mandatory Power had decided “to postpone or withhold application of
such provisions” of the Mandate it considered inapplicable “to the existing local conditions” in
Transjordan. However, at the expiry of the six month period, Abdullah was reconfirmed in his position
by the newly elected Conservative Government that replaced the Lloyd George Government and
ended Churchill’s tenure at the Colonial Office. The irony of the situation that developed was that
despite the severance of Transjordan from the Jewish National Home as a temporary measure only, in
the mind of Abdullah, it was permanent never to be changed back to its original status as part of the
Jewish National Home.
integral part of the Mandate for Palestine subject to its provisions except those relating to the Jewish
National Home. It must be emphasised that Transjordan’s detachment from the Jewish National Home
was only meant to be a provisional or temporary measure as clearly indicated by the words in Article
25 of the Mandate, that the Mandatory Power had decided “to postpone or withhold application of
such provisions” of the Mandate it considered inapplicable “to the existing local conditions” in
Transjordan. However, at the expiry of the six month period, Abdullah was reconfirmed in his position
by the newly elected Conservative Government that replaced the Lloyd George Government and
ended Churchill’s tenure at the Colonial Office. The irony of the situation that developed was that
despite the severance of Transjordan from the Jewish National Home as a temporary measure only, in
the mind of Abdullah, it was permanent never to be changed back to its original status as part of the
Jewish National Home.
Whatever the provisions of the Mandate said, not only Abdullah considered his rule of Transjordan to
be permanent, but so did the new British Government and all subsequent governments. On a trip to
London, Abdullah was given an Assurance by Britain in October 1922 that it recognised the existence
of his independent government in Transjordan under Abdullah’s rule provided that such government
was constitutional. When this assurance was officially broadcast in Amman by the High
Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel on May 25, 1923, Abdullah considered this assurance
to be a legal recognition of Transjordan’s independence and not merely that his government was
independent, regardless of the restrictions that existed under the Mandate. In confirmation of
Abdullah’s belief, this date was thereafter celebrated as the date of Jordan’s independence. May 25, is
also the day in 1946 that Transjordan formerly declared itself a sovereign and independent kingdom.
(see Uriel Dann, Studies in the History of Transjordan, 1920-1949, The Making of a State, Westview
Press, Boulder, Colorado, (1984), p. 6, 81, 104)
be permanent, but so did the new British Government and all subsequent governments. On a trip to
London, Abdullah was given an Assurance by Britain in October 1922 that it recognised the existence
of his independent government in Transjordan under Abdullah’s rule provided that such government
was constitutional. When this assurance was officially broadcast in Amman by the High
Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel on May 25, 1923, Abdullah considered this assurance
to be a legal recognition of Transjordan’s independence and not merely that his government was
independent, regardless of the restrictions that existed under the Mandate. In confirmation of
Abdullah’s belief, this date was thereafter celebrated as the date of Jordan’s independence. May 25, is
also the day in 1946 that Transjordan formerly declared itself a sovereign and independent kingdom.
(see Uriel Dann, Studies in the History of Transjordan, 1920-1949, The Making of a State, Westview
Press, Boulder, Colorado, (1984), p. 6, 81, 104)
It may be said in retrospect that Churchill undoubtedly knew that his contrived plan to deprive the
Jewish National Home of its easternmost territory across the Jordan would turn out to be not the
temporary measure he initially told the Lloyd George Government but rather a permanent and final
detachment. Indeed, just prior to the expiry of the six month period accorded Abdullah, he had already
decided to extend Abdullah’s stay in Transjordan indefinitely and to work out permanent
arrangements with him. (op. cit. p. 5) In this underhanded manner Churchill was able to set in motion
the eventual creation of Transjordan as an independent state in absolute violation of what the Mandate
for Palestine prescribed. By his deleterious act, Churchill was hardly the ardent Zionist he claimed to
be. His actions in the years 1921-1922 robbed the Jewish People of their legal right to Transjordan and created the bad precedent for the partition of Palestine. Churchill did a lot more harm to the Zionist
cause by re-interpreting the meaning of the term “Jewish National Home” as found in the Balfour
Declaration. When he issued a White Paper on June 3, 1922, he redefined the Jewish National Home
to be only a cultural or spiritual centre “in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds
of religion or race, an interest and a pride”. However, the Jews already had such a centre elsewhere in
Poland and the United States. It was the prospect of a Jewish State which excited the Jewish masses
then numbering about fourteen million. The Churchill White Paper precluded the establishment of a
Jewish State despite his later denial that this was not the case.
Jewish National Home of its easternmost territory across the Jordan would turn out to be not the
temporary measure he initially told the Lloyd George Government but rather a permanent and final
detachment. Indeed, just prior to the expiry of the six month period accorded Abdullah, he had already
decided to extend Abdullah’s stay in Transjordan indefinitely and to work out permanent
arrangements with him. (op. cit. p. 5) In this underhanded manner Churchill was able to set in motion
the eventual creation of Transjordan as an independent state in absolute violation of what the Mandate
for Palestine prescribed. By his deleterious act, Churchill was hardly the ardent Zionist he claimed to
be. His actions in the years 1921-1922 robbed the Jewish People of their legal right to Transjordan and created the bad precedent for the partition of Palestine. Churchill did a lot more harm to the Zionist
cause by re-interpreting the meaning of the term “Jewish National Home” as found in the Balfour
Declaration. When he issued a White Paper on June 3, 1922, he redefined the Jewish National Home
to be only a cultural or spiritual centre “in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds
of religion or race, an interest and a pride”. However, the Jews already had such a centre elsewhere in
Poland and the United States. It was the prospect of a Jewish State which excited the Jewish masses
then numbering about fourteen million. The Churchill White Paper precluded the establishment of a
Jewish State despite his later denial that this was not the case.
What was hypocritical, immoral or even fraudulent about Transjordan’s provisional detachment is that
during the year-long boundary negotiations with France in 1920 over their respective Mandated
territories, the British told the French negotiators that Transjordan was needed for the economic
development of the Jewish National Home which is why France could not obtain Transjordan. France
then considered Transjordan to be part of Syria and its claim to the territory was enhanced by the fact
that it was ruled by Emir Feisal during the interim period from October 1918 to July 1920 before the
Peace Conference was convened when he was the purported “King” of Syria before the French evicted
him from his so-called “throne”.
during the year-long boundary negotiations with France in 1920 over their respective Mandated
territories, the British told the French negotiators that Transjordan was needed for the economic
development of the Jewish National Home which is why France could not obtain Transjordan. France
then considered Transjordan to be part of Syria and its claim to the territory was enhanced by the fact
that it was ruled by Emir Feisal during the interim period from October 1918 to July 1920 before the
Peace Conference was convened when he was the purported “King” of Syria before the French evicted
him from his so-called “throne”.
Despite British assurances to France in 1920 that Transjordan was to be part of the Jewish National
Home, and contrary to his own article published in a British Sunday newspaper, the Illustrated Sunday
Herald on February 8, 1920 to the effect that he foresaw the creation in his lifetime of a Jewish State
“by the banks of the Jordan”, that clearly meant the inclusion of Transjordan in the Jewish State,
Churchill cut off Transjordan from the Jewish National Home in accordance with a newly inserted
provision in the Mandate for Palestine that he deviously and illegally placed in the text in August 1921
several months after the end of the Cairo Conference, namely Article 25. As I pointed out to you
previously and as stated above, the withdrawal of Transjordan from the Jewish National Home was
only provisional rather than permanent that was to last, according to the said Article 25, until the
“existing local conditions” were improved. This period of temporary severance should not have lasted
for longer than seven years at the maximum, as Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen who worked in
Churchill’s Colonial Office as military adviser told him at a heated meeting the two had in his office
on June 21, 1921.
Home, and contrary to his own article published in a British Sunday newspaper, the Illustrated Sunday
Herald on February 8, 1920 to the effect that he foresaw the creation in his lifetime of a Jewish State
“by the banks of the Jordan”, that clearly meant the inclusion of Transjordan in the Jewish State,
Churchill cut off Transjordan from the Jewish National Home in accordance with a newly inserted
provision in the Mandate for Palestine that he deviously and illegally placed in the text in August 1921
several months after the end of the Cairo Conference, namely Article 25. As I pointed out to you
previously and as stated above, the withdrawal of Transjordan from the Jewish National Home was
only provisional rather than permanent that was to last, according to the said Article 25, until the
“existing local conditions” were improved. This period of temporary severance should not have lasted
for longer than seven years at the maximum, as Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen who worked in
Churchill’s Colonial Office as military adviser told him at a heated meeting the two had in his office
on June 21, 1921.
Upon hearing the news that Churchill had severed Transjordan from the Jewish National Home,
Meinertzhagen “foaming at the mouth with anger and indignation” went straight to see the Colonial
Secretary. In his diary, Meinertzhagen recounted what he told Churchill to his face:
Meinertzhagen “foaming at the mouth with anger and indignation” went straight to see the Colonial
Secretary. In his diary, Meinertzhagen recounted what he told Churchill to his face:
"… It was grossly unfair to the Jews, that it was yet another promise broken and that it was a
most dishonest act, that the Balfour Declaration was being torn up by degrees and that the
official policy of His Majesty’s Government to establish a Home for the Jews in Biblical
Palestine was being sabotaged. (See Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen’s book, Middle East
Diary: 1917-1956, published by Thomas Yoseloff, New York, (1960), p. 100)"
most dishonest act, that the Balfour Declaration was being torn up by degrees and that the
official policy of His Majesty’s Government to establish a Home for the Jews in Biblical
Palestine was being sabotaged. (See Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen’s book, Middle East
Diary: 1917-1956, published by Thomas Yoseloff, New York, (1960), p. 100)"
Meinertzhagen continued that Abdullah’s rule in Transjordan ought to be of a temporary nature, “say
for seven years and a guarantee given that Abdullah should never be given sovereign powers over
what was in fact Jewish territory”. Churchill reacted by telling Meinertzhagen that “he saw the force
of my argument and would consider the question”. However, he thought that it was too late to alter the
situation, “but a time limit to Abdullah’s rule might work”. In the event, no time limit was ever placed
on Abdullah’s rule and what was to be only a temporary measure, lasted almost the entire period of the
Mandate, which must be deemed an illegal act under Article 25 for which Britain as Mandatory has
never been held legally accountable to this very day. It should be noted that both Meinertzhagen and
Churchill mistakenly referred to Abdullah’s “emirate” in Transjordan, which under the Mandate never
existed.
for seven years and a guarantee given that Abdullah should never be given sovereign powers over
what was in fact Jewish territory”. Churchill reacted by telling Meinertzhagen that “he saw the force
of my argument and would consider the question”. However, he thought that it was too late to alter the
situation, “but a time limit to Abdullah’s rule might work”. In the event, no time limit was ever placed
on Abdullah’s rule and what was to be only a temporary measure, lasted almost the entire period of the
Mandate, which must be deemed an illegal act under Article 25 for which Britain as Mandatory has
never been held legally accountable to this very day. It should be noted that both Meinertzhagen and
Churchill mistakenly referred to Abdullah’s “emirate” in Transjordan, which under the Mandate never
existed.
In my considered legal opinion, the State of Israel still has dormant legal rights to Transjordan which
however cannot be exercised, unless Jordan as a state disintegrates which would allow Israel to
reclaim the historical Jewish territories of Gilead, part of Bashan (formerly Turkish Hauran) and the
conquered kingdoms of Moab and Edom, all of which were included in the Israelite Kingdoms of
David and Solomon (c.990-928 BCE).
however cannot be exercised, unless Jordan as a state disintegrates which would allow Israel to
reclaim the historical Jewish territories of Gilead, part of Bashan (formerly Turkish Hauran) and the
conquered kingdoms of Moab and Edom, all of which were included in the Israelite Kingdoms of
David and Solomon (c.990-928 BCE).
While you are right in saying that the huge desert area of Transjordan abutting Iraq, Saudi Arabia and
Syria never had a historical connection with the Jewish People, may I also tell you that neither was
there any Arab historical connection to the same desert area that comprises most of Jordan today. This
desert was simply uninhabitable but was still part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I.
What was important in British eyes was that Transjordan’s extension into the desert expanses
prevented French-ruled Syria from being contiguous to the Arabian Peninsula that was under British
protection or influence. For the Zionists the fertile areas of Transjordan would have served as the
economic bread-basket of Cisjordan. It was this latter consideration that motivated Chaim Weizmann
to tell Churchill in a letter sent to him in March 1921, that it was needed for the Jewish National Home
and that he should not deprive Palestine of this productive agricultural land that Weizmann said was
essential for the success of the Jewish National Home. Moreover, Transjordan with its desert expanses
provided greater security and was thus of strategic importance in deterring foreign attacks or
invasions. Indeed Weizmann never gave up hope for Transjordan’s re-attachment to the Jewish
National Home though, ironically, he was the one who convinced the Zionist Executive to approve
Churchill’s plan of dividing Palestine into two parts with separate administrations for each part. As
late as 1943 Weizmann was told by Clement Attlee, then serving as the Deputy Prime Minister and
Leader of the Labour Party, at a luncheon with Churchill at Chequers, that “something should be done
about allowing the Jews to settle in Transjordan” after the war. For his part, Churchill thought that
Attlee’s idea was a good one and even suggested that Transjordan might be part of a future Jewish
State (see the book by Sir Martin Gilbert, Churchill & The Jews, Simon & Schuster, UK Ltd., Pocket
Books, London, (2008), p.204,205). This was quite a change from what Churchill had done in 1921-22
to emasculate the future Jewish State but his proposal came too late to change the situation.
Syria never had a historical connection with the Jewish People, may I also tell you that neither was
there any Arab historical connection to the same desert area that comprises most of Jordan today. This
desert was simply uninhabitable but was still part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I.
What was important in British eyes was that Transjordan’s extension into the desert expanses
prevented French-ruled Syria from being contiguous to the Arabian Peninsula that was under British
protection or influence. For the Zionists the fertile areas of Transjordan would have served as the
economic bread-basket of Cisjordan. It was this latter consideration that motivated Chaim Weizmann
to tell Churchill in a letter sent to him in March 1921, that it was needed for the Jewish National Home
and that he should not deprive Palestine of this productive agricultural land that Weizmann said was
essential for the success of the Jewish National Home. Moreover, Transjordan with its desert expanses
provided greater security and was thus of strategic importance in deterring foreign attacks or
invasions. Indeed Weizmann never gave up hope for Transjordan’s re-attachment to the Jewish
National Home though, ironically, he was the one who convinced the Zionist Executive to approve
Churchill’s plan of dividing Palestine into two parts with separate administrations for each part. As
late as 1943 Weizmann was told by Clement Attlee, then serving as the Deputy Prime Minister and
Leader of the Labour Party, at a luncheon with Churchill at Chequers, that “something should be done
about allowing the Jews to settle in Transjordan” after the war. For his part, Churchill thought that
Attlee’s idea was a good one and even suggested that Transjordan might be part of a future Jewish
State (see the book by Sir Martin Gilbert, Churchill & The Jews, Simon & Schuster, UK Ltd., Pocket
Books, London, (2008), p.204,205). This was quite a change from what Churchill had done in 1921-22
to emasculate the future Jewish State but his proposal came too late to change the situation.
One final point should be stressed. The British had no right to be in Transjordan at all nor to extend its
frontiers into the desert as it subsequently did, except for the exclusive purpose of establishing the
Jewish National Home and future independent Jewish State. This point is one of supreme importance.
It is worth reiterating that, as a matter of Mandate law, anything the British did in Transjordan was
theoretically supposed to be in furtherance of the Jewish National Home, which was the only reason
that it was legally entitled to be in Transjordan. However, the British acted as if it was not bound by
any such obligation. This was a blatant violation of the right it enjoyed to govern Transjordan. In
acting as it did, Britain, as the Mandatory Power, injured the integrity of the Jewish National Home
comprising both Transjordan and Cisjordan, contrary to the Mandate it had received from the Principal
Allied Powers in conformity with the San Remo Resolution. There was only one mandate issued for
the entire territory of Cisjordan and Transjordan and that was the Mandate for Palestine. There was
never any mandate for Transjordan as some have erroneously stated. The British violated the “sacred
trust” it was given to preserve intact all of Palestine on both sides of the Jordan by creating the illegal
state of Transjordan in 1946 contrary to both Articles 5 and 25 of the Mandate for Palestine.
frontiers into the desert as it subsequently did, except for the exclusive purpose of establishing the
Jewish National Home and future independent Jewish State. This point is one of supreme importance.
It is worth reiterating that, as a matter of Mandate law, anything the British did in Transjordan was
theoretically supposed to be in furtherance of the Jewish National Home, which was the only reason
that it was legally entitled to be in Transjordan. However, the British acted as if it was not bound by
any such obligation. This was a blatant violation of the right it enjoyed to govern Transjordan. In
acting as it did, Britain, as the Mandatory Power, injured the integrity of the Jewish National Home
comprising both Transjordan and Cisjordan, contrary to the Mandate it had received from the Principal
Allied Powers in conformity with the San Remo Resolution. There was only one mandate issued for
the entire territory of Cisjordan and Transjordan and that was the Mandate for Palestine. There was
never any mandate for Transjordan as some have erroneously stated. The British violated the “sacred
trust” it was given to preserve intact all of Palestine on both sides of the Jordan by creating the illegal
state of Transjordan in 1946 contrary to both Articles 5 and 25 of the Mandate for Palestine.
In light of the continuing and ill-tempered British criticism of Israel nowadays for building settlements
in Judea and Samaria we should never stop reminding the British of their illegal partition of Palestine
which deprived the Jewish People of its rightful patrimony that was a clear violation of international
law. They have no right to tell Israel it is violating international law in building these settlements when
they committed the largest theft of Jewish land in removing Transjordan from our Homeland and
creating there a fictitious “kingdom” for the Hashemite family hailing from the Hedjaz in Western
Arabia. A proud Israeli Government should not hesitate to remind Britain of its sabotage of the
Mandate in partitioning the Jewish National Home and demand an appropriate apology for all the
damage this caused to the Jewish People on pain of legal proceedings.
in Judea and Samaria we should never stop reminding the British of their illegal partition of Palestine
which deprived the Jewish People of its rightful patrimony that was a clear violation of international
law. They have no right to tell Israel it is violating international law in building these settlements when
they committed the largest theft of Jewish land in removing Transjordan from our Homeland and
creating there a fictitious “kingdom” for the Hashemite family hailing from the Hedjaz in Western
Arabia. A proud Israeli Government should not hesitate to remind Britain of its sabotage of the
Mandate in partitioning the Jewish National Home and demand an appropriate apology for all the
damage this caused to the Jewish People on pain of legal proceedings.
It should be recalled that Transjordan could have taken in and absorbed millions of Europe’s Jews
fleeing Hitler’s inferno had Britain approved the proposal made to this effect by the U.S. Senator from
Delaware, Daniel O, Hastings, in a series of six articles that appeared in the New York American
newspaper in 1936. Senator Hastings was a member of the Hearst Unofficial Senatorial Commission,
sent to Palestine in summer of 1936 by the Hearst newspaper chain to parallel the inquiry of the
Palestine Royal Commission established in the same year. In its steadfast policy to keep Transjordan
Jüdenrein, Britain rejected any plan to settle Jews there which, had it done so, would have made it a
flourishing part of the Jewish National Home as well as saving the lives of countless European Jews who were seeking a refuge to escape the horrors of the Holocaust. The Hastings plan of mass Jewish
settlement in Transjordan therefore never got off the ground. Britain had earlier scuttled a similar but
less ambitious plan originally proposed by Emir Abdullah when he approached two members of the
Jewish Agency Executive in 1933, Joshua Heshel Farbstein and Emanuel Newman to provide a loan
for the general development of Transjordan, which at the same time would have opened it up to Jewish
settlement.
fleeing Hitler’s inferno had Britain approved the proposal made to this effect by the U.S. Senator from
Delaware, Daniel O, Hastings, in a series of six articles that appeared in the New York American
newspaper in 1936. Senator Hastings was a member of the Hearst Unofficial Senatorial Commission,
sent to Palestine in summer of 1936 by the Hearst newspaper chain to parallel the inquiry of the
Palestine Royal Commission established in the same year. In its steadfast policy to keep Transjordan
Jüdenrein, Britain rejected any plan to settle Jews there which, had it done so, would have made it a
flourishing part of the Jewish National Home as well as saving the lives of countless European Jews who were seeking a refuge to escape the horrors of the Holocaust. The Hastings plan of mass Jewish
settlement in Transjordan therefore never got off the ground. Britain had earlier scuttled a similar but
less ambitious plan originally proposed by Emir Abdullah when he approached two members of the
Jewish Agency Executive in 1933, Joshua Heshel Farbstein and Emanuel Newman to provide a loan
for the general development of Transjordan, which at the same time would have opened it up to Jewish
settlement.
Though the British representative to the Permanent Mandates Commission, Mark Young, who was
also the Chief Secretary of the Government of Palestine, admitted to the Commission at its 23rd
Session in 1933 that “it was true that there was nothing in the Mandate which prohibited the Jewish
colonisation of Transjordan”, nevertheless the British Government concluded that on the grounds of
local feeling and for reasons of security, “it was not practical to facilitate such colonisation”. However,
both reasons offered by Young were demonstrably false since Jewish settlement in Cisjordan never
depended on “local feeling” nor should it have been relevant in Transjordan. As far as security was
concerned, that was provided by the Jews themselves as was the case in Cisjordan. The real reason for
Britain not allowing Jews to settle in Transjordan was to keep it free from any attachment to the
Jewish National Home so that Transjordan would remain exclusively under British rule and serve in
the future as a military base to further its imperial goals.
also the Chief Secretary of the Government of Palestine, admitted to the Commission at its 23rd
Session in 1933 that “it was true that there was nothing in the Mandate which prohibited the Jewish
colonisation of Transjordan”, nevertheless the British Government concluded that on the grounds of
local feeling and for reasons of security, “it was not practical to facilitate such colonisation”. However,
both reasons offered by Young were demonstrably false since Jewish settlement in Cisjordan never
depended on “local feeling” nor should it have been relevant in Transjordan. As far as security was
concerned, that was provided by the Jews themselves as was the case in Cisjordan. The real reason for
Britain not allowing Jews to settle in Transjordan was to keep it free from any attachment to the
Jewish National Home so that Transjordan would remain exclusively under British rule and serve in
the future as a military base to further its imperial goals.
It should be remembered that at that time the Jews of Palestine and the Zionist Organisation were
powerless to force Britain to open up Transjordan to Jewish settlement and to also serve as a refuge for
European Jews during the Hitler years. Despite this lack of power, the Jewish Agency, acting on
behalf of the Jewish community of Palestine, could have submitted a Petition to the Council of the
League of Nations as it had the right to do under Article 85 of the Palestine Order-in-Council of 1922,
to complain that the terms of the Mandate were not being fulfilled by the Government of Palestine and
to ask that it require the Mandatory to permit Jewish settlement in Transjordan, since the indefinite
exclusion of Jews from settling there was illegal under the Mandate. In the first instance it was illegal
under Article 15 which prohibited discrimination between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of
race, religion or language and further stated that “no person shall be excluded from Palestine on the
sole ground of his religious beliefs”. Secondly, it contravened Article 25, since this provision of the
Mandate never permitted the permanent exclusion of Jews from settling in Transjordan as noted above
not only by the literal reading of the Article itself which spoke only of a “postponement” that by
definition is never permanent as is also the phrase to “withhold application” as corroborated by the
British Representative, Mark Young, when he appeared before the Permanent Mandates Commission,
as well as by the official French translation of the text of Article 25.
powerless to force Britain to open up Transjordan to Jewish settlement and to also serve as a refuge for
European Jews during the Hitler years. Despite this lack of power, the Jewish Agency, acting on
behalf of the Jewish community of Palestine, could have submitted a Petition to the Council of the
League of Nations as it had the right to do under Article 85 of the Palestine Order-in-Council of 1922,
to complain that the terms of the Mandate were not being fulfilled by the Government of Palestine and
to ask that it require the Mandatory to permit Jewish settlement in Transjordan, since the indefinite
exclusion of Jews from settling there was illegal under the Mandate. In the first instance it was illegal
under Article 15 which prohibited discrimination between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of
race, religion or language and further stated that “no person shall be excluded from Palestine on the
sole ground of his religious beliefs”. Secondly, it contravened Article 25, since this provision of the
Mandate never permitted the permanent exclusion of Jews from settling in Transjordan as noted above
not only by the literal reading of the Article itself which spoke only of a “postponement” that by
definition is never permanent as is also the phrase to “withhold application” as corroborated by the
British Representative, Mark Young, when he appeared before the Permanent Mandates Commission,
as well as by the official French translation of the text of Article 25.
In addition the Jewish Agency could have asked a sympathetic foreign government to institute a
lawsuit in the Permanent Court of International Justice protesting this British policy. But in fact
nothing of this nature was done. Thus the ban on Jewish settlement in Transjordan persisted beyond
normal limits contrary to the application of Article 25 which only disallowed Jewish settlement for a
relatively brief period that was certainly not longer than seven years as Colonel Meinertzhagen had
told Churchill. He was right because Article 25 was never a permanent bar to exclude Jews from
settling in Transjordan. This area was lost to the Jewish People by illegal and deceptive means
contrived by Churchill and his advisers. Once the ban on Jewish settlement was put in place, it was
never changed thereafter. In effect, Britain gave away without the legal right to do so, what was
supposed to be an integral part of the Jewish National Home to a foreign Arab state which it created in
blatant violation of the terms of the Mandate for Palestine. It is not inconceivable nor beyond reason to
say that the Jewish State has a legitimate right and interest to reclaim at least the historical parts of its
lost patrimony, specifically Gilead and Bashan, in the event of the demise of the Hashemite polity.
lawsuit in the Permanent Court of International Justice protesting this British policy. But in fact
nothing of this nature was done. Thus the ban on Jewish settlement in Transjordan persisted beyond
normal limits contrary to the application of Article 25 which only disallowed Jewish settlement for a
relatively brief period that was certainly not longer than seven years as Colonel Meinertzhagen had
told Churchill. He was right because Article 25 was never a permanent bar to exclude Jews from
settling in Transjordan. This area was lost to the Jewish People by illegal and deceptive means
contrived by Churchill and his advisers. Once the ban on Jewish settlement was put in place, it was
never changed thereafter. In effect, Britain gave away without the legal right to do so, what was
supposed to be an integral part of the Jewish National Home to a foreign Arab state which it created in
blatant violation of the terms of the Mandate for Palestine. It is not inconceivable nor beyond reason to
say that the Jewish State has a legitimate right and interest to reclaim at least the historical parts of its
lost patrimony, specifically Gilead and Bashan, in the event of the demise of the Hashemite polity.
Please note that I am only discussing the subject of Transjordan again because you raised it in your
letter and I thought that it was important to give you my expert legal opinion.
letter and I thought that it was important to give you my expert legal opinion.
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