Arab Unity: Miscellaneous
Projects
International Affairs: Arab Unity
Memorandum Presented to the King-Crane
Commission by the General Syrian Congress
July 2, 1919 (i)
We the undersigned members of the General Syrian Congress, meeting
in Damascus on Wednesday, July 2nd, 1919, made up of representatives from
the three Zones, viz., the Southern, Eastern, and Western, provided with
credentials and authorizations by the inhabitants of our various districts,
Moslems, Christians, and Jews, have agreed upon the following statement
of the desires of the people of the country who have elected us to present
them to the American Section of the International Commission; the fifth
article was passed by a very large majority; all the other articles were accepted
unanimously.
1. We ask absolutely complete political independence for Syria within these
boundaries : the Taurus System on the North; Rafah and a line running
from Al Jauf to the south of the Syrian and the Hejazian line to Akaba on the
south; the Euphrates and Khabur Rivers and a line extending east of Abu
Kamal to the east of Al Jauf on the east; and the Mediterranean on the west.
2. We ask that the Government of this Syrian country should be a democratic
civil constitutional Monarchy on broad decentralization principles, safeguard-
ing the rights of minorities, and that the King be the Emir Feisal, who carried
on a glorious struggle in the cause of our liberation and merited our full
confidence and entire reliance.
3. Considering the fact that the Arabs inhabiting the Syrian area are not
naturally less gifted than other more advanced races and that they are by no
means less developed than the Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks, and Roumanians
at the beginning of their independence, we protest against Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, placing us among the nations in their
middle stage of development which stand in need of a mandatory power.
4. In the event of the rejection by the Peace Conference of this just protest
for certain considerations that we may not understand, we, relying on the
declarations of President Wilson that his object in waging war was to put an
end to the ambition of conquest and colonization, can only regard the mandate
mentioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations as equivalent to the
rendering of economical and technical assistance that does not prejudice our
complete independence. And desiring that our country should not fall a prey
to colonization is farthest from any thought of colonization and has no poli-
tical ambition in our country, we will seek the technical and economical
assistance from the United States of America, provided that such assistance
does not exceed 20 years.
5. In the event of America not finding herself in a position to accept our
desire for assistance, we will seek this assistance from Great Britain, also pro-
vided that such assistance does not infringe the complete independence and
unity of our country and that the duration of such assistance does not exceed
that mentioned in the previous article.
(i) The text is copied from Foreign Relations of the United States: Paris Peace Con-
ference, 1919, vol. I2 y pp. 780-781.
The Arab States and The Arab League
6. We do not acknowledge any right claimed by the French Government in
any part whatever of our Syrian country and refuse that she should assist us
or have a hand in our country under any circumstances and in any place.
7. We oppose the pretensions of the Zionists to create a Jewish common-
wealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, and oppose Zionist
migration to any part of our country; for we do not acknowledge their title
but consider them a grave peril to our people from the national, economical,
and political points of view. Our Jewish compatriots shall enjoy our common
rights and assume the common responsibilities.
8. We ask that there should be no separation of the southern part of Syria,
known as Palestine, nor of the littoral western zone, which includes Lebanon,
from the Syrian country. We desire that the unity of the country should be
guaranteed against partition under whatever circumstances.
9. We ask complete independence for emancipated Mesopotamia and that
there should be no economical barriers between the two countries.
10. The fundamental principles laid down by President Wilson in condem-
nation of secret treaties impel us to protest most emphatically against any
treaty that stipulates the partition of our Syrian country and against any
private engagement aiming at the establishment of Zionism in the southern
part of Syria; therefore we ask the complete annulment of these conventions
and agreements.
The noble principles enunciated by President Wilson strengthen our
confidence that our desires emanating from the depths of our hearts, shaJl be
the decisive factor in determining our future; and that President Wilson and
the free American people will be our supporters for the realization of our hopes
thereby proving their sincerity and noble sympathy with the aspiration of
the weaker nations in general and our Arab people in particular.
We also have the fullest confidence that the Peace Conference will realize
that we would not have risen against the Turks, with whom we had par-
ticipated in all civil, political, and representative privileges, but for their
violation of our national rights, and so will grant us our desires in full in order
that our political rights may not be less after the war than they were before,
since we have shed so much blood in the cause of our liberty and independence.
We request to be allowed to send a delegation to represent us at the Peace
Conference to defend our rights and secure the realization of our aspirations.
2 Resolution Adopted by the General Syrian Congress
Damascus , March 7, 1920 (i)
The General Syrian Congress, which is fully representative of the Syrian people
in their three territories, namely, the interior, the coastal region, and the southern
(i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordan-
ian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947)* pp. 6-9. Attention is drawn to the fact
that this Resolution will be frequently referred to in some of the Jordanian Government's
documents reproduced in this volume as the "National Syrian Covenant". The reader
should also note that the name "Syria", as used in this document, and also in some of the
Jordanian documents dealing with the question of Syrian unity (reproduced in this
volume) , is meant to include Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine, in addition to "Syria"
as it existed between 1922 and 1958. ED.
International Affairs: Arab Unity
region - Palestine, adopts the following resolution at its plenary session held on
Sunday, Jamadi ath-Thani 16, 1338 A.H., and in the evening of the following Mon-
day 3 corresponding to March 7, 1920 (A. D.):
The political societies and parties of the Arab nation, with its ancient glory and
flourishing civilization, did not, during the Turkish period, take up the political
struggle and shed the blood of its freedom-loving martyrs in revolt against the Turk-
ish Government, save in order to seek complete independence and a life of freedom.
This (the Arab nation did) as a nation with an independent existence and with a
nationalism of its own, with the right to govern itself, like other peoples whose civili-
zation and progress are not in advance of its own.
(The Arab nation) took part in the World War on the side of the Allies, relying on
the general and specific promises which they had openly declared in their official
councils and through their political leaders and heads of governments, and especially
their specific pledges to His Majesty, King Husayn, concerning the independence of
the Arab countries.
(The Arab nation took part in the War) also on the strength of President Wilson's
open declaration of the noble principles calling for the freedom and the independence
of peoples, large and small, on a footing of equality in rights, the ending of the policy
of conquest and colonization, the abolition of secret treaties which are prejudicial to
the rights of nations, and the granting of the right of self-determination to the libera-
ted peoples. (All) this was officially approved by the Allies, as (is evidenced) by the
statements of M. Briand, the French Prime Minister, before the (French) Chamber
of Deputies on November 3, 1916; by (the statement) of Lord Grey, the Foreign
Secretary of Great Britain, before the Foreign Affairs Committee on November 23,
1916 ; by the declaration of the Allies in their reply to the Memorandum of the Central
Powers, submitted by M. Briand through the American Ambassador in Paris ; by the
Allies' reply of January 10, 1917, to the Memorandum of President Wilson; by the
statement of the French Chamber of Deputies on July 5, 1917; by the statement of
the (French) Senate on the 6th of the same month ; and by the speech delivered by
Mr. Lloyd George in Glasgow on (July) 29, 1917.
The exploits of His Majesty King Husayn on the side of the Allies were the major
incentive to liberate the Arab nation and save it from the yoke of Turkish rule; these
(exploits) have immortalized for His Majesty the best and finest repute in Arab history.
His noble sons and the Arab nation fought most courageously on the side of the
Allies for three years in the course of which they fought a regular war for which they
received credit, as attested by the prominent political and military leaders of the Allies
themselves and of the rest of the civilized world.
A great number of the sons of the (Arab) nation who joined the Arab movement
from the (various) parts of Syria, the Hijaz and Iraq sacrificed their lives. (This was)
in addition to the actions carried out in particular by the Syrians in their country -
actions which facilitated the victory of the Allies and the Arabs in spite of the persecu-
tions, tortures, slaughter and exile which (the Syrians) had suffered. These actions
greatly contributed to the defeat of the Turks, their evacuation of Syria, and the
brilliant victory of the Allies' cause. (The victory) realized the hopes of the Arabs in
general and (those) of the Syrians among them in particular. They thus hoisted the
Arab flags and established national governments in the (various) parts of the country
before the entry of the Allies into it.
The Arab States and The Arab League
When military arrangements necessitated that Syria (i) be divided into three
zones, the Allies officially declared that they had no ambitions over Syria, and that, in
pursuing war in the (Middle) East, they aimed at nothing but the final liberation of
peoples from Turkish rule. They also asserted that the division (of the country) into
zones was only a temporary military measure which had no effect on the future of the
country, its independence or unity. They then officially decided (to embody this as)
Article 22, clause i, of the Peace Treaty with Germany, whereby they recognized our
independence in confirmation of their promise to grant the right of self-determination
to peoples. Later they sent the American Commission (2) in order to learn the wishes
of the people, which wishes were made manifest in the demand for independence and
complete Syrian unity. Nearly one year and a half has (now) elapsed and the country
is still subjected to military occupation and division which have caused it great losses,
hampered its business and its economic and administrative interests, and caused its
sons to harbour misgivings about its future. The people have thus been prompted, in
many territories, to start national uprisings, protesting against foreign military rule
and demanding the independence and the unity of their country.
Therefore, we, members of this Congress, in our capacity as representatives
of the Syrian people throughout the whole of Syria, speaking in the name of the
Syrian nation and openly expressing its wishes, have found it necessary to find a way
out of this critical situation. (This we have decided to do) relying on our natural and
legitimate right to a life of freedom; on the blood shed by our martyrs; on our long
struggle for this sacred aim; on the promises, pledges and noble principles previously
referred to ; and on what was and still is being daily witnessed by us of the nation's
firm determination to demand its rights and unity and to attain these by all means.
We therefore unanimously declare the following:
(1) The complete and unblemished independence of our Syrian country in its
natural boundaries - including Palestine - on the basis of a civil representa-
tive (system of government);
(2) The safeguarding of the rights of the (non-Arab) minority;
(3) The repudiation of the Jewish allegations (purporting) to make Palestine a
national home for the Jews or a place to which they would migrate;
(4) We have chosen His Highness Amir Fay sal, the son of His Majesty King
Husayn, who has pursued his struggle for the liberation of the country and
made the nation find in him its great leader, as the constitutional King of Syria
under the title of cc His Majesty King Faysal the First";
(5) We have declared the end of the present governments of military occupation in
the three regions, provided that there should be established in their stead a
monarchy with a representative government which shall be responsible to
this Council^) in all matters concerning the principle of complete independ-
ence of the country until the government shall be able to convene its parlia-
ment;
(6) It remains understood that these districts (4) shall be governed according to
the system of decentralized administration, with due regard to the national
(1) The Arabic term used here is cc al-Bilad as-Suriyya ", literally meaning the "Syrian
homeland". ED.
(2) Presumably referring here to the King-Crane Commission. ED.
(3) Presumably meaning the Syrian General Congress itself. ED.
(4) The Arabic term used here is "al-Muqata'at". ED.
International Affairs: Arab Unity
aspirations of the Lebanese regarding the administration of the districts of
Lebanon within the boundaries known before the general (World) War and on
condition that (Lebanon) shall remain beyond any foreign influence.
In view of (the fact) that the Arab Revolt was started in order to liberate the
Arab people from the rule of the Turks , and since the reasons which serve as
bases for the independence of Syria are the same as those which serve as bases
for the independence of Iraq, and as there exist between the two countries
such linguistic, historical, economic, geographical and racial bonds as to render
each of the two countries indispensable to the other.
We therefore demand the complete independence of Iraq, provided that
there shall be formed a political and economic federation between the two
sister countries.
(Finally), we (declare), in the name of the Syrian nation that has designated
us to act for it, that we will maintain our friendly (relations) with the noble
Allies and fully respect their interests as well as those of the other States. We
have full confidence that the noble Allies as well as all the other civilized States
will meet our present action, which is based on (our) legitimate and natural
right to live, with the noble purpose and honourable intentions we are wont to
find in them, and that they will recognize this independence. (We also trust)
that they will withdraw their forces from the Arab and southern territories,
so that the national soldiers and the national administration may maintain
order and administer (the country), maintaining at the same time reciprocal
(friendship with the Allies). In this way, the Syrian Arab nation will reach a
high degree of progress and become an active member of the civilized world.
The Syrian Government which will be formed on the (above) basis shall put
this resolution into effect.
Statement by the Arab National Congress, Jerusalem
December 13, 1931 (i)
All those who have taken part in, or followed the course of, the various phases of
the Arab movement realize what noble efforts have for long been exerted by the
Arab leaders, thinkers and young men, particularly after the promulgation of the
Ottoman Constitution, in order to reconstruct a general Arab cause aiming at the
realization of an independent Arab entity that comprises the various Arab countries,
and to achieve for the Arab nation the independence enjoyed by all free nations of
the world. The political struggle of the Arabs had a sacred objective, the effects of
which were reflected in the activities of the societies and clubs, and the congresses
which they used to hold. Then came the great Arab Revolt during which the Arabs
were promised the achievement of their noble purpose. For this sacred cause of
independence the Arabs, during the Great World War, gave (much) precious blood
and (made many) costly sacrifices.
( i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in M. 'Izzat
Darwaza: Hawl al-Haraka al-'Arabiyya al-Haditha (Concerning the Modern
Arab Movement)) vol. 3 (Sidon, Lebanon, )jp5/, pp. 301-303.
The Arab States and The Arab League
However, as soon as the War was over, the Arabs began to encounter, on the
part of the colonial ambitions of states, denial of their rights and of their struggle,
as well as ingratitude for their sacrifices. They beheld their (erstwhile) allies viciously
placing obstacles in their way to independence. The outcome of this was that the
Allies openly came out with their plots, when before they had secretly engineered
them in order to dismember the Arab homeland and to stab the Arab cause, itself
one of the greatest national causes in the world, representing one of the greatest
nations on earth, (famous for its) glories, civilization and history - a nation comprising
today no less than 70 million people and situated in the world's most favoured regions
of Asia and Africa.
One of the features of this infamous plot, and also one of the means of ensuring
its success, was the separation of the inhabitants of each Arab country from their
brethren in the others by (encouraging their preoccupation) with artificial regional is-
sues, diminutive local problems and diverse tribulations. (The aim of this) was to
limit the scope of (Arab) efforts and prevent these efforts from extending to wider
horizons, to a level at which the (various) Arab problems could converge in a closely
knit and integrated form, in line with the natural course of the renascence of nations
and the progress of peoples.
These contrived preoccupations consumed the time of the citizens of each
country. In fact, every faction amongst the Arabs was immersed in them ; so much so
that the imperialists almost achieved the object of their conspiracies, that of making
the Arabs divided and without a great cause. (But the Arabs have a cause) for which
their leaders and their societies have worked and for which (they have made) sacrifices
and lost martyrs. The primary object of (this cause) is to achieve the unity and inde-
pendence of the Arabs, and so revive their ancient prosperous civilization, a civili-
zation whose constructive accomplishment is well known in history and to which the
world succumbed, and which filled the whole universe with knowledge, prosperity
and enlightenment.
This is what led some Arab leaders, well known for their contributions to the
Arab movement, to invite a number of the representatives of the Arab countries, who
had attended the General Islamic Conference held in Jerusalem, to a conference which
they held on Monday evening, Sha'ban 4, 1350 A.H., corresponding to January 13,
1931-
They discussed what should be done to guard against the imperialistic catast-
rophes which had befallen their countries and the local problems with which the im-
perialists had flooded them.
They adopted the following points as a sacred covenant, which shall be the
objective of the Arabs, in their various countries, and the target and goal of their
efforts, as well as the torch by (whose light) they will resume their struggle for
(their) cherished independence. They will follow the principles of (this covenant) so
that God may help them attain (their) objective and fully realize their wishes. The
text of the covenant is as follows:
Article i. The Arab countries constitute an indivisible unit; the (Arab) nation
does not acquiesce in any sense to the fragmentation which it has been undergoing.
Article 2. The efforts of all the Arab countries shall be directed towards one
objective, namely their complete independence and unity, and the combatting of every
idea which aims at restricting (Arab) efforts to local and provincial policies.
Article 3. As imperialism, in all its forms and types, is diametrically opposed to
the dignity and great objective of the Arab nation, the Arab nation will reject it and
resist it with all its might.
International Affairs: Arab Unity
The conference has also considered it necessary to convene a general Arab
conference, (to be held) in one of the Arab capitals, for the purpose of discussing the
means of publicizing and maintaining the covenant, as well as the course that should
be followed for its fulfilment.
We, the undersigned, have been deputed (to act) as an executive committee for
publicizing this covenant in the Arab world, and for making preparations, for the
conference, as well as to act as a liaison for correspondence between the various Arab
countries on matters relating to this task.
We have started this task, with the assistance of God Almighty, motivated by
that living and generous spirit which manifested itself at (our recent) important meet-
ing, and which appears time and again in the (various Arab) countries. This spirit
has ever strongly and violently protested against the imperialist despotism, which has
oppressed and exhausted the Arabs, torn down their solidarity by artificially - created
local problems, and obstructed their progressive efforts towards the attainment of
success for (the Arab) cause in accordance with this covenant.
May God give support to our purpose.
Signed by : 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, Khayr ad-Din az-Zirikli, Subhi al-Khadra,
'Ajaj Nuwayhid, As'ad Daghir, 'Izzat Darwaza - as members of the Executive
Committee of the Congress.
It has also been signed by : Rashid Rida, Muhammad Bahjat al-Athari, Ibrahim
al-Wa'iz, Khayr ad-Din az-Zirikli, Subhi al-Khadra, Ibrahim al-Khatib, 'Ali 'Ubayd,
Muhammad Ishaq Darwish, 'AH Nasir ad-Din, Salah 'Uthman Bayhum, Muhammad
al-'Afifi, Riyad as-Sulh, Shukri al-Quwwatly, Raghib Abu as-Sa J ud ad-Dajani,
Ahmad Hilmi, Salim al-Hindawi 'Izzat Darwaza, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, Muhammad
Tahir al-Juqqa, 'Umar at-Tibi, Muhammad 'Ali Bayhum, Mu'in al-Madi, Nabih al-
'Azma, Salih al-'Awran, Mustafa al-Ghalayini, Husayn at-Tarawna, Ahmad al-Imam,
Muhammad 'Ali at-Tahir, 'Awni al-Ka'ki, 'Ajaj Nuwayhid, 'Abdullah ad-Dawud,
Muhammad Tariq, Khalil at-Talhuni, Sami as-Sarraj, Muhammad Bannuna, Sa'id
Thabit, Bashir as-Sa'dawi, Sulayman as-Sudi, Muhammad Husayn ad-Dabbagh al-
Makki, Kamil ad-Dajani.
Nuri As-Sa'id's Fertile Crescent Project A
1943 (i) T"
The following proposals of mine are based on the close and firm ties between
Iraq and all the Arabs inhabiting historical Syria. The States of the Arabian Peninsula
(/) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text which forms part of the
Memorandum submitted by Nuri as-Sa'id at the beginning of 1943 to Mr. R.G. Casey ,
British Minister of State in the Middle East (Cairo). This Memorandum was entitled) in
part) Istiqlal al-'Arab wa Wahdatuhum: Mudhakkira fi al-Qadiyya al-'Arabiyya
(Arab Independence and Unity: Memorandum on the Arab Cause)) printed by the
Government Press, Baghdad, 1943. The part translated above occurs on pp. 19-22 of
this Memorandum and follows a somewhat lengthy exposition (15 pages) of political condi-
tions in the Arab countries since the latter part of the Ottoman era) as well as their rela-
tions with Britain and France since the First World War. ED.
The Arab States and the Arab League
have an economic system which differs from our own, though they are very close to us
in respect of language, customs and religion. On the other hand, Egypt has a bigger
population than that of backward (i) States. It also has its (own) problems in the
Sudan and elsewhere. Because of this, I have assumed that these States are not in-
clined to join an Arab federation (2) or an Arab League from the start (3). But
if the union (ittihad) of Iraq and Syria does materialize, it may then be very likely that
these States mentioned (4) may in the course of time show their desire to join this uni-
on. But I expect that this union - even if confined to Iraq and Syria - will at the very
beginning lead to the facilitation of joint consultation among all the Arab States and to
all these States acting in concert, whether they are inside the union or outside it. For
many of our problems are common, and we all belong to one civilization; thus, we
generally have the same (way of) thinking and are moved by the same ideals, namely,
the principles of freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, equality before the
law, and the fundamental human brotherhood.
Conclusion
In my view, the only equitable solution indeed, the only hope of securing
permanent peace, reassurance and progress in these Arab areas, is for the United Nat-
ions to declare now the following:
(1) That Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans Jordan be reunited into one State.
(2) That the inhabitants of this State themselves shall decide upon the type
of government to be adopted by this State, whether monarchal, republican, unitary
or federal.
(3) That there shall be created an Arab League to which Iraq and Syria shall
adhere at once, provided that the other Arab States are permitted to adhere to it
whenever they please.
(4) That this Arab League shall have a permanent Council nominated by the
States Members of this League and presided over by one of the heads of States, who
shall be chosen in a manner acceptable to the States concerned.
(5) That the Council of the Arab League shall be responsible for the following
matters:
(a) Defence
(b) Foreign Affairs
(c) Currency
(d) Communications
(e) Customs
(f ) Protection of Minority Rights
(g) Education.
(6) The Jews in Palestine shall be granted a semi-autonomous administration in
the area wherein they form a majority. They shall also be given the right to their
(1) The Arabic word used here is cc al - mustakhlifa", which is probably meant to be
"al-Mutakhallifa", literally meaning "backward, underdeveloped etc" On this basis,
the phrase above may have beenmeant to refer to Egypt as one of the most densely popu-
lated "backward countries." ED.
(2) The Arabic term used here is "Ittihad" which can also be translated as "Union". ED.
(3) The Arabic term used here is " 'Usba". ED.
(4) That is, those of the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, and the Sudan. ED.
10
International Affairs: Arab Unity
own rural and urban administration, including schools, health institutions and police,
provided that these health institutions and police shall be under the general super-
vision of the Syrian State.
(7) Jerusalem shall be a city to which members of all faiths shall have free access
for the purpose of pilgrimage or worship. A special commission composed of the
representatives of the three prevailing religions shall be set up to ensure this.
(8) That the Maronites in Lebanon shall, if they so desire, be granted a privileged
administration such as the one they enjoyed during the last years of the Ottoman
Empire. This special administration, like those to be set up in accordance with
paragraphs (6) and (7), above, shall rest on an international guarantee.
Should it be possible, as is (proposed) above, to create a Confederation of the
Arab States, comprising Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Transjordan at the beginning,
to which the other Arab States may later adhere, then a great many of the difficulties
faced by Great Britain and France in the Near East during the past twenty years will
disappear.
We see that the Arabs of Palestine are at present afraid that they may become a
minority in a Jewish State. For this, we see that they are strongly opposed to granting
special rights to the Jews. This hostility will, however, diminish if Palestine becomes
part of a large strong Arab State. The Jews can establish their national home in those
parts of Palestine where they are now a majority. They will, thus, feel more reassured
as to their safety, since their Arab neighbours will show good will towards them, and,
in addition, their economic opportunities will increase when they become a semi-
autonomous religious community(i) in a much larger State than they had hoped for.
The British Empire is not founded on negative bases, but on positive ideals.
Free institutions and free co-operation will give it greater life and vigour. On the
basis of this free co-operation a real union comprising many diverse peoples and
countries has been established. This union depends on noble and firm principles
which are inscribed in the heart and conscience of Man. If the Arab peoples are
given the opportunity to establish such a free co-operation among themselves, they
will then be able to deal tolerantly (2) with all the Jews living in their midst, whether
these Jews are in Palestine or in (any) other country. Admittedly, conditions must
be made and guarantees secured. But these conditions and guarantees must be
practicable, lest they should become a dead letter, as has been the case with many
provisions concerning minorities in European countries during the past twenty years.
Should these proposals meet with approval they will require meticulous study
until it becomes possible to take the appropriate measures at the suitable time and
in the right order. Naturally enough, the union of the various parts of historical
Syria must first be effected. On the one hand, this union may at the beginning (take
the form of) a federation comprising Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan,
provided that each Member State (3) continues to manage its own internal affairs,
leaving defence, foreign affairs, currency and customs to the Central Government.
On the other hand, it may be possible to unite Syria at once and at the same time to
make whatever provisions may be necessary for the Jewish enclaves and the adminis-
(1) The Arabic term used here is "ta'ifa". ED.
(2) The Arabic word used in this connection is u at-tasahul". ED.
C?) The Arabic term used here is "Duwayla", i.e. "small State". ED.
II
The Arab States and The Arab League
tration of the City of Jerusalem. Measures should be taken at once to fix the bound-
aries of these enclaves. This will necessitate the drawing up of an accurate ethno-
graphical map of Palestine, which will show the number of Arabs and Jews in each
district (/) and town, as also the drawing up of another map on the same scale as that
of the (first) map, which will show the lands under cultivation as well as the lands
which can be intensely cultivated in the future. In addition, an inquiry should be
made into the number of Jews who have settled (in Palestine) since the outbreak of
war in September 1939.
The achievement of unity may necessitate sacrificing the rights of sovereignty
and the traditional interests. The British Dominions have made similar sacrifices.
It is also possible to require the Arab leaders to make sacrifices like these.
I have throughout this Memorandum presumed that, as France declared before
the War that she was willing to grant independence to Syria and Lebanon, she will not
be given the chance to repudiate her undertaking, nor to place obstacles in the way of
every union that may be created for the Arab countries by insisting on retaining old
privileges and antiquated rights.
Political Memorandum Concerning the Settlement of the Arab
Question in General and the Syrian Question in Particular, Sub-
mitted to Amir 'Abdullah by a Number of Trans Jordanian Dignitaries
Amman, March 6, 1943 (2)
SUBJECT : SYRIAN UNITY AND THE ARAB FEDERATION
In accordance with Great Britain's previous and subsequent promises to the
Arabs,
And in view of the inability of the lawful French Government to carry out its
temporary mandate on behalf of the League of Nations in Syria, and the ipso facto
termination of this mandate by the loss of its legal character,
And considering Syria's possession of a legally-acquired independence and a
legitimate constitution,
And with reference to the recent declaration of the British Foreign Minister,
Mr. Anthony Eden, regarding Arab unity,
We believe that the above, and even the facilitation of the task of the Democracies
in the Near East, along with the reinforcement of the traditional Anglo- Arab friendship,
and the maintenance of confidence and real stability in the Arab countries which have
been liberated since the last war, necessitate the immediate implementation of one of
the following two projects:-
(1) The Arabic word used here is "Nahiya". ED.
(2) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jor-
danian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947} , pp. 64-70. The reader's
attention is drawn here to the fact that in this document, as in the other documents in
this section, the term cf lttihad" will be translated by "Federation", unless the context
requires otherwise. ED.
12
International Affairs: Arab Unity
THE FIRST PROJECT
A. The Syrian Unity Project "The Unified Syrian State", and the Arab Federation :
1. The Allies should declare their support of the independence of Syria in its
natural boundaries, and consider its national and geographic unity as the
basis of its system of government;
2. This declaration will, in fact, uphold the interests of the country and the
wishes of the Syrian people, which they have expressed at the end of the
last World War and on all occasions, as recorded by the American Plebis-
cite Commission, namely, Mr. Crane's Commission, (i) Moreover, the Sy-
rian Congress which was held in Damascus, representing all the regions of
liberated Syria, namely, Northern Syria, Lebanon, Trans Jordan and Pa-
lestine, also declared the above in (its) resolution of March 8, 1920, which
was duly communicated to the (various) States and to the League of Nations.
The (Syrian Congress) thus expressed in this historic resolution the real
wishes of the Syrian people. It was that resolution which has since then be-
come the National covenant of all Syrians. The present Syrian Government
still considers the day on which it was proclaimed an official national day,
and the flag which was designed (by that resolution) for Syriaas the same
flag which (now) shelters the Government of Transjordan.
3. The project of the Unified Syrian State consists of:-
a) The recognition of an independent and sovereign Syrian State whose
system of government shall be a constitutional monarchy.
b) The Unified Syrian State shall comprise Northern Syria, Transjordan,
Palestine and Lebanon.
c) Both Palestine, in some of its districts, and ancient Lebanon shall each
have, in accordance with the constitution, a special administration. In the
case of the former, the rights of the Jewish minority and the special status
of the Holy Places shall be duly safeguarded, while in the case of the
latter due regard shall be paid to the national aspirations of the Lebanese.
d) The Balfour Declaration shall be revoked for its inacceptance by the
Arabs, who are the legitimate owners of the country. Otherwise,
it shall be given a definitive interpretation which will dissipate
the fears in the Arab and the Muslim worlds. Thus, the status quo,
namely, a proportion of one third (Jews) to two thirds (Arabs), will be
considered as adequate, and Jewish immigration will be absolutely
prohibited.
4. The Head of the Syrian State:
His Highness Prince 'Abdullah bin al-Husayn shall be invited to become
the head of the Syrian State, on the basis of the following legitimate con-
siderations :-
a) His established legitimate rights to the Jordanian Imara, (2) which
is an important part of Greater Syria.
b) His former and subsequent contribution of effective help to the Allies
which help has covered the Syrian front in the present war.
c) His being the first heir to the rights of his father, His Majesty the late
(7) Referring here to the King-Crane Commission which visited Syria in the summer of
79/9. See Doc. No. i. ED.
(2) i.e. Princedom (from "Amir", meaning "Prince") . ED.
13
The Arab States and The Arab League
King Husayn, in looking after the rights of the Arabs in general
andthose of Syrians in particular.
d) The promise made to him by the British Government, as far back as
1 92 1 3 through its present Prime Minister, Mr. (Winston) Churchill,
that he would head the Syrian State; also (in view of) the disappear-
ance of all obstacles to the fulfilment of that promise after the collapse
of France, which rendered (France's) legal mandate on behalf of the
League of Nations inoperative, with Great Britain acquiring freedom
of action in the various regions of Syria.
e) The Syrians' wish to be ruled by a constitutional Monarchy in the
event of the achievement of a general unity or of a central Federation
(in the country).
5 . The Arab Federation :
Immediately after the proclamation of the establishment of the Unified
Syrian State an Arab Federation shall be established. It shall consist of the
States of Syria and Iraq (the Fertile Crescent) and shall have a co-ordinated
(foreign) policy, defence, education, and national economy. Nothing shall
prevent the other Arab States from joining this Federation, provided that
the presidency of the Council of the Arab Federation be by rotation or, if
necessary, entrusted to the Arab State which is largest (in terms of) wealth,
influence and population.
THE SECOND PROJECT
B. A Concrete Project for the Establishment of a Syrian Federal State and an Arab Con-
federation :
Should the Unified Syrian State not be established immediately, it would not
be impossible to proceed with the establishment of a Central Syrian Federation,
namely, a Syrian Federal State, on the basis of the following principles. (These
principles) have been laid down in the light of the real interests of the Syrian
regions and with due regard to their present conditions, as well as to the real inter-
ests of the Allies in so far as concerns the gaining of public confidence and the
facilitation of the task of the defence of the Near East :
1. A Central Syrian Federal State, comprising the Governments of Trans Jor-
dan, Northern Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, shall be established in Syria,
in its natural boundaries. Damascus shall be its capital.
2. The Central Syrian Federation shall have competence over matters of def-
ence, communications, national economy, foreign policy, education, and fed-
eral justice. Each of the four regional governments shall retain its autono-
my, except in such matters as may have become within the competence of
the General Syrian Federal Government.
3. The Syrian Federation shall have an "elected General Legislative Assem-
bly", representing the federated regions ; the Prime Minister of the Federa-
tion, as well as the members of the Federal Executive, shall be elected from
(this Assembly), in accordance with the provisions of the constitution.
4. The Syrian Federation shall be established by negotiation and agreement
between the four regional Governents; the first step towards its realization
shall be negotiation and an agreement between the Governments of Trans-
jordan and Northern Syria.
5 . The rules and the bases of the Federation shall be laid down in a draft federal
constitution which shall be drawn up by a special committee representing
14
International Affairs: Arab Unity
the regions participating (in the Federation). The number of the members
of (the Committee) and its powers shall be agreed upon (later).
6. His Highness Prince 'Abdullah bin al-Husayn shall be designated head
of the Syrian Federal State for the same reasons and considerations set out in
clause 4 of the preceding project. The internal administration of Transjor-
dan shall be entrusted to a deputy (acting on behalf) of His Highness.
7. The draft constitution of the Syrian Federation shall be debated and appro-
ved by the Representative Councils of the regional Governments sitting in
(the form of a) Congress, or by a General National Assembly representing
the regions of the Federation and elected for this purpose.
8. The Federal Consitution shall be officially proclaimed and shall come into
effect on the appointed date in accordance with the decrees concerned.
9. In case of accession, later, by the Governments of Lebanon or Palestine to
the Syrian Federation, or (their accession) on a confederate basis only, the
conditions and the extent of such accession shall be separately approved by
the Federal Legislative Assembly and by the regional Chamber of Deputies
of the acceding State, and the coming into effect (of this accession) shall then
be announced.
10. Should the Government of Lebanon, for reasons of its own, fail to join the
Central Syrian Federation, the Syrian territories which were incorporated
into Lebanon against the wishes of (their) inhabitants shall be returned to
Syria on the basis of a plebiscite.
1 1 . Palestine's accession to the Syrian Federation and, consequently, to the Gen-
eral Arab Confederation shall be conditional on the realization of the fol-
lowing:
a) A national constitutional government should be set up in Palestine in its
present boundaries.
b) The White Paper (/) shall continue to be provisionally effective, provid-
ed that it should be replaced by a definitive official interpretation of the
Balfour Declaration (2) by the British Government within a given per-
iod. This interpretation should (be of such a nature as to) dissipate the fears
of the Arab and Muslim worlds, by affirming the Palestine Arabs' na-
tional and political rights to their own country, which they have inherited
from their fathers and forefathers. The national status of (the Arabs) in
Palestine should thus remain safeguarded and should not be undermined
through any (further) Jewish immigration or any other measures. More-
over, foreign Jewish immigration should be stopped forthwith, and the
status quo, that is, the present proportion of one-third Jews to two- thirds
Arabs a proportion brought about by a continuous foreign immigra-
tion ever since the end of the last War, and the legitimacy of which has
never been recognized by the Arabs - should be maintained.
This Jewish proportion, which is accidental in Palestine and aganist
the wishes of its Arab inhabitants, should be considered by the British
Government an adequate justification for the claim that it has fulfilled
its promise to the Jews. This is particularly so since (the British Gov-
ernment) is, at the same time, committed to the Arabs by obligations
(1) That 15, the British Government's White Paper of 1939*
(2) See Doc. No. 226. ED.
The Arab States and The Arab League
which conflict with the Balfour Declaration. And this, in addition to the es-
tablished legitimate national rights of the Arabs to their inherited country.
c) In the national administration of Palestine due regard shall be given to
the special status of the Holy Places.
d) The areas with a Jewish majority shall be granted a decentralized ad-
ministration as an affirmation of the safeguarding of the rights of the
Jewish minority.
e) There shall be reciprocal beneficial economic co-operation between the
General Arab Federation and the Jewish citizens of Palestine.
f) The Arabs' recognition of these privileges to the Jewish minority in
Palestine shall be conditional on the declaration of the responsible Jewish
(Agency) of the Jewish final acceptance of this solution by notifying the
British Government accordingly.
12. In case the Palestine problem is not solved by the British on this basis,
Palestine shall remain outside the Syrian Federation, and the Arabs, as a
nation having a national covenant and legitimate national rights, shall contin-
ue their non-recognition of the status quo in Palestine, and shall persist in
demanding the revocation of the Balfour Declaration. (This is based on) the
consideration that the Palestine problem is the main source of the poisoning
of the relations between Britain (on the one hand) and the Arab and Muslim
worlds (on the other), and that Palestine is not a place large enough to solve
the problem of world Jewry. It is, indeed, in the opinion of Great Britain's
friends, in the interest of all that the Palestine problem should be solved in
the manner explained above. This is the most the Arabs can accept; suffice
that it be in the interest of peace, stability and international justice in the
present and in the future; in the same way it will put an end to dissension,
suspicion, and the propaganda adverse to the Democracies in the Near East.
13. Immediately upon the setting up of the Syrian Federal State, in accordance
with the principles outlined in the previous clauses, the establishment of the
Arab Confederation shall be proceeded with in accordance with the
provisions of clause 5 of the first project.
Letter Addressed by Amir 'Abdullah of Transjordan to Prime
Minister Tawfiq AbuP-Huda, Concerning the Question of Arab Unity
August 24, 1943 (i)
To our Prime Minister, Tawfiq Pasha Abu'1-Huda:
Instruction regarding the question of Arab Unity
1) His Excellency Nuri Pasha (as-Sa'id) has acquainted you with the necessary
(points) which have been the basis of the talks between the Egyptian and the
Iraqi Prime Ministers concerning (Arab) unity.
2) What we have been informed of, in relation to what took place between their
Excellencies, is the maximum possible within that sphere.
(/) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordanian
Government's White Book (Amman, 1947) , pp. 101-103. See also Mudhakkirat al-
Malik 'Abdullah (King Abdullah's Memoirs), in Arabic, Sao Paulo, Brazil>pp. 240-243.
16
International Affairs: Arab Unity
3) Transjordan is fully determined to support these laudable efforts.
4) The late King Husayn meant by the Arab countries (i) those countries which
are bounded, on the west, by the Egyptian frontiers, the Mediterranean
and the Red Sea; on the north by the Turkish vilayets', on the east, by the
Iranian frontiers, with the exception of the Principalities and Sultanes which
have treaty relations with the Government of India, namely, (those of) the
(then) Prince Ibn Sa'ud, the Prince of Bahrein, the Sultan of Muscat, and the
Sultans of Hadramaut and Lahaj. As to the Ottoman Villayet of Yaman, the
Mutasarrafiyya of 'Asir the Villayet of Hijaz and the Principality of Shammar-
which is the Principality of ar-Rashid, with Ha'il as its centre - all these are
within the "Arab countries" meant (by King Husayn). There remain outside
only those Princes and Sultans who have, as mentioned, treaty relations with
India, as well as the British Colony of Aden and the six Districts.
5) The British reservations included the western coast of Syria, such as
Mersine and Adana, and the late (King) agreed that these should not be con-
sidered as purely Arab.
6) Since both the coastal and the interior parts of Palestine and Syria were the
object of the (Arab) Revolt, they constitute, therefore, the problem from which
we should emerge either with total unity or with a confederation. In the form-
er sense, it is to make of the whole (of these territories) a single government
having the same character, in accordance with the two resolutions of the Syrian
Congress of July 2, 1919, and of March 8, 1920, as communicated at the time
by the Fay sal Government to the Governments concerned. In the latter sense,
it is (to incorporate them into) a confederation which will maintain the regional
governments as they are, and join them together in respect of matters which will
be decided upon (later) in order to unite the various parts under one head.
7) The Federation which is being worked for to-day, and which (primarily)
depends upon Egypt and Iraq, will not be durable unless the Syrian territories
- Greater Syria - are either united or federated. If the sovereignty of these
territories remains incomplete under foreign mandates, or if (they remain) lo-
cally disunited, their conformity (in policy) with Egypt and Iraq will be so
weak and inconsistent that they will be unable to carry out their obligations in
this respect.
8) It is believed that, following the Atlantic Charter and as a result of what the
present war has proved, Great Britain and the United Nations, as well as
those who are with them, must have decided to rectify the mistakes of the last
war and to build democracy on a sound basis. This (it is believed) will give
the Eastern nations a status of independence, national honour, and readiness
that will qualify them sufficiently to deserve being (considered) reliable
for the maintenance of a comprehensive peace along the northern coast of
Africa and the western coast of Palestine and Syria. It is therefore believed
that if the question of unity is handled in a proper and co-ordinated manner
by Iraq and Egypt, with an absolute insistence on either the unity of Syria or
its federation, there would remain as far as Britain and America are concerned
no difficulties to be met by those who are working for Arab unity. As for
the French Mandate, France's present position in itself makes sure that it
( /) Presumably referring here to the exchange of letters between (King) Husayn and Sir
Henry Me Mahon in 19/5-1916. ED.
The Arab States and The Arab League
will be impossible for her ever to undertake such a heavy burden again. The
Arabs of Greater Syria are determined to attain their rights in their country,
namely, independence and either unity or federation. This is a vital military
necessity to Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt at the same time.
9) As for the Palestine question, Great Britain has declared her policy with
regard to it in the White Paper which she has not revoked to this day. There
is no escape from the inclusion of Palestine in the federation or unity. This
inclusion does not conflict with any solution proposed by any British com-
mission sent for this (purpose), or by any Arab conference which has sub-
mitted its proposals in this respect. It is possible to rely in this respect on the
resolutions of the London Conference or on the resolutions of the Arab World
Parliamentary Congress held in Egypt.
As for Lebanon, there is no objection to leaving to her the choice between
unity or federation with all these Arab countries, and to her maintaining the
form and method (of government) she may choose; but (it should be under-
stood that) the question of Great Lebanon(i) is among those Syrian rights
which should not be neglected.
As for the Sudan, it is at present, as is well-known, Anglo-Egyptian.
As for North Africa, it is preferable that a way be found to come to an
understanding with His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco and with His Highness
the Bey of Tunisia.
As for Libya(2) and Tripolitania, their question is to be (left) until due
time. We are more than inclined to believe that Libya will have an Arab
status. The question of Tripolitania is doubtful.
As for Egypt, in spite of her being called so, she is one of the leading
Arab countries. She is the land of Kinana(j), and has (with us) ancient re-
lations and national bonds which (we) cannot disown, God forbid. The Arab
countries, therefore, welcome with all their might unity with this dear state,
and laud those who are working for it, especially (Egypt's) respected leader.(^)
10) The Amir of Transjordan supports with all his power the efforts of Egypt
and Iraq, and insists that Egypt and Iraq should work for the unity or fede-
ration of Syria before any other Arab federation. Let, then, Your Excellency's
discussions with His Excellency (the Egyptian Prime Minister) be conducted
on this basis. We give you guidance by these instructions and leave to your
known sagacity and wisdom any new (issues) that might come up (in
the course of discussion).
P.S. As for Najd, Hijaz and Yaman, I believe that these should not be urged
with regard to (matters) which they may not find acceptable. Yet they
should be kept informed of what is taking place, with the exception of
those matters which Iraq, Egypt and those with them may consider
as still being secret.
(/) That is, "Grand Liban". ED.
(2) By "Libya" here is presumably meant "Cyrenaica" (the province), since by definition
Libya (the whole country) already includes Tripolitania. ED.
(3) Kinana, in Arabic, means "quiver". A number of Arab historians and others refer to
Egypt as "the land of Kinana", meaning thereby that Egypt is the most important coun-
try for the defence of the Arab homeland. ED.
(4) Mustafa an-Nahhas (Pasha). ED.
18
International Affairs: Arab Unity
Letter Addressed by Amir 'Abdullah of Transjordan to Mustafa- '7
an-Nahhas, Egyptian Prime Minister
August 14, 1944 d)
To His Excellency Mustafa an-Nahhas Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt:
Your Excellency,
'Abd al-Mun'im Bey ar-Rifa'i has returned with delightful and heart-
warming news. This (indeed) is in keeping with what (we) have (always) expected
and known of Your Excellency. God willing, the Jordanian Prime Minister will have
the honour of attending (the meeting of) the Preparatory Committee of the (Arab)
Unity Conference at the fixed time.
I have thought it beneficial to communicate to Your Excellency my views
concerning Palestine and its representation at the Conference. This is an exceedingly
essential and serious matter, for I firmly believe that to leave out Palestine is to deny a
right of hers which should not be neglected. It is for this reason that Your Excel-
lency has always insisted on this representation and done the impossible to bring to
the Arab Conference in London (2) those who did not attend. Now, however, I may
say that, with the recent Zionist attempt against the departing (British) High Com-
missioner, the danger constituted against Palestine by the Jews and their ambitions
beyond Palestine has become fall the more) evident. In view of our close proximity
(to Palestine), the Zionist movement threatens us here before any other country;
hence the question of preserving the very existence and safety of Palestine is vital
to Transjordan.
We have thus instructed our Government, in a directive issued by us, to
take the necessary (measures) to secure this noble aim, and to approach the British
authorities and inform them that Palestine is the first line of defence to Transjordan
and to the Arab countries lying behind it; that we shall take the necessary precautions
for the safety of Palestine, especially when the Zionists have gone to the extent of
attacking the Government, its centres, and its High Commissioner; and that, not-
withstanding (all) this, the Arab nation will not close its door if a settlement, safe-
guarding the security and sovereignty of Arab Palestine, is submitted to it. Your
Excellency will therefore see that, under the circumstances, the question of repre-
senting Palestine at the Conference is of first (importance) to us, and that opinion is
one in both Transjordan and Palestine concerning this national problem. I have
therefore summoned His Excellency the Egyptian Consul-General in Jerusalem, in
order to transmit my present message to Your Excellency, by a quick and safe means.
To clarify the matter (further), I am submitting to Your Excellency a list (j) of
the names of the notables to whom I kindly request you to send invitations for attend-
ing the Conference. I have indicated (in the list) the name of the party to which each
of (these notables) belongs.
I believe that this is the solution which satisfies us all. His Excellency the
Consul-General will convey to you, in addition to my present letter, my personal
(1) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jor-
danian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947), pp. 99 - 100.
(2) That is, the Conference convened in London by the British Government in January
1939) and attended by the delegates of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yaman,
but not by any representatives of Palestine. ED.
(j) Not printed. ED.
19
8
The Arab States and The Arab League
entreaty that you may give effect to our request concerning the sending of the
invitations.
With my deepest affection and respect to Your Excellency,
(Signature)
Sha'ban 25, 1363 A.H., corresponding to
August 14, 1944
Note Addressed by the Iraqi Government to the Chairman of the
Subsidiary Committee of the Preparatory Conference on Arab Un-
ity, Embodying the Views of the Iraqi Government and Its Reserv-
ations Concerning the Draft Pact of the Arab League
March u, 1945 (i)
To His Excellency the Chairman of the Subsidiary Committee for the Draft Pact of
the League of Arab States,
Greetings and respects,
I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that, in view of the delay in signing
the minutes of the meetings of the Subsidiary Political Committee of the Preparatory
Committee for the Arab Conference, which (delay) is because certain additions to and
modifications of the draft Pact of the League of Arab States have been proposed and
about the subject of which some members have not ascertained their Governments'
views, Therefore,
And in order to avoid any misunderstanding that may arise in this respect in
future,
And in order that I may advise my Government on this matter, I have deemed it
fit to inform Your Excellency that the Iraqi Government considers that the following
should be made clear :-
First : Article 12: The States of the League may not interfere, jointly or severally
in any dispute of whatever nature, that may arise between the State of Iraq
and any (other) State or States of the League, or other (States), except at
the request of the State of Iraq and the State or States party to the dispute.
Second : Article 14- This Article gives to the (Member States of the) League the
right to establish among themselves a wider co-operation than that provid-
ed for in the Pact, should these States so desire. This authorization is,
needless to say, (only) an admission of the right which is now enjoyed by
the (Member) States of the League. It should, therefore, be clear that
none of the States of the League may object, for any reason whatever, to
any arrangements which some of the States of the League may make to
widen the scope of such co-operation among themselves.
Third: Article 15: The choice of the system of government in each of the States
(Members) of the League is the exclusive right of the people of that State.
But since the text of Article 15 of the draft (Pact) does not adequately clari-
fy this principle, it should be made clear that the Iraqi Government cannot
accept any departure from this principle which is recognized by all the
(i)The Note was signed by Mr. Tahsin al-'Askari, Iraq's Minister in Cairo; translated
by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordanian Govern-
ment's White Book (Amman, 1947), pp. 107 - 108. ED.
20
International Affairs: Arab Unity
countries of the civilized world.
I shall be grateful if Your Excellency will kindly inform me that you have
taken note of the contents of this letter, so that I may be able to inform my Govern-
ment accordingly before the isth of the current (month of) March.
With all my respects to Your Excellency,
March n, 1945 (Signed) TAHSIN AL'-ASKARY
Minister of Iraq.
Statement by the Lebanese Foreign Minister (Hamid Franjiyya), Q
Concerning the Greater Syria Plan
November 13, 1945 (i)
I am surprised that this theme - meaning (2) the theme of unity or federation -
should appear every now and then for motives which are no longer unknown to any-
body. In our view, this question does not exist. The Lebanese Government has
repeatedly announced its deprecation of such an idea, and I regret that we should each
time find ourselves compelled to denounce it and to refute it. For how could we forget
that the Arab countries became independent within (their) present boundaries, that
each of them has recognized the independence of the other States within these boun-
daries, and that the Arab League has been formed on this basis? For such illusory
plans explicitly conflict with the Arab League Pact, and I am surprised that they
should emanate from one of the Members of the League.
The policy of Lebanon is clear and does not admit of ambiguity or equivocation:
For Lebanon, thanks be to God, enjoys her independence and sovereignty within her
present boundaries. She has joined the Arab League on this basis, and will accept no
alternative to this policy. The Arab States have co-operated with each other with the
utmost sincerity concerning all their common affairs, and it is my firm hope that this
theme will not appear again lest it should disturb the propitious atmosphere in which
we are closely collaborating for the good of all.
Reply of the Jordanian Foreign Minister (Ash-Shurayqi) to the JQ
Statement of the Lebanese Foreign Minister
November 1945 (3)
I was glad that my honourable colleague, His Excellency Hamid Bey Franjiyya,
has given me this opportunity to clarify the Jordanian point of view with regard to the
plan of Syrian unity or federation.
The idea of Syrian unity or federation is a principle unanimously respected in
Syria and Jordan, and has many supporters in Lebanon as well. It is not a theme that
(1) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jorda-
nian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947), p. 233.
(2) This phrase, interpreting the word "theme", above, does not form part of the State-
ment in hand, but has been added by the editors of the Jordanian Government's
White Book. ED.
(3) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordanian
Government's White Book (Amman, 1947) pp. 234-236.
21
The Arab States and The Arab League
is likely to disturb the magnificent atmosphere in which we are collaborating in our
work for the good of all if we realize that unity or federation is one of the most
cherished themes to Arab ears. This is because it is the thundering voice of the
Arab Revolt of Independence in 1915, and the echo of the historic resolution unani-
mously adopted in Damascus on March 8, 1920, by the delegates of the coastal,
interior, northern and southern regions (i) of Syria, and with them there were the
delegates of sister Lebanon as well. Nay, it is the watchword of the Syrian Revolu-
tion, which was addressed, with the unanimous approval of (all) the national organi-
zations, by the commander-in-chief to all the warriors, and they all generously
offered their noble lives to achieve (its aims). It is, indeed, strange that the friendly
Lebanese Government should deprecate the idea of unity or federation, and should
not allow us to deprecate, in our turn, the idea of the regional division of the one
homeland. It should, however, be noted that when we now advocate the idea of
unity or federation, we do so only within the limits of the Pact of the League of
Arab States and inspired by the general wish of every independent Syrian region.
It is true that the Arab countries became independent within the present
boundaries of each of them, and that they have recognized the independece of each
other within these boundaries, as His Excellency my honorable collegaue says. But
since when have independent States still the more so if they are regional states
been unable to become united if the people wanted them to be united, or unable to
federate by their own choice and free will, (or) even by virtue of their rights of sove-
reignty as well ?
But to say that the plan of unity or federation openly conflicts with the Pact of
the League of the Arab States(2) is, in our view, a statement unsupported by proof.
For Article 9 of the Pact provides that "those Arab League States desirous of closer
collaboration with each other, and stronger ties than those specified by this
Covenant (3) , have a right to conclude such agreements between themselves towards
the realisation of those objects, as they desire".
There is nothing, therefore, to prevent the realization of a confederation or of
total unity, if we refer this (matter) to the wishes of the responsible Governments or
to the general national wish. I maintain that as our dear Lebanon has the right to
adhere to her aspirations and her own policy not accepting any other alternative
while remaining faithful to the Pact of the League, so also Trans Jordan has the full
right to adhere to her national covenant and her own policy - not accepting any other
alternative - while remaining faithful to the Pact of the League, too.
Yet, if the Pact of the League has stipulated that the system of government in
each of the acceding States is one of the rights of that State, it is to this (stipulation)
that the Jordanian Government has always held, guided by (the instructions of the)
Head of the great Hashimite Dynasty. (The Jordanian Government) has thus made
its call to unity or federation subject to the wish of the very people concerned, or
to the (free) choice of the responsible Governments themselves. The general wish,
in every nation which respects the true democratic principles, is undoubtedly the
one that matters in such questions. This is the very sound view expressed at the time
by His Excellency the learned (Mr.) Paris Bey al-Khouri, former Primer Minister
of Syria.
( /) The Arabic term used here "al-Aqalhn', ED.
(2) See. Doc. No. 29. ED.
(3} The terms "Pact" and "Covenant" are used interchangeable^ in this book. ED.
22
International Affairs: Arab Unity
As to (my) honourable colleague's explanation of the emergence of this call
(to unity) by motives which are no longer unknown to anybody, as he says, I (can)
assure His Excellency that these motives are the most noble motives and the most
propitious to the national interest. Moreover, the official documents exchanged be-
tween the higher political authorities on the subject of this cherished national aspira-
tion will, when the time of their publication comes, be the truthful witness to the
noble character of this call and of its disinterestedness. (They will also serve as) a
decisive reply to those who want us to acquiesce absolutely to the partition of our
dear homeland and to avoid everything that would realize its unity or federation by
free choice, at a time when the right of self-determination has become a respected
international right, and when national and even international unity characterize this
modern age.
Excerpts From the Speech From the Jordanian Throne, Dealing T y
with the Question of Arab Unity L 1
November u, 1946 (i)
With this stand of ours, (2) and from this very (throne) we declare, Honourable
Deputies, that we are seeking neither a (wider) possession which we desire, nor a
throne which we want to establish, but that our aim is stability in this western part of
the Arab world which overlooks the Roman sea (5), leads to the Western world, and is
the doorway to our country. The security (of this part of the Arab world) lies in its
unity, and the danger to it (resides) in its disunity. The will is God's, and the wishes
(emanate) from the Nation which we have pledged ourselves to serve not to deceive
or endanger the life thereof. We seek nothing except its honour and glory, the safe-
guarding of its dignity, the raising of its prestige, and the safety of its religious and
temporal values. We have pledged ourselves before God to serve and promote (our)
faith and to unite the Arabs, both Muslims and Christians, under their (common) flag
and in their own fatherland, without any distinction among them. God is always with
the group. (4) This is our aim, and these are our limits. May God protect us from the
evils of the enemy.
(Please) be informed, Honourable Deputies, that we are firmly decided on a
close unity between ourselves and our sister Iraq, whose aim is the co-ordination of
efforts and attitudes in the two sister countries. The door is not closed between the
States of the Arab League and ourselves for any confederal co-operation, brotherly
pact, or federation of such nature; for we are (and shall remain), God willing, ready to
give advice to all, now and in the future.
You have known, Gentlemen, that we have accepted the invitation of His Majes-
(1) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jorda-
nian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947)3 PP* 2 4 - 2 4 l
(2) Referring here to King 'Abdullah own views on the question of Syrian unity dealt with
in the preceding part of the Speech. ED.
(3) That is, the Mediterranean. ED.
(4) That is, God always lends His help wherever there is unity. ED.
The Arab States and The Arab League
ty the King of Egypt to consider matters relating to the future of (our) dear Pales-
tine^/) We thank His Majesty for this generous invitation and this noble aim, for he
has done what is fit and proper. We have spared no efforts to attain what His Majesty
was aiming at, and we sincerely express our high praise to those of Their Majesties and
Excellencies the Kings and Presidents who attended (the Conference) or who delega-
ted others on their behalf. We hope we will carry out the decisions (of the Conference),
as these provide the effective remedy which can serve that dear country which is pa-
tiently bearing the procrastinations and delays it is being subjected to. You have also
heard of the London Conference and of its postponement for a given time ; there is no
harm in that, as the reconsideration of matters in dispute between friendly countries is
the way that leads to the best results. Yet we have proposed what we found (fit) for
raising funds to protect the lands against sale (2) and to raise the standard of the Arabs
so that they may be (better) prepared to serve the fatherland. We (also) hope that the
stamps which were issued for this purpose will be successfully circulated in Trans-
Jordan, and we also hope that they will be successfully circulated in Palestine in ac-
cordance with our recommendations to the Arab Higher Committee.
Gentlemen:
We have no more to add in this Speech except (to express) our firm desire to live
in peace, friendship and brotherhood with our sister Arab States, and (to hope) that
(our) association (through) the League will grow stronger and closer. We have pleas-
ure to state that co-operation between our ally, Great Britain, and ourselves will, God
willing, grow stronger and firmer during (this) stage of complete independence.
Excerpts from the Reply to the Speech from the Throne, made by
the Jordanian Legislative Assembly
November u, 1946 (3)
Your Majesty,
God has honoured the nation by your declaration to its Deputies and to all the
people, that, being what you are, you do not seek in your call for Syrian unity any
(wider) possession or (an additional) throne, but the (realization of the) nation's ideals
and charters, as well as the realization of a general stability and a general national
unity. (You also declared that you seek) a unity which would eliminate dissension, put
an end to division, safeguard the safety of the one Fatherland against the ravages of
invaders and the devastators of (this) land, and consolidate its front lines to protect it
against any danger.
The Arabs in general and their veteran leaders in particular will follow none but
this blessed call and its successful leadership, all aware that Your Majesty's share in
the fields of war and politics was and still is more resplendent than the crown, and
more honouring than the sceptre and the realm.
What you have reviewed (in your Speech) of the developments of the Arab cause
and the effect of the Revolt of Liberation under the leadership of the Great Libera-
(1) Referring here to the Conference of Arab Kings and Presidents at Inshas, Egypt.
See. Doc. No. 140. ED.
(2) That w, the sale of Arab lands in Palestine to the Zionists. ED.
(3] Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jorda-
nian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947 ),PP- 247 - 248.
International Affairs: Arab Unity
tor may God be pleased with him and render him reward ; of Your Majesty's
being the first to come to this land in order to resume the struggle after the catastrophe
of Damascus and to take this loyal region as a base of effective assistance and help to
every national movement and patriotic call all these shall not be forgotten by the
Arab nation which has entrusted its cause to your dynasty for the realization of its
mission. (Your dynasty) has thus fought a worthy fight for the sake of God, and has
revived the past glories (of the nation).
Your Majesty,
It is a source of delight to the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, and to all the Arabs
that the plan of Iraqi-Jordanian unity should be accomplished in the very near future,
in realization of the wishes of the two sister countries, as kindly referred to by you (in
your Speech). (It is also a source of delight) that the message of Arab unity should
be realized, within the limits of international pacts and the Pact of the Arab League, at
the hand of the great Hashimite Family, so that (the nation) will be again, as it had
started (in the beginning), pregnant with deeds and overflowing with hope, and that
the solidarity of the Arab States will continue to be its programme, criterion, guiding
light, and source of inspiration, (i)
One of the great aspects, indeed, of this solidarity is what you have graciously
referred to in the resolutions of the great Inshas Conference,^) and the noble resolu-
tions and wise directives which Their Majesties and Excellencies the Arab Kings and
Presidents have unanimously agreed upon at their historic Conference. The Arabs are
still expecting (these resolutions and directives) to heal the bleeding wounds of Pales-
tine, guarantee its legitimate rights, fulfil its cherished hope and restore its lost in-
dependence.
Question Addressed by a Number of Deputies to the Jordanian J 3
Foreign Minister, Regarding the Statement of the Lebanese Foreign
Minister About Syrian Unity
November u, 1946 (3)
The Lebanese Press published a statement (4) which the Lebanese Foreign
Minister made in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on November 13, 1945, contain-
ing the following:
"Lebanon has joined the (Arab) League on the basis of her effectively complete inde-
pendence, within her present boundaries, and of the independence of each of the
States (Members) of the League. Therefore, the question raised from time to time,
under the name of "Greater Syria", cannot be a subject of discussions, for we neither
want "Greater Syria" nor accept it by any means."
As this statement relates to the rights of the regional States of Syria including
the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan we request His Excellency the Foreign Minister
to enlighten the Chamber in respect of the Government's view regarding this state-
1 i) The Arabic word used here is "Nibrasuha", literally meaning "lantern, chandelier,
source of illumination, etc.". ED.
(2) See. Doc. No. 140. ED.
(3) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jorda-
nian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947) p. 251.
(4) See Doc. No. 9 . ED.
The Arab States and the Arab League
ment. It should, however, be understood that all the Deputies of the nation are not
satisfied with (the said) statement because it conflicts with the country's natural and
national rights.
'ABD AL-QADIR AT-TALL 'ABUD AZ-ZABIN SALAMA AT-TAWWAL
'ISA 'AWAD HUSAYN YUSUF SALIM AL-HINDAWI
MUHAMMAD SABRI AT-TABBA' NAWFAN AS-SA'UD
MA'ARIK AL-MAJALYYA YUSUF AL-'AKASHI
Reply of the Jordanian Foreign Minister (Ash - Shurayqy), to the
Question of the Jordanian Deputies
November 19, 1946 (i)
I thank the esteemed Deputies for their concern over everything relating to
national rights, and I wish to define the Government's view regarding the statement
referred to, as follows:
The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, while adhering to the Pact of the League
of Arab States, will never give up the Covenant of Syrian unity or federation. (2)
(This is) not only in its character as a Syrian state, but also because of its conviction
that any revocation of this Covenant will also constitute a revocation of Syria's
natural rights and a rejection of her national struggle, geographic existence, and
common regional interests - (a revocation) which cannot be accepted by any Syrian
who believes in his country.
Everybody has recognized, from the very beginning, the independence of
Lebanon, and also admitted her complete freedom regarding the question of unity or
federation, because the wishes of the Lebanese people must remain above any other
consideration. We expected that our honourable colleague, His Excellency the
Lebanese Foreign Minister, would desire for the Syrian regions what he desires for
Lebanon and what we, too, desire for her, and that he would thus refrain from inter-
fering in what concerns the Syrian regions exclusively, unless (of course) he considers
Lebanon a Syrian region - and we do not believe he thinks so.
We have no doubt that there is no one who does not know that all the Syrians,
including in particular the Jordanians, will accept nothing in exchange for their
countries' unity or federation, and that there is none to make them forget that they
have made sacrifices and struggled for nearly thirty years for the realization of this
sacred aim.
We have a right to ask why sister Lebanon should have been allowed to expand
at the expense of Syria and without (Syria's) being consulted at the time, and yet
why Syria - the partitioned, nay, dismembered (Syria) - should not be allowed to
unite by her own free choice so that she may grow on the basis of her natural and
national rights, and within the limits of her (own) regions.
Reference has sometimes been made to the diversity in the form of government
as an obstacle (to Arab unity), and this (in spite of) the knowledge that the nation has
unanimously decided that "national unity" should not be sacrificed for the sake of
the form of government. Besides, if the choice of a form (of government) is left to the
nation itself - and this is what we have always advocated - there will no longer be any
(j) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordanian
Government's White Book (Amman, 1947), p. 252.
(2) See Doc. No. 2. ED.
26
International Affairs: Arab Unity
room for the claims of those who oppose the principle of general Syrian unity.
Moreover, the federal form (of government) does not in itself conflict with diversity
in the form of government. If the Arab States can meet in the Council of their League
in spite of the diversity in their forms (of government), why cannot the regional Syrian
States meet in a Federal Council as well and carry out the people's wishes in de-
termining their common interests and natural rights ? (This is all the more so) since
this wise and practical measure has become, from the international point of view, one
of our own rights?
Reference has sometimes also been made to Zionism. Some have gone so far as to
allege that the call for unity or federation is nothing but an (attempt at) expansion at
the expense of Palestine. This is a strange misrepresentation, since Zionism will not
feel at ease towards any Arab block that would encircle it and strangle it. On the con-
trary, Syrian unity or federation will constitute a new defensive power that would
repel the Zionist danger to Palestine and to the whole Syrian group (of States). Jordan
is, indeed, proud of her efforts and struggle for the realization of the national aspira-
tions in Palestine, Besides, if unity or federation can be aeieved only by our jyint
action and common agreement, what room will there be left for suspicion ?
Reference has also been made to the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty (i) and to the
existence of a military alliance between Great Britain and Transjordan; (this reference
has been made in spite of) the knowledge that the new Treaty has recognized our
complete independence and that the alliance is to be exclusively defensive and within
the limits of (what is admitted by) the Security Council, without the stationing of any
(British) troops except by agreement between the two parties and in case of defensive
exigencies. This is ( a measure ) adopted by all independent States when this is
necessitated by their common interests and by the exigencies of their external
security. Even if we concede, for argument's sake, the isolation is, within the new
international system, better than alliances, would this necessitate our giving up (both)
our national unity and the realization of our federation, now that we have all attained
the means of the realization thereof without any encroachment upon our vested poli-
tical and international rights?
To clarify this further, I would ask whether Northern Syria, for example, when
she accepted the treaty of 1936 and the military alliance which it entailed, would have
refused her unity or federation with her provinces and coastal cities which had a
special status at that time, or would have rather accepted every possible expansion of
her national unity until the complete realization of her National Covenant ?
I believe that no Syrian who has faith in his country does not consider that the
continuation of the estrangement between our regions is only in the interest of
(others). The Jordanian policy will continue to consider the Syrian general unity as
the basis and the main (principle) of its national programme. In this, it will be
inspired only by the national covenants and by Arab ideals.
The Speech from the Throne last week so clearly explained this point that no
further clarification will be needed. We, therefore, hope that His Excellency the
esteemed Lebanese Foreign Minister was not driven to make his statement in the
Chamber of Deputies by some of those who do not want to revoke publicly what
they themselves had agreed upon.
(j) See Doc. No. 204. ED.
27
The Arab States and The Arab League
Statement by the Lebanese Foreign Minister (Philip Taqla), in Con-
nection with the Jordanian Foreign Minister's Statement on Syrian
Unity
November 22, 1946 (i)
Lebanon's attitude towards the question of Greater Syria has always been clear,
for we do not want Greater Syria with or without Lebanon.
I reiterate what I had said in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies: Lebanon has
joined the Arab League on the basis of her independence within her present bouda-
ries and on the basis of the independence of each of the other (Arab) States in their
own boundaries. I am, indeed, surprised that the question of Greater Syria should be
raised periodically and at particular dates, contrary to the Cairo Pact (2) and the true
interests of the Arabs. Has His Excellency ash-Shurayqy Pasha forgotten the siga-
ture of his country's representatives ? I do not believe that the countries meant by the
Greater Syria plan agree with his point of view, for it would be better for them to have
in international organizations several votes rather than one vote. It is, indeed, regret-
table that this question, which was buried a long time ago, should be raised again, and
at a time when the delegates of the Arab States are meeting to co-ordinate their efforts
for (serving) their League. I, however, see nothing in the statement of ash-Shurayqy
Pasha except a personal opinion which is of no political consequence.
Statement by the Syrian Acting Foreign Minister, Made in the
Chamber of Deputies, Concerning Syrian Unity
November 23, 1946 (3)
The Government has perused the statement and speeches made by the Foreign
Minister of the Kingdom of Jordan and by some high official sources (there)
expressly reiterating what had been unofficially circulated and published, both in
the Press and in conversations, regarding a subject which relates to the very being of
this country.
In answer to the question of the honourable deputy, I hereby submit to you
the view of (my) Government in this respect:
The attitude of the authorities of the Kingdom of Jordan, as reflected in their
plans and statements, is contrary to the general principles of international law, and
contradicts the rules observed by states, as well as the Pact of the League of Arab
States, which provides that every (Arab) State should respect the system of govern-
ment existing in the other States, and should refrain from interfering in their internal
affairs. (This Jordanian attitude) is also repugnant to the spirit of co-operation and
amity on which the Pact of the League is based.
(j) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jorda-
nian Government's White Book (Amman) 1946), p. 255.
(2) Presumably referring to the Pact of the Arab League. See Doc. No. 29 ED.
(3) This Statement was made in answer to a question asked in the Syrian Chamber of
Deputies by deputy Hamid al-Khawja> concerning Transj or dan's "ambitions" over
Syria; translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the
Jordanian Government's White Book (Amman 1947), pp. 259-260. ED.
28
International Affairs: Arab Unity
From the very dawn of the Arab (national) movement, Syria has been working
to (achieve) the solidarity and unity of the Arab countries. In her struggle, she has not
made a distinction between her (own) independence and (the realization) of this idea,
which is cherished by every Arab. We can (indeed) say, in all pride, that our country
has been (the) leading (one) in this field, and that the Arab (national) idea is still our
guide and ideal. But we have always wanted the idea of federation or unity to be based
on dignity and sovereignty, and have opposed the exploitation of this noble idea in
order to undermine the independence and sovereignty of any (Arab) country.
From the time when Transjordan was detached from this country (i) in 1920,
following the tragedy of (French) occupation, we have been suffering greatly and
making sacrifices for the sake of freedom, until (finally) God ordained (our) victory.
Thus Syria achieved (her) full independence and sovereignty, shook off all shackles,
and was admitted to the United Nations, participating thus, on a footing of equality
with big states, in international conferences. The last thing achieved by (Syria) in the
international field, was her admission to (the membership of) the Security Council
and her occupation of a prominent position in that (U.N.) organ- thanks to the support
of the Arab States and the other States.
Syria, accordingly, has no desire (to join) any union that is not free of all blemishes
or that would encroach upon the rights and privileges which she has gained and which
are (commonly) enjoyed by sovereign states. (Nor would she accept any union) based
on a foundation other than that chosen by the country as its charter and programme.
For (Syria) adopted its republican constitution, through its Constituent Assembly,
nearly twenty years ago, and is concerned over (the maintenance) of her republican
system and accepts no alternative to it.
We have no doubt that the Chamber (of Deputies) of the Syrian nation upholds
this policy of ours, inspired as it is by the speech of His Excellency the President of
the Republic in this Chamber last year, and based on adherence to the republican
system, the consolidation of the ties of friendship and co-operation among the Arab
States, and resistance to any kind of Zionist domination.
Statement to the Press Made by the Jordanian Foreign Minister J *7
(Ash-Shurayqy), in Connection with the Lebanese Foreign Minister's '
Statement on Syrian Unity
November 24, 1946 (2)
The French News Agency published a new statement made by His Excellency
the Lebanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Philip Taqla, in which he clearly affirmed what
he had previously declared in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies regarding Syrian
unity or federation. His Excellency the (Foreign) Minister was this time particularly
clever when he pointed out, in all sympathy for the interests of the Arabs, how the
question of Greater Syria is raised periodically and at particular dates, contrary to
what the Arab States had undertaken by virtue of the Cairo Pact (3), as he says. To
enlighten Arab public opinion, and to put matters in their proper place, we think
(/) Meaning here Syria. ED.
(2) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordan-
ian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947) , pp. 256-257.
(3) That is, the Pact of the Arab League. ED.
The Arab States and The Arab League
that we should also declare, in our turn, that those who raise this question perio-
dically and at particular dates, to give it a form other than its own and present it as if
it were a subject of dispute and argument, are its opponents and not its advocates.
(In doing so) they are ignoring the wishes of the Syrian people, the general Arab
aspirations, and the provisions of Article 9 of the Cairo Pact, itself which provides
that "those Arab League States desirous of closer collaboration with each other, and
stronger ties than those specified by this Covenant, have a right to conclude such
agreements between themselves towards the realisation of these objects, as they desire.
Treaties and Agreements previously concluded, or which may be concluded with any
other state, by any state belonging to the League, shall not be obligatory or binding
on the other members."
Would there be any room left, with the existence of this provision, to domineer
over the will of the Syrian people or of the Arab States if they (choose) closer co-
operation and stronger bonds which may be made possible through unity or federa-
tion? I rather find in this domineering (action) an encroachment upon the very inde-
pendence of the Arab States which can by no means be admitted by the Pact of
Cairo.
What indeed attracts attention is that His Excellency the Lebanese Foreign
Minister should openly oppose Syrian unity or federation, as such, even if the com-
plete independence of Lebanon is maintained and no one asks Lebanon to join (this
unity or federation). This constitutes an extremely domineering attitude over the
affairs of others a (policy) which the democratic national circles in Lebanon have
always avoided and in which they found a trend incompatible with Arab aspirations
and the modern international principles, and (one) which is unlikely to further (even)
the Lebanese aspirations themselves.
If we were to be as completely frank as His Excellency the Lebanese Foreign
Minister has chosen to be and (such frankness) is necessary in such a case we
should ask ourselves why sister Lebanon should be allowed to expand at the expense
of the Syrian regions, against their free choice, and yet why Syria the partitioned,
nay dismembered (Syria) should not be allowed to unite by her own choice and
free will so that she may grow on the basis of her national and natural rights and within
the limits of her (own) regions ?
As for those who consider that we should sacrifice our national unity so that we
may increase our votes in international organizations, I think that they are very well
aware that one single important vote is still vetoing, in these organizations, all the
votes of the United Nations. Yet who knows? May be they would justify further
divisions of the one country as long as the reason is that we should have more votes in
the international field. Let us wait then.
O Statement by the Jordanian Prime Minister and Acting Foreign
O Minister (Ibrahim Hashim) in the Legislative Assembly, in Reply
to the Statement of the Syrian Foreign Minister (Khalid Al-'Azm),
Concerning Syrian Unity
November 1946 (i)
(j) The above Statement was made in reply to a question raised by a member of the
Assembly ( Sabri at-Tabba J ) in connection with Syria's official attitude towards
the question of Syrian unity \ translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic)
text as it appears in the Jordanian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947),
pp. 261-262. ED.
30
International Affairs: Arab Unity
I reply to your question (by saying) that the Jordanian Government's reply to
the various statements made in the Syrian Chamber of Deputies by the esteemed
Deputies and by His Excellency the Syrian Foreign Minister is, as far as the essence
of the question is concerned, the same as that given by the Jordanian Foreign Minister
to His Excellency the Lebanese Foreign Minister.
As for all the other things which His Excellency the Deputy (Foreign) Minister
and the esteemed Deputies have said, to the effect that the responsible (authorities) in
Transjordan have acted in contradiction to the rules observed by states, and violated
the Pact of the League of Arab States, (I would say) : all this has nothing to do with
the essence of the question, namely, the indispensable Syrian unity for which we
should work, with God's help. This (indeed) is the wish of the whole of the Syrian
people and their sound and ancient Covenant.
As for the present conditions in Syria, I would say - in my capacity as a Prime
Minister of a Syrian State lying in the south of that beloved country - that there is
a great difference (on the one hand) between a country which was established by the
Arab Revolt and by the national principles, and which gave shelter to the noble
revolutionaries in days of crises, and (on the other hand), other administrations(i)
which were established by the French Republic and by the Sykes-Picot Agreement;
(2) - the two cannot be compared together - for when (France), regretting (having
established Syria as a State ), then delivered her severe blows (against Syria, it was
Jordan who) stood in support of those who were in power (in Syria) at the time.
There is now in Syria another European State (j) which interfered and then
evacuated; but he who evacuates cannot be trusted not to return when the oppor-
tunity arises. There is nothing to prevent such catastrophes except the unity of the
Syrian countries.
As for the Pact of the Arab League, all the States (Members) of the League know
very well that we adhere to it, and that (this Pact) does not prevent the unity of one
country which has been partitioned by foreign imperialistic interests, with private
interests wanting to keep it divided. The Syrian Nation, which has been tormented
through its own sons, because of what it has been suffering from during the recent
days, knows those who are working for its good. It is the nation that has the last word,
and not those (Syrian rulers) against whom the Constitution Committee of their own
Parliament decided that they had violated the Constitution by the Ordinances which
they had issued.
Statement by the Jordanian Foreign Minister (Ash-Shurayqy) at the J Q
Council of the Arab League, in connection with the Stand Taken over ^
the Question of Syrian Unity by Sa'dallah Al-Jabiry, Syrian Prime
Minister
(November 26, 1946) (4)
While being thankful for the true feelings shown by the (representative of the)
Member States who desire the welfare of the League, yet, in order to put matters in
their proper place, I beg to state that the question has been submitted for discussion in
(j) Presumably meaning the Syrian Republic - perhaps also Lebanon and Palestine. ED.
(2) See Doc. No. 167. ED.
(3) Presumably referring here to Britain. ED.
(4) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordan-
ian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947), pp. 262-265.
The Arab States and The Arab League
a sudden manner without our prior knowledge, and on a basis which conflicts with
the competence of the Council (of the Arab League). For the Council of the League is
bound by a Pact which does not authorize it to consider a dispute or disagreement if
this (question) may be considered a dispute between two or more Member States
of the League, unless the question is submitted to it for arbitration by the two conten-
ding parties, or unless it considers the question on the basis of mediation and in con-
formity with a special procedure which has not been observed here.
I heard the Secretary-General (of the League) mention the word "complaint" and
then explain it. The esteemed Council has no right to hear any complaints, in any
case, but may arbitrate if appointed (for such a purpose) by the two contending par-
ties. Yet the issue is not a dispute. It is only malicious propaganda which describes it
as a dispute or a disagreement and exaggerates it. If you consider (the question) now
being raised as an informal talk which is not of an official character, then I can
assure you all that the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan is foremost amongst those who
have concern for solidarity among the States of the League and respect its Pact. Had
we prepared our documents (in advance) and had you enabled us to expound our
point of view as it should be (expounded), you would have found that it is not we who
are stirring up a controversy on this subject; for those who are stirring it up are the
opponents of our National Covenant. The question is a purely national one, relating
to the general Arab conscience, the principles of the Arab Revolt, and the struggle in
the necessity of which we believe and the course of which we have followed, together
with our brethren, for about thirty years.
"Greater Syria", honourable brethren, cannot be disputed by the protagonists of
the Arab cause, nor can it be (the subject of a dispute), for what is meant by it ?
By "Greater Syria" is meant Syria (i) in its natural boundaries, considering that
it is a geographic, historical and national unit, constituting one (single) Arab country
which is one of three (regions): Egypt, Iraq and Syria. The Syrian territories, Jordan
included, believe in their Arabdom, in their common land and interests, and in the
natural state of affairs which God has ordained for them. It is (indeed) in the light of
this that our national struggle has been (directed) ever since the dawn of Arab revival.
In spite of (Syria's) occupation by foreign troops and its dismemberment into various
regions at the end of the First World War, in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agree-
ment and the Balfour Declaration, it has declared its independence and unity in Dam-
ascus, on this basis, since 1920. It has also provided for the necessity of striving for
the realization of the Arab federation. This memorable (occasion) has become an of-
ficial national day, and the citizens of all the Syrian regions have made of this historic
resolution a National Covenant because it was issued unanimously by the General
Syrian Congress (2). The General Syrian Congress is the only Constituent Assembly
in which Syria was represented in its natural boundaries, and which comprised depu-
ties of all the regions of Syria at the time. And its resolution has been observed by all
the Syrian territories from the extreme north to the extreme south because it was a
sound and true expression of their general wish.
There is not, therefore, a new plan called "The Greater Syria Plan", in the sense
in which it is being diffused and spread, but rather a continuation of the movement of
the Arab struggle for the realization of national aspirations in the Syrian regions,
within (Syria's) natural boundaries. But the establishment of artificial barriers,
(1) The Arabic term used here is "Bilad ash-Sham". ED.
(2) See Doc. No. 2. ED.
International Affairs: Arab Unity
together with the continuation of estrangement between the regions of one homeland,
under the pretext of the diversity in the system of government, or for any other
(reason) which may be inspired by foreigners or by those with personal designs,
constitutes, in our view, a backing out of, and a flinching from the common struggle.
(It also constitutes) an unjustifiable revocation of the Covenant of general Syrian unity
in international circumstances under which the realization of this Covenant has be-
come one of our own rights. (This is) all the more so since the diversity in the systems
of government does not conflict with the federal system. Moreover, there is not one
single Syrian region which has the right to revoke unilaterally the Covenant of unity,
because (such action) would involve an encroachment upon the general national
conscience and upon the rights and common interests of all the Syrian regions. What
we must now ask ourselves is : if the common struggle for the realization of Syrian
unity or federation was possible for us when we were under direct foreign domination,
why should it not be possible for us to give effect to our determination and to our
Covenant, now that our countries have become free, or at least the possibilities of our
common action have become greater than ever before ?
Is is indeed, strange that we should be held accountable for our national aspira-
tion to unity or federation, when it is the realization of this aspiration that was aimed
at by the Pact of our League, in letter and spirit. What attracts attention, indeed, is
that the aspiration to unity or federation, which emanates from the general Arab cons-
cience, should be considered as an encroachment upon the regime which exists in any
of the Arab States j (in spite of) the knowledge that the national aspiration is one thing
and the encroachment upon an existing regime is something else. For (this natural)
aspiration) is a belief relating to freedom of opinion, the ability to pass judgment on
national public matters, and (to) the political programmes not binding on others. The
ultimate decision regarding (this aspiration), moreover, rests with the wish of the peo-
ple which is the source of all power.
A few days ago, when the Syrian Government's statement which unjustifiably at-
tacked the Covenant of Syrian unity was published, I was reading in the same paper
Mr. ChurchilFs proposals regarding the formation of the United States of Europe,
You will all recall that Mr. Churchill had previously made a similar proposal, during
the war, for the formation of a federal state comprising France and England. You will
also recall that after the First World War Mr. Briand had adopted the project of the
United States of Europe as well. These international precedents do not mean in any
way that any of these statesmen was, in his proposals, encroaching upon the regimes
in the other states, in spite of all the national and regional differences which exist
between those states.
I consider the esteemed Chamber is far above considering the call to the adher-
ence to Arab ideals and national covenants which are unanimously respected by the
Syrian people in their various regions as a source of dispute or disagreement.
Resolution Adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States, 20
Concerning Syrian Unity
November 28, 1946 (i)
A controversy has recently taken place regarding the Greater Syria Plan. The
Foreign Ministers of the Arab States, accordingly, held a special meeting in which
(i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic} text as it appears in the Jordan-
ian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947) p. 267.
33
The Arab States and the Arab League
they studied the question from its (many) angles. It appeared, however, that no one
intended, by dealing with this subject, to encroach upon the independence and sov-
ereignty of any State (Member) of the (Arab League) or to interfere in its system of
government.
They have, therefore, affirmed the adherence by their States to the Pact of the
League, and their respect and observance thereof, in letter and in spirit.
JAMIL MARDAM-BEY MUHAMMAD ASH-SHURAYQY
(For the Syrian Foreign Minister) (Foreign Minister of the Hash-
imite Kingdom of Jordan)
YUSUF YASIN FADIL AL-JAMALI
(Far the Foreign Minister of (Foreign Minister of Iraq)
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
PHILIP TAQLA IBRAHIM 'AED AL-HADI
(Foreign Minister of Lebanon) (Foreign Minister of the Kingdom
of Egypt)
MUHAMMAD AL-'UMARI
( Representative of Yaman )
T Covering Letter by the Jordanian Foreign Minister (ash-Shurayqy)
* Addressed to the President of the Arab League Council, Together
with a Memorandum, Concerning Syrian Unity
November 1946, (i)
In confirmation of the adherence of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan to the
Pact of the League of Arab States, my Government has requested me to submit the
enclosed Memorandum. (This Memorandum) embodies the Jordanian point of view
regarding the question of Syrian unity or federation, considering that this is a national
principle which-is in no way related 10 the propaganda which has been spread about
it and which the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States have finally agreed to end,
being concerned for the dissipation of doubts and for the complete solidarity of the
States of the Arab League.
MUHAMMAD ASH-SHURAYQY
Foreign Minister of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan
(TEXT OF MEMORANDUM)
The Jordanian Government considers that to advocate any national unity or
federation, by (the right) political means or proper and lawful statements,
without encroachment upon the rights of others, should not be regarded as a matter
for disagreement, since every Arab country is essentially based on the unity or fede-
ration of its various parts. Thus, if the lawful reasons for, and the possibilities of,
unity or federation are present, without prejudice to any private or public right, it
would be to the advantage of the Arabs that disunity should disappear. For (dis-
unity) is harmful to the nation, being incompatible with the welfare of the country or
with its aspirations and hopes. In the opinion of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan,
this does not conflict in any way with the respect of the independence of any of the
States of the League or with the existing systems of government as long as the decision
(j) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jor-
danian Government's White Book (Amman* i947)> pp. 265-266.
34
International Affairs: Arab Unity
regarding any unity or federation is ultimately left to the will of the people (i)
concerned, in their character as the source of all power, to general (Arab) national
conscience, and to voluntary agreements between the responsible Governments.
While we fully appreciate the concern of the Committee of the Foreign Ministers
of the Arab States in putting an end to the mischievous propaganda directed against
the Greater Syria Plan, as stated in their joint statement,(2) we are submitting the
present Memorandum in order to reserve (the right) of the Jordanian Government to
(maintain) its point of view regarding a national principle to which it attaches parti-
cular significance, a (principle) which has an essential bearing on (Jordan's) regional
interests and national Covenant.
Kindly accept my highest esteem
HEAD OF THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION AND FOREIGN MINISTER
OF THE HASHIMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN.
Statement to the Press, Made by the Syrian Foreign Minister
(Khalid Al-'Azm) Concerning Syrian Unity 2 2
December 2, 1946 (3)
I have read a statement made by Mr. Ibrahim Hashim,the Jordanian Prime Min-
ister, in the Legislative Assembly. (This statement) is distinguished from
previous statements by two points which the Syrian Government refutes most strong-
ly and frankly :
i. The distinction between Trans Jordan and Syria in so far as concerns (their)
emergence and establishment :
It was mentioned in the above statement that the State of Jordan was established
by the Arab Revolt and by national principles, and that the Republic of Syria was
created by France and the Sykes-Picot Agreement.
Recent history, which we all still remember, is the best answer to this assertion.
For Jordan's present status is nothing but the outcome of a statement made by the
British High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, in which he declared
the extension of Britain's rule (4) over this province which had been cut off from
Syria following the catastrophe of 1920. This (statement) was followed by the
British authorities' choice of the rulers of that region. Sovereignty there is still
incomplete, since foreign troops are still stationed in Jordan with the consent of its
rulers. Our own status, on the other hand, is the outcome of a constitution drawn up
by the Constituent Assembly which was lawfully elected in 1928, and according to
which the State is headed by a president elected by the nation.
As for the Sykes-Picot Agreement - which was irrevocably rejected by the whole
country - it was buried in its own cradle, and exists only in the discarded records of
the buried history of imperialism. Our country now enjoys a full fledged independ-
ence and a complete sovereignty, which are not restricted by any limitation or condi-
(i)Literally, "nation". ED.
(2) See Doc. 20. ED.
(3) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jor-
danian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947), pp. 268-269.
(4) The Arabic term used here is "siyada", literally meaning "sovereignty, suzerainty,
etc" which does not apply in this case. ED.
35
The Arab States and the Arab League
tion and cannot be undermined by any agreement or treaty. Moreover, there is no
sign of any foreign troops in (our) country.
2. The allegation that the evacuation of Syria was brought about by a European
State, and that those who evacuated cannot be trusted not to return whenever the
opportunity arises:
We are loath to think that any Arab would attribute the favour of Syria's
national sovereignty, which is characterized by the complete evacuation (of foreign
forces), to the act of the foreigners, or that he would underestimate the scores of
thousands of victims, the tremendous efforts exerted, the frequent revolts which broke
out, and the dreadful disasters which have befallen Syria. The last of these (revolts)
comprised the events of last year, as a result of which Syria attained her goal and
realized her cherished aspiration 3 complete sovereignty and independence.
We also deem it grave that any Arab leader should think of or allude to the return
of those who have evacuated the country when Syria, having made all these sacrifices
to achieve her independence, will not hesitate to make many more, in order to safe-
guard her independent status and republican regime.
It is, indeed, strange that the international situation, which is being supervised
by the United Nations Organization, with the support of the Security Council, should
be underestimated to the extent that Member States of that Organization should be
suspected of thinking of revoking what (they) had concluded, thus violating the
United Nations Charter and disturbing peace.
I affirm once more the declaration I have made on behalf of the Government
before the Chamber of Deputies which represents the wishes of the nation - a decla-
ration which obtained the unanimous approval of the Chamber, But to persist in rais-
ing this question by statements and declarations which are made every now and then
would only serve those who harbour evil designs against the Arabs; and who would be
satisfied by the subversion of the Arab League , which is enhancing the Arab cause
and is standing as an impregnable bulwark in the face of Zionist ambitions ?
Statement by the Jordanian Foreign Minister ( Ash-Shurayqy ),
Made in the Legislative Assembly in Reply to a Question Concerning
Syria's Attitude Towards the Arab Foreign Ministers' Resolution
December 7, 1946 (i)
Honourable Deputies:
The Chamber has devoted this sitting to hearing our reply to the following
question :
(The Question)
A number of the members of this Chamber have requested the holding of this spe-
cial meeting so that the Government may enlighten the country (on the following) :
First : The reasons for the persistence of certain Syrian papers in attacking this Arab
country in a manner harmful to (our) national ties and common patriotic struggle, and
which alienates the citizens of the one homeland from one other.
Second : The reasons for which His Excellency the Syrian Prime Minister and De-
(/) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordan-
ian Government's White Book (Amman)) 1947* pp. 270-275.
International Affairs: Arab Unity
puty Foreign Minister had made to the Press new statements which will inevitably give
rise to controversy between the two parts of one country, an action which conflicts
with the resolution adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States, on Novem-
ber 28, 1946, and declared on their behalf by His Excellency the President of the Coun-
cil of the League of Arab States for this session.
Deputy 'Isa 'Awad
(The Reply)
First : Regarding the first part of the question, I would reply as follows :
The charges, revilements, and open instigations published by the Syrian Press
and offending the dignity and the very self of (our) struggling Arab country, have, in
fact, gone beyond all the limits of official courtesy moral and national. Nothing but
provocation is intended by this. Although this can hurt none but those who perpe-
trate it, yet any local authority may connive at it whenever it wants to foster estrange-
ment and the alienation of the citizens of one homeland from one another. And yet,
who is to blame (for such estrangement and alienation) if it is true that we are seeking
the well-being of the Arabs and the consolidation of the League of Arab States ?
Second : As for the second part of the question, a political argument with His Excel-
lency the Lebanese Foreign Minister has, as you recall, recently taken place on the
the subject of the Covenant of Syrian unity or federation. This was followed by a
planned attack, in the Syrian Chamber of Deputies, by certain (deputies) of the
northern region of (our) dear (Arab) homeland. (This attack) was not less extremist
than that made by the papers referred to. These (deputies) unjustly and most exten-
sively dealt with matters which essentially pertain to our domestic affairs, comparing
the two countries together on a basis of error or subterfuge. All this (happened)
because Jordan, which is a part of (Greater) Syria, was and still is advocating the unity
of the homeland, within the limits of lawful possibilities, in pursuance of what the
Syrian fatherland has pledged itself to, and of what was unanimously adopted at the
time by its regions.
This deliberate attack compelled His Excellency the Prime Minister, Ibrahim
Pasha Hashim, following a question addressed to him in the Chamber, to reply to the
statement made by the Syrian Government in its Chamber of Deputies. In the mean-
time, while I was in Cairo as the head of the Jordanian delegation, the Council of the
League of Arab States was taken by surprise by the Syrian delegation's raising the
subject of Syrian unity or federation, or what is referred to by the Press as "The Grea-
ter Syria Plan". In the hope of putting an end to the controversy while yet maintain-
ing (our) principles, we were the first to welcome a private, and not an off icial, discus-
sion of the question because it was not on the Council's agenda for that session. We
explained frankly to our brethren that the call for the unity or the federation of the
homeland by lawful means, in our view, essentially pertains to the Pact of the League
in (its) letter and spirit, and is one of its aims (quite) the contrary of what was being
spread and diffused. (We also explained) that to announce and advocate proposals and
plans for unity or confederation (i) does not conflict with the general principles of
international law, as long as the question does not go beyond the limits of an opinion
and a free invitation.
(i) The Arabic term used here is "ittihad duwaliyy", literally meaning "international
federation". ED.
37
The Arab States and the Arab League
This is supported by international practice and precedents. Mr. Churchill, for
example, is still advocating the federation of the States of Western Europe; during the
last war he proposed and advocated the establishment of a federal state which would
comprise France and England. Mr. Briand,the French (ex-Prime) Minister, had also,
at the end of the First World War, espoused the call to the plan of the United States of
Europe. Such (a policy) can in no way mean that any of these responsible statesmen
was, in his plans and proposals, encroaching upon the systems of government in the
other States in spite of the national and regional differences between those States. And
yet, how different is this from our (own) call to a unity or federation to which all the
Syrian territories had jointly bound themselves, so that no Syrian district now has the
right to revoke it unilaterally, because of the violation of the general national wish and
common interests of the Syrian regions (which such an act would constitute).
The Council of the League, having heard our point of view and discussed the
question in a brotherly spirit, decided to consider the discussion private, and (also
decided) that the Foreign Ministers should come to an agreement among themselves.
We thus met in the most friendly and brotherly (manner), and arrived at the following
joint resolution:
(See Doc. No. 20)
The Foreign Ministers entrusted the announcement of this joint communique to
His Excellency the President of the Council of the League for this session. They all
agreed to cease all political controversy. We were the first to adhere to this, in spite of
the intimations we felt in the papers, aiming at the shelving of the (very) principle (of
Greater Syria) and not at ending the controversy.
And to reaffirm further our adherence to the Pact of the League of Arab States,
we submitted to the President of the Council of the League the following Memoran-
dum:
(See Doc. No. 21)
Honourable Deputies:
You will notice from these explanations that, in all we did, we were only aiming at
the maintenance of the Covenant of national unity or federation, on the one hand, and
the Pact of the League of Arab States, on the other. We would have liked to hope
earnestly that our brethren who are in power in Northern Syria would not unjustifi-
ably revive the controversy, contrary to what was agreed upon among the (Arab) For-
eign Ministers in Cairo. In view of the statement recently made by His Excellency
the Syrian Prime Minister and Deputy Foreign Minister at a Press conference on
December 2, 1946, the Jordanian Government cannot but correct the mistakes con-
tained in that official statement, so that Arab public opinion would be aware of our
point of view as well.
His Excellency Khalid Bey al-' Azm stated that Trans Jordan was not the outcome
of the Arab Revolt. He knows that (statehood) is one thing and the recognition there-
of is another. (He also knows) that this beloved part of the greater homeland was the
main field of the Revolt, and that its Goverment is the same Syrian Arab Government
which was reduced to the south when the Balfour Declaration and the Sykes-Picot
Agreement most severely tore up our Syrian country into pieces. No better proof
of this is provided than (this country's) fluttering flag, which is the flag of the Arab
Revolt and is decorated by the star of Syrian unity that beloved flag which shall
remain an everlasting symbol of the birth of our one homeland in its natural bound-
aries.
38
International Affairs: Arab Unity
As to what was stated by His Excellency Khalid Bey al-'Azm, to the effect that
Northern Syria is the outcome of the Constitution of 1928, this is what we, too, say,
but with this difference: this Constitution (of 1928) is in fact a regional constitution
which was drawn up after the partition (of Syria) and on the basis of (that partition),
by virtue of the deletions made in it by the French in order to confirm the partition
Partition was, in fact, only the fruit of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. How, then,
could this Zionist and imperialistic Agreement have been buried in its cradle, when
our one homeland is still divided ? For if we are actively seeking the repudiation of
this unjust Agreement, we ought to co-operate and work in solidarity for the realiza-
tion of unity or national federation and the achievement for our beloved country of its
full national rights.
Some of the Honourable Deputies in the northern part of the (Arab) homeland
inquired whether we wanted to annex them, or to join them thus forgetting that we
are all the sons of one homeland, and that we are seeking neither (their) annexation (to
us) nor (our) joining them, but only reunion. We want the brothers and (members of)
the same family to reunite and pray that God will bring together those who have been
separated, now that the circumstances for their reunion have become favourable. We
(also want) to decide on a practical and legal method whereby these two parts of (our)
dear country could come together by common agreement, within the limits of lawful
possibilities and without prejudice to the systems of government or to international
vested rights. (This we want) since the matter will ultimately rest with the wishes of
the nation or on voluntary agreements between the responsible governments in a man-
ner which will guarantee the other rights on an international basis.
As for Jordan's association with Great Britain through a treaty of friendship and
alliance, this will not undermine any situation or vested right in the case of any unity
or federation ; the examples of this, in the international sphere, are numerous and well-
known. Moreover, with her new treaty, Jordan has become independent, similar to
her sister (States), and God has thereby saved her from the Mandate and the Balfour
Declaration; there is no way to deny this fact, much as malicious propaganda may
try to distort facts.
Honourable Deputies:
It has been sometimes said that this is not the time for advocating unity or federa-
tion; but what harm is there in this, when unity is (only) strength and disunity weak-
ness, and (also) when (unity or federation) have (now) become possible and depend
exclusively on the wishes of the nation. We do not even consider that anybody
whoever he may be has a right to prevent the one homeland from being reunited or
its rupture from being mended, by lawful methods, on the basis of complete freedom,
within the limits of available possibilities, and without prejudice to anybody's right.
His Exellency the Syrian Prime Minister and Deputy Foreign Minister men-
tioned, in his recent statement, that the declarations of His Excellency the Jordanian
Prime Minister which (in fact) solely deal with the wish to see the country united
impair the interests of the Arabs and make the foreigner wait for an opportunity to
undermine the League of Arab States. As for us, we know of nothing more harmful to
the interests of the Arabs than the division of their homeland, as a measure to weaken
their prestige. We also find nothing in the fostering of division which is prejudicial to
the common interests of our country, except an actual conspiracy against (our) nation-
al aspirations and the aims of the Arab League.
39
The Arab States and the Arab League
Resolution of the Jordanian Legislative Assembly Concerning
Syrian Unity
December 7, 1946 (7)
1. The Jordanian Legislative Assembly completely upholds the principle of the
unity of Greater Syria, and declares the adherence of Jordan to the joint Syrian
Covenant emanating from the only Constituent Assembly which comprised the
representatives of all the Syrian regions who met in 1920, i.e. the General Syrian
Congress.
2. The Jordanian Legislative Assembly affirms that the Covenant of the "greater
unity of the country", which was duly supported by the results of the plebiscite held
for the Syrian people in all their regions, is also a national principle unanimously
respected, and that no Syrian region may revoke it unilaterally. This principle should
not constitute an encroachment on the private rights of the regions and their systems
of government, as long as the question of its definition and fulfilment rests ultimately
with the general national wishes, or with voluntary agreements between the re-
sponsible Governments.
3. The Jordanian Legislative Assembly protests against the violation, by the
Syrian Prime Minister and Deputy Foreign Minister, of the resolution adopted by the
Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Arab States at the League Council, concerning
the cessation of political controversy in deference to solidarity among the Arab
States. It also protests against the publication by some Syrian papers of abusive
attacks which injure the dignity of this country and are detrimental to inter-Arab
relations and to the common national interests.
4. The Assembly charges the Government with the announcement of this
resolution and its communication to the quarters concerned.
The Syrian (Qudsi) Project Submitted to the Political Committee
of the Arab League for Establishing an Arab Federation
January 23, 7957 (2)
i. The President of the Syrian Council of Ministers has the honour to submit, in
the name of the Syrian Government, the following Memorandum to the Secretariat-
(7) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordanian
Government's White Book (Amman 1947), p. 276.
(2) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text courteously sent him by the
Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States. The project was considered by
the Political Committee, which decided:
(i)To invite those Arab States zvhich signed the Treaty of Joint Defence and Eco-
nomic Co-operation ( Arab Collective Security Pact ) to proceed to ratify this
Treaty and to implement its provisions at the earliest possible date.
(2}To set up a committee composed of the representatives of Member States under the
chairmanship of the Egyptian Foreign Minister, in order to study the comments of
these States on the Project (to be sent within three months) and to report to the
Political Committee before June 75, '95^.
The Council of the League approved the recommendations of the Political Com-
mittee on February 2, 7957. (Resol 337 - Sess. 13 - Sched. 3). ED. D.
40
International Affairs'. Arab Unity
General of the League of Arab States, as well as to their Royal Highnesses and Excel-
lencies, the Representatives of the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Hashimite
Jordan, Lebanon, and Mutawakkilite Yaman, at the Political Committee (of the
League) now meeting in Cairo. He is hoping that (this Memorandum) will be studied
by this Committee and that recommendations be made by it to the Council of the
League so that this Council may take decisions concerning (these recommendations)
at its shortly forthcoming meeting.
2. The dangerous character of the international situation is obvious and does not
need any explanation. Events are rapidly following each other in such a way that
imminent dangers are coming well within sight. All this (is taking place ) while the
the Arabs remain as they are: weak, divided, hesitant, backward, and perplexed.
This (state of affairs) renders their countries and peoples exposed to inevitable
(catastrophes) which one finds difficult to define, and makes them, when divided, of
no significance on the international scale. (This will be so) whether the cold war
continues, whether the apprehended event takes place, (i) or whether it comes to
settling accounts.
It has been proved that small states are no longer of any significance, and that
they have to form a block that will bind them together by firm legal ties; the strong
effect of which will become manifest in peace and the durability of which will not
be subject to doubt in war.
3. Besides these* dangers, which are harassing the whoje world, we find that the
Arab States have been inflicted with another danger, namely, the Jewish enemy
settled in the midst of our countries, harbouring evil designs over us, and whose
danger increases every time a Jewish immigrants' ship anchors on the shores of
Palestine.
4. Sound military considerations indicate tha: it is at present difficult for most of
the Arab States individually to face this Zionist danger, whose chief concern has been
to divide the Arab States and meet them one after the other, so that it may survive and
then expand. The only way to ward off its danger at present is to encircle it with a
defensive tier in the North, East and South.
One of the greatest catastrophes we fear may befall the Arab world on account
of Israel is the separation, on the one hand, of the Arabs of Egypt and the adjoining
(Arab lands) to the West these constitute about 60 millions and on the other hand,
the Arabs of the East al-Mashriq [these constitute about 20 millions]. The most
dangerous arrow that has been directed by the Jews against the Arabs has been the
separation of these two segments (of the Arab world) through their manoeuvres in
the Negev and through their murder of Bernadotte for their definite interest.
5. Let us remember that the Jews look onto the Mediterranean and the Red Sea,
and that they have possibilities for the equipment of a mercantile fleet and navy that
would expose all the neighbouring Arab coastal (States) to danger, whether in respect
of their economic (affairs) or their integrity. Their designs in (the Gulf of) Aqaba,
in particular indicate (the existence of) great expansionist intentions (on their part)
in these waters.
6. All of the Arab States will, sooner or later, (find themselves) equally (exposed) to
these dangers, whether international or Zionist, however much these States may differ
in their geographical situations or in their local conditions. This is a fact which is
(/) By the "apprehended event" w, presumably) meant the outbreak of war. ED.
41
The Arab States and the Arab League
worth remembering. For the question is not one of some of the Arab States proceed-
ing to rescue their sister (States). Indeed, the realities of the situation (necessitate) that
all of (these Arab) States should take good care of their integrity and safeguard their
existence.
The events of the past years, whether in the international sphere or in Palestine,
and (also) the designs harboured against the Arab world, are self-explanatory proofs
of what we are saying (now).
7. It is common knowledge that it is only the elements of strength, military pre-
paredness, and material possibilities, which give weight to States in the political
field. Accordingly, only Turkey and Israel, on the basis of their armies, are at present
seriously taken into consideration by the (experts of the) two world blocs for the
defence of the Middle East and for the achievement of security therein. The Arabs
are, however, in the view of war commanders and their experts, but negligible quanti-
ties. For this (reason), no arms are shipped to them, and the aid which they have been
repeatedly promised and which has eventually come to be restricted to endless
investigations, studies and postponements, has not been granted.
8. We would point out that should the Arabs remain in their (present) condition,
the question would not be one of their alignment with the Democratic Bloc or with
Communism. For whichever of these two Blocs comes out victorious, (the Arabs)
will continue to be pestered with Zionism and with foreign pressure, from the East
or from the West. The important thing is to create power first and then to determine
our stand in the light of our interests, confidently and with conviction, before looking
towards this camp or that. The after-events of the last war have demonstrated to the
intelligent that if strong states are defeated, they are treated, and will eventually be
treated, better than victorious weak states.
9. For these considerations, a summary of which we have made above, we consider
it necessary to propose a practical project that would include all the Arab States and
that would ensure unification in foreign policy, in the national defence forces , in
economics, and in the basic (public) utilities, and that would be considered by Arab
public opinion and by world blocs as a subject of interest and hope or apprehension.
Recent history demonstrates that this process takes three forms :
First, the coming into being of the "Arab United States" , which is the
supreme ideal of every Arab. The events of the past two centuries have < demon-
strated the propriety of (this form) and its impact upon the nations of Europe and
America. And it is not a novel thing in the history of the Arabs, since for the past
twelve centuries they have been as one State, and this is stronger than a "United
States ".
As to the second form -which, as is demonstrated by history, is less effective
in its results - it is Federation (i) between the Arab States.
The third form - which is the weakest of the (three forms) - is Confederation.
10. In submitting these proposals, we would declare our faith in the definite pre-
ferability of the first form. And if we have mentioned the second and third forms, that
has been only in order to overcome (any) difficulties and obstacles that may stand
in the way of the first (form) or lead to an examination of the two other forms.
We consider that to follow this path will prove to be in the national interest
(i) The Arabic word used here is "al-Ittihad". Unless the context requires otherwise, the
term "federation" will be used throughout this text for the Arabic "ittihad". ED.
International Affairs: Arab Unity
and (will also) lead to effective strength that will have the last word in the Middle
East and a (considered) view on the international scale, and that will guarantee for us
and for our posterity the integrity of the homeland and constant hope under these
dangerous international circumstances.
On the other hand, the continuance of the relations among the Arab States as
they are (now) has not led to the consolidation of the prowess of the Arabs in the
recent past, and consequently nothing much can be expected from this (continuance)
in the dangerous present and in the impending future. In our view (therefore) it is
inevitable that the preceding proposal should be adopted.
11. As regards the practical means of accomplishing this, we would suggest that the
Political Committee (of the Arab League) should proceed, during its present meeting,
to adopt the idea in principle and then proclaim it publicly, first, in order to revive the
aspirations of the Arab peoples and reinforce their resoluteness in the internal field,
and (secondly) in order to consolidate the Arab poltitical stand abroad. Next, a (sub-)
committee representing all the (Arab) States should be immediately chosen. Its task
should be to get in touch speedily with those in power in the (Arab) capitals, (in order)
to) expound the idea and overcome (any possible) obstacles, to harmonize the
(various) points of view. (Its task should also be) to prepare the texts and documents
necessary for the new status, on strong, practical and fruitful bases to be studied by it
carefully and vigilantly. It should (further) propose the texts and provisions that
ought to be drawn up and enacted. (The sub-committee) should, however, complete
its work within a short time to be specified in advance by the Political Committee.
The Political Committee should immediately after that meet at a time to be
agreed upon from now in order to examine the proposals of the appropriate (sub-)
committee, and in respect of these to recommend immediately to the Council of the
(Arab League) the adoption of whatever has been agreed upon.
12. Since the present circumstances do not permit any delay, postponement or the
loss of time, we consider that, in addition to the above, the (Arab) Collective
Security (Pact) should be ratified on the basis of a unified command, and that the
appropriate military committee or committees should be called upon to discharge
their functions, in particular to organise the command in time of peace and to
provide for general military training in the Arab countries.
The combination of this political preparation with the accomplishment
of military organisation will restore to the Arab masses that (same) faith with which
they (were able in the past) to inscribe the most splendid and glorious (deeds) in their
history and which can save them from impending dangers. In this way, they will
(be able to) serve their nation as well as mankind, by their strong and useful stand and
by their (being able) to prevent quarrelling between the strong (States). This is (all)
in addition to the hidden riches in our lands and the fortunes on the abundance of
which depend mechanical (means of) civilization.
13. It is evident that the problem of weapons constitutes a handicap; the solution of
which depends on overcoming (certain) outstanding problems. This requires a
(certain) amount of time. For this reason, we think that the Arab States should im-
mediately proceed to train the larges possible number from amongst their inhabitants
with the weapons possessed by them at present and in a speedy and concrete manner,
as was done by Germany before she was permitted to re-arm in the years 1930-1935.
Were the Arab States to do this in earnest, speedily and resolutely, the States con-
cerned would then become certain that the Arabs had begun to lead a new life and
(to work) energetically. This would pave (the way) for the solution of the various
outstanding Arab problems. For the importance of states is always gauged, particu-
43
The Arab States and the Arab League
larly in the present circumstances, by their discipline and power, as well as by what
military strength they may have at the appropriate time.
We believe that the essential thing is to find the men who are trained in the
defence of our homelands. For once these are found, it will be easy to secure the
weapons and equipment necessary for their divisions.
14. We do not exaggerate when we say that the preceding proposals represent the
persistent desire of the Arab nation in (the) various (Arab countries).
We are also confident that what we are aiming at is realistic. For, whether we look
back to the past history of the Arab nation or to the very reality of the present, we find
that the factors of (Arab) unity are latent, abundant and tranquil, waiting for the
leaders of the (Arab) peoples to give the sign to rise in order to dispel the perched
spectre of disunity for which there are no roots or foundations in the conscience of the
(Arab) people.
The peculiar thing is for us to see throughout the world, particularly in Western
and Eastern Europe, the existence of unions that bring together nations that have dif-
ferent origins, racial roots, languages, history and traditions, (nations) that are stand-
ing in solidarity and unifying their foreign policies, that share in their defensive forces
and harmonize their economic possibilities, at a time when the Arab States are dis-
united although they are of one common origin, race, language, history, beliefs and
also interests.
We even think it still more peculiar, in so far as concerns Germany, Japan and
the Allies, that the enemies of yesterday should come to terms with each other for
the sake of (their) common interests, and that the armies which only a few years ago
stopped (their) dreadful fighting should be unified in order to ward off the imminent
danger. It would be a priori more becoming for the brothers of yesterday and tomor-
row to unite with each other.
Finally, we (do) see bigger unions (i) in all parts of the world: In North and
South America, in the Atlantic region, in Eastern Europe, and in the Far East. Only
these alliances can subsist.
15. However, if we were to decide on the creation of one of the three forms of union,
we would have to point out clearly that there are (certain) regimes which, logically
enough, should be given paramount consideration, but which can be harmonized
with the (steps) which we would be taking during the preliminary stages. This is in
order that these regimes may be reconciled with the new form (of union).
History is rich in examples of this type, showing that states, principalities
(duwaylat) or provinces maintained a degree of their particular status and (at the same
time) closely shared in the basic (public) utilities, so that this status came to be harm-
onized, steadily and amicably, within the framework of the common national unity
which eventually brought individuals to this status.
1 6. We also find it to be (our) duty to refer to (the fact that) the divergencies among
the Arab States in respect of their populations are an accomplished fact. (In this
connection), the sense of realism also necessitates that the composition of the councils
and (other) organs which will have supervisory power over the federation should be
taken into consideration.
17. However, (with regard to) the considerations which it has often been said stand
(j) The Arabic term used here is ec al-Ittihadat al-Kubra". ED.
44
International Affairs : Arab Unity
in the way of unity or federation, (we would point out that) social developments and
international resolutions, whether slow and quiet, or sudden and tumultuous, are
such that all considerations formed on a purely local basis would not (be able to)
stand in their way. Indeed, stupendous and oppressive waves are rising in this world,
in the face of which the status of the individual state will not endure. It (thus)
becomes the duty (of all) to find a solution for them before things get out of hand and
before it is too late. Some may consider that the proposals contained in this Memoran-
dum are of unrealizable or fanciful kinds of projects. But we are convinced that
for the Arabs to remain as they are in the face of the dangerous international cir-
cumstances, brings (one) nearer to illusion and (makes things) less enduring.
1 8. It is our frank opinion that the Arab States will be exposed to inescapable de-
velopments, that it is better for them to work towards federation as free (States), and
that our interest should lie in whatever we accomplish ourselves, and (should be the
result) of the zeal and enthusiasm of the Arab nation, instead of having other forms
(of unity) imposed upon us under circumstances beyond our power 3 (circumstances)
which will be adverse to us and advantageous to our enemies, and because of which
the Arab peoples will suffer terribly.
19. National consciousness is ahead of the politicians in the Arab world. This
consciousness will not tolerate the continuation of a policy which resulted in the
tragedy of Palestine and which may still result in graver (tragedies) in one (Arab)
country after another. It would (indeed) be prudent on our part to respond to the will
of the peoples while they are still disciplined and confident and before the anarchy of
disunity overtakes them and takes advantage of their present failure and of their
desperation of the future.
20. The Arab League has frustrated the hopes of the Arabs. It has been prodigal in
display and words and sparing in results and accomplishments. Everyone has (come)
to realize that the spirit which predominates in it does not keep abreast of the realities
of the age, the movement of the times, the grave nature of events, or the peoples' will
to go ahead. This is because (the League) has not followed a constructive path in the
defensive, economic, cultural or social fields. The individual Arab has not felt its
existence because it did not provide for any of his needs or revive in him any hope
for evolution and progress.
21. The present session of the Political Committee, and after it (that of) the Council
of the League, has, in the eyes of all the Arabs, the decisive word concerning the
(very) existence of the League. Likewise, world events under the present circumstan-
ces have the decisive word between peace and war and between the two quarrelling
blocs. Accordingly, either the League should disintegrate in the eyes of the nation,
if it is to continue in its argumentations, commentaries, adjournments and references
to committees and governments ; or, else, it should be rejuvenated if it is to adopt
whatever will bring confidence to (Arab) public opinion.
22. The (thing) which will be reassuring to public opinion is this federation which
will pool together the (various) possibilities of the Arab States. Foremost among these
comes the defensive force which will be the result of the integration of the armies
of (these States), the provisions for their needs, and the bearing of their burdens,
(a force) which will protect (the federation) against dangers and which will safeguard
its integrity. Then (comes the force) which will result from the pooling of the resour-
ces of these countries, which are complementary to each other, whether as regards
(their) characteristics, their abundance or their conditions. (These) include the
ability to carry out great projects in the economic, health education and social fields.
45
The Arab States and the Arab League
This will raise the standard of living of the individual Arab in order that he may feel
at heart that the homeland is not an abstract word but a reality that is reflected in the
invulnerability and evolution which everyday life brings to him, and in order that he
may be filled with enthusiasm for the defence of this homeland and be energetic and
successful in (his) work in the service of his nation, humanity, and peace.
Jordanian Prime Minister's ( T. Abn Al-Huda's ) Statement on
the Subject of the Iraqi-Jordanian Union
January 12, 1952 (r)
A secret session of (the Jordanian) Parliament was held on December 18, 1951,
in which I made certain statements on this subject (of union with Iraq). It is, indeed,
a matter for regret that what was said during that session was greatly distorted.
One would have expected that those who publicized the deliberations of the secret ses-
sion would at least have reported faithfully what was said, or, when they saw that
what they reported was distorted, would have made an effort to correct this perver-
sion.
Certain foreign (news) agencies have reported that I asserted at that session
that the reason for our non-acceptance of the idea of unity was that Iraq wanted to cut
down the financial aid to Jordan to one-and-a-half million dinars, (2) while at present
Jordan receives five million pounds sterling from Britain. I hereby declare that this
report is fabrication and lying. What I did say, in the presence of forty deputies and
some Ministers attending the session, was that if the proposed union aimed at the
unification of defence or the Army, or at any other practical joint action, we would
have considered it useful and fruitful. But the written and unequivocal plan is
confined to the unification of the Crown, provided the Army continues to receive
foreign aid as before and (provided) it preserves its present status and composition
for another five to ten years, after which time the question of what may be done con-
cerning the Army or any other real co-operation in economic matters will be recon-
sidered.
With regard to other arrangements leading to real unification, such as unity in
economic matters, etc., the plan put forward did not specify any basis or offer any
details. It onlv stated that agreement could be reached on such points after the above-
mentioned transitional period, and that discussion of the bases of such a future agree-
ment should be left until that time.
As to the sums mentioned, I did not speak of them at all with respect to the Army.
I did say that a verbal promise had been made to me by a responsible person, at a time
when I was not holding a responsible position, that in view of the present economic
situation in Jordan, Iraq would assist by giving loans for a number of years, ranging
(1) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in a number
of Arabic newspapers, including ad-Difa' (Jerusalem) January 13, 1952. See also
an-Nida* (Beirut) January 13 and 14, 1952; an-Nahar( Beirut) January 13, 1952;
and Liwa' al-Istiqlal (Beirut), January 15, 1952. This statement by Prime Minister
Abu al-Huda was broadcast from the Jordanian Broadcasting Station, Jerusalem
(Ramallah).
(2) The Jordanian dinar is equivalent to one pound sterling.
International Affairs: Arab Unity
between one million to one million-and-a-half dinars, provided that such loans would
naturally be given after the unification of the Crown. I also stated in Parliament that
such loans could not be a rational cause for effecting a change in the existence of the
Kingdom and the position of the country, or for overlooking the rights of the throne.
I also said that if it were a matter of loans, those could be obtained by other means
that will not expose the country to a fundamental change such as the one proposed.
I explained that, if accepted, the plan would forever deprive the heirs of the late King
'Abdullah of the rights of the throne, since (these rights) would be transferred to
others.
The above-mentioned (news) agencies have reported that the second reason I
gave for my reluctance concerning unification was that the British alliance protects
Jordan from dangers, and that any unity does not realize this protection. This is a
most shameful distortion of my words, as all the deputies and Ministers present at
the session heard me say that when unification would be practicable in a way that
would secure its desired objective we would be confronted with an external danger
which we would have to take into consideration. I said that we would have then to
think together with the other Arab States about our prospects of repulsing such
a danger should it appear after our agreement. I did not even hint that it was the
British alliance that protected us, but explained that we had to rely on ourselves and
on those Arab States with joint interests before relying on any foreign Power.
This is what I said at that secret session. I withstood all the attacks in connec-
tion with that session, because I wanted to maintain its secrecy. But since certain
persons have deviated from the customary secrecy and thus caused the distortion of
facts and the spreading of calumny, I felt compelled to clarify the situation.
Truth and justice compel me to say that die Iraqi plan submitted was a reply to
another plan proposed previously during the reign of King 'Abdullah. When I knew
about it I was not in office. When I came into office nobody discussed it with me.
After the death of King 'Abdullah, the official leaders of Iraq, foremost among whom
were the Regent and his Prime Minister, expressed their wish that Jordan should
continue to maintain whatever it considered was in its interest. No contacts or conver-
sations were maintained on this matter by official Iraqi elements.But several unofficial
personages in Iraq and outside, having learned of the old pkn, and without under-
standing the facts and the realities, circulated these rumours and interpretations and
continued to circulate them in order to confuse and mislead public opinion. I am
glad to make this statement and thus establish the truth of the matter.
Memorandum Submitted by the Iraqi Delegation to the Arab 97
League, Concerning the Establishment of an Arab '
Federation: Jamaly Project
January n, 1954 (j)
The Iraqi delegation to the League of Arab States presents its compliments to
(i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text courteously sent him by the
Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States. The project was considered by the
Political Committee of the League which decided " to take noteofitand to recommend
that the Governments of Member States should study it". This decision of the Po-
litical Committee was approved by the Council of the League on January 27,
(Resol 667 Sess. 20 Sched. 8). ED.
47
The Arab States and the Arab League
the fecretariat-General of the League of Arab States, and begs the communication of
the following Memorandum to the Member States for their consideration.
It is no secret that the national policy of Iraq has always aimed at the unity of the
Arabs and their solidarity. Indeed, the Iraqi Government declared in the Speech
from the Throne on December i, 1953, tiiat " the onl y wa Y to save the Arabs from
their present plight, to face the Israeli danger and to stabilize peace in this vital part
of the world, is to achieve Arab federation(i). "The Iraqi Government is going ahead
with this policy...". The Iraqi Government has noted with pleasure and delight
the sincere desire, repeatedly expressed by sister Egypt through her President and
members of her Government, for the federation of the Arab countries. Such a desire
has been expressed at varying periods by the heads of the Governments of the other
Arab States.
The Iraqi delegation has seen fit, in realization of its policy and in response to the
noble desire repeatedly expressed in Egypt and in the other Arab countries, to submit
the following Memorandum. It has taken care that (this Memorandum) should be
compendious and brief, preferring to postpone the necessary details for the desired
negotiations after (its proposal) has been accepted and a start has been made for its
implementation :
(A)
1. The federation of the Arab peoples is no longer a figment of the imagination of
those concerned with the highest principles. It has, indeed, become an incumbent
national necessity for the whole of the Arab nation, on which depends the (very) exis-
tence of (this nation), and on which at the same time depends the definite ability to
ward off the dangers surrounding the Arab nation and to solve the problem faced
by it.
2. If we are to grant (the existence) of those facts and to realize the impending dan-
ger that is threatening the very existence of the Arabs, it becomes the duty incumbent
on the Arab States to proceed to take the initiative of actually adopting the principle
of federation. (They should, however), at the same time consider the probability that
they cannot, together and at the same speed, go along the road to federation, and this
because of (the existence of certain) temporary geographical, internal and social fac-
tors and considerations that are peculiar to each (individual) Arab country.
3. The view that it is necessary for all the States Members of the League to proceed,
collectively and at the same speed, towards the cherished federation has retarded the
cause of Arab federation, which is the aim of the Pact of the League of Arab States.
4. It is, thus, the duty of those (Arab) States having present possibilities for the
achievement of federation to start immediately and to go ahead with its achievement,
provided that they be assisted by the other States until these in their turn are able to
adhere to this federation in a natural way.
5. There is no doubt that any federation (union) between two or more States should
(/) The term "federation 9 ' will be used throughout this text wherever the Arabic word
used is ittihad, though this latter word may also be translated as "union". The term
"federation", therefore, need not be understood here in its purely technical sense, that
is, as a system of government distinguishable from the "confederal" and "unitary"
systems. It is not clear whether the Iraqi Memorandum is referring to the purely
technical meaning of the term. ED.
International Affairs: Arab Unity
stem from the conviction of the peoples and Governments as to what constitutes the
demands of common interests and objectives. And it shall not be permissible to pro-
ceed with federation on non-democratic bases. We (feel) confident that the peoples of
the Arab States are, sooner or later, heading towards this objective.
(B)
i . Negotiations should take place between the States which are able and willing to
enter into federation on bases upon which it is desired to establish the federation.
After reaching an agreement in this respect, the League of Arab States should be noti-
fied concerning that (matter), and (the League) should in turn notify the Member
States concerning same.
2 The States desiring to federate should proceed to draw up a constitution for the
federation, which should be submitted to their parliaments for approval, whereupon
their constitutions should be amended on that basis.
3. The federal constitution should aim at unity in foreign policy, defence, common
economic affairs and other matters that may be agreed upon by the negotiators. The
constitution should provide for the legislative and executive organs of the federation
(Q
Iraq, indeed, expresses her willingness to enter the federation, together with
any of the (other) Arab countries desirous of this. She sincerely hopes that she will
meet, on the part of the Member (States), a desire similar to her own and for the rea-
lization of which she is working.
(D)
Until all of the States Members of the Arab League belong to the federation, the
Arab League should continue to be an instrument for the mutual association of the
great Arab commonwealth.
The Iraqi delegation takes this opportunity to express to the Secretariat-General
its highest esteem and appreciation.
49
II
The League of Arab States
International Affairs: League of Arab States
The Alexandria Protocol
October 7, 1944 (i)
The undersigned, chiefs and members of Arab delegations at the Preliminary
Committee of the General Arab Conference, viz :
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PRELIMINARY COMMITTEE
H.E. MUSTAFA AL-NAHHAS PASHA, Egyptian Prime Minister and Minister
of Foreign Affairs; head of the Egyptian delegation;
SYRIAN DELEGATION
H. E. SA'DALLAH AL-JABIRI, Syrian Prime Minister and head of the Syrian
delegation;
H. E. JAMIL MARDAM BEY, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
H. E. DR. NAGIB AL-ARMANAZI, Secretary General of the Presidency of the
Syrian Republic;
H. E. M. SABRI AL-'ASALI, deputy of Damascus;
TRANS-JORDANIAN DELEGATION
H.E. TAWFIQ ABDUL-HUDA PASHA, Trans- Jordanianian Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs, head of the Trans- Jordanian delegation;
H. E. SULAYMAN SUKKAR BEY, Financial Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs;
IRAQI DELEGATION
H. E. HAMDI AL-BAHJAJI, Iraqi Prime Minister and head of the Iraqi delegation;
H. E. ARSHAD AL-'UMARI, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
H. E. NURI AL-SA'ID, former Iraqi Prime Minister;
H. E. TAHSIN AL-'ASKARI, Iraqi Minister Plenipotentiary in Egypt;
LEBANESE DELEGATION
H. E. RIYAD AL-SULH BEY, Lebanese Prime Minister and head of the Lebanese
delegation;
H. E. SALIM TAQLA BEY, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
H. E. MUSA MUBARAK, Chief of the Presidential Cabinet;
EGYPTIAN DELEGATION
H. E. NAGIB AL-HILALI PASHA, Minister of Education;
H. E. MUHAMMAD SABRI ABU-'ALAM PASHA, Minister of Justice;
(/) This Protocol was drawn up at the end of the Conference on October 7, 1944. The
text is copied from Basic Documents of the League of Arab States (Arab Informa-
tion Center, New York, April 1955), pp. 5-$. ED.
53
The Arab States and the Arab League
H. E. MUHAMMAD SALAH-AL-DIN BEY, Under Secretary of State of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Anxious to strengthen and consolidate the ties which bind all Arab countries and
to direct them toward the welfare of the Arab world, to improve its conditions, insure
its future, and realize its hopes and aspirations,
And in response to Arab public opinion in all Arab countries,
Have met at Alexandria from Shawwal 8, 1363 (September 25, 1944) to Shawwal
20, 1363 (October 7, 1944) in the form of a Preliminary Committee of the General
Arab Conference, and have agreed as follows :
1. LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES
A League will be formed of the independent Arab States which consent to join
the League. It will have a council which will be known as the "Council of the League
of Arab States" in which all participating states will be represented on an equal foot-
ing.
The object of the League will be to control the execution of the agreements which
the above states will conclude; to hold periodic meetings which will strengthen the
relations between those states ; to coordinate their political plans so as to insure their
cooperation, and protect their independence and sovereignty against every aggression
by suitable means; and to supervise in a general way the affairs and interests of the
Arab countries.
The decisions of the Council will be binding on those who have accepted
them except in cases where a disagreement arises between two members states of the
League in which the two parties shall refer their dispute to the Council for solution.
In this case the decision of the Council of the League will be binding.
In no case will resort to force to settle a dispute between any two member states
of the League be allowed. But every state shall be free to conclude with any other
member state of the League, or other powers, special agreements which do not contra-
dict the text or spirit of the present dispositions.
In no case will the adoption of a foreign policy which may be prejudicial to the
policy of the League or an individual member state be allowed.
The Council will intervene in every dispute which may lead to war between a
member state of the League and any other member state or power, so as to reconcile
them.
A subcommittee will be formed of the members of the Preliminary Committee
to prepare a draft of the statutes of the Council of the League and to examine the poli-
tical question which may be the object of agreement among Arab States.
2. COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, SOCIAL AND OTHER
MATTERS
A. The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee shall closely
cooperate in the following matters:
(1) Economic and financial matters, i.e. commercial exchange, customs, cur-
rency, agriculture, and industry.
(2) Communications, i.e. railways, roads, aviation, navigation, posts and tele-
graphs.
(3) Cultural matters.
(4) Questions of nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgements, extrad -
tion of criminals, etc.
(5) Social questions.
54
International Affairs: League of Arab States
(6) Questions of public health.
B. A subcommittee of experts for each of the above subjects will be formed in
which the states which have participated in the Preliminary Committee will be repre-
sented. This subcommittee will prepare draft regulations for cooperation in the above
matters, describing the extent and means of that collaboration.
C. A committee for coordination and editing will be formed whose object will
be to control the work of the other subcommittee, to coordinate that part of the work
which is accomplished, and to prepare drafts of agreements which will be submitted
to the various governments.
D. When all the subcommittees have accomplished their work, the Preliminary
Committee will meet to examine the work of the subcommittees as a preliminary step
towards the holding of a General Arab Conference.
3. CONSOLIDATION OF THESE TEES IN THE FUTURE
While expressing its satisfaction at such a happy step, the Committee hopes that
Arab States will be able in the future to consolidate that step by other steps, especially
if post-war events should result in institutions which bind various Powers more close-
ly together.
4. A SPECIAL RESOLUTION CONCERNING LEBANON
The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee emphasize their res-
pect of the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon in its present frontiers, which
the governments of the above States have already recognized in consequence of Leba
non's adoption of an independent policy, which the Government of that country an-
nounced in its program of October 7, 1943, unanimously approved by the Lebanese
Chamber of Deputies.
5. SPECIAL RESOLUTION CONCERNING PALESTINE
A. The Committee is of the opinion that Palestine constitutes an important part
of the Arab World and that the rights of the Arabs in Palestine cannot be touched
without prejudice to peace and stability in the Arab World.
The Committee also is of the opinion that the pledges binding the British Gov-
ernment and providing for the cessation of Jewish immigration, the preservation of
Arab lands, and the achievement of independence for Palestine are permanent Arab
rights whose prompt implementation would constitute a step toward the desired goal
and toward the stabilization of peace and security.
The Committee declares its support of the cause of the Arabs of Palestine and its
willingness to work for the achievement of their legitimate aim and the safeguarding
of their just rights.
The Committee also declares that it is second to none in regretting the woes
which have been inflicted upon the Jews of Europe by European dictatorial states.
But the question of these Jews should not be confused with Zionism, for there can
be no greater injustice and aggression than solving the problem of the Jews of Europe
by another injustice, i.e. by inflicting injustice on the Arabs of Palestine of various reli-
gions and denominations.
B. The special proposal concerning the participation of the Arab Governments
and peoples in the "Arab National Fund" to safeguard the lands of the Arabs of Pales-
55
29
The Arab States and the Arab League
tine shall be referred to the committee of financial and economic affairs to examine
it from all its angles and to submit the result of that examination to the Preliminary
Committee in its next meeting.
In faith of which this protocol has been signed at Faruq I University at Alexan-
dria on Saturday, Shawwal 20, 1363 (October 7, 1944).
The Covenant of the League of Arab States
Cairo, March 22, 1945 (i)
His Excellency the President of the Syrian Republic
His Royal Highness the Amir of Transjordan
His Majesty the King of Iraq
His Majesty the King of Sa'udi Arabi
His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic
His Majesty the King of Egypt
His Majesty the King of the Yaman
In order to affirm the close connections and numerous ties which link the Arab
States, and being desirous of maintaining and establishing these connections on the
foundations of respect for the independence and sovereignty of those states, and in
order to direct their efforts towards the general good of the Arab States, the improve-
ment of their circumstances, the security of their future, and the realisation of their
hopes and aspirations, and in response to Arab public opinion in all quarters of the
Arab World.
Have agreed to enter into a Covenant for this object, and have appointed the
under-mentioned delegates on their behalf;
His Excellency the President of the Syrian Republic
Has appointed to represent Syria:
His Excellency Paris al-Khuri, Prime Minister,
His Excellency Djamil Mardam Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
His Royal Highness the Amir of Transjordan
Has appointed to represent Transjordan:
His Excellency Samir al-Rifa'i Pasha, Prime Minister,
His Excellency Sa'id al-Mufti Pasha, Minister of the Interior,
His Excellency Sulaiman al-Nabulsi Bey, Secretary to the Government.
His Majesty the King of Iraq
Has appointed to represent Iraq :
His Excellency Arshad al-'Umari, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
His Excellency 'Ali Djawdat al-Aiyubi, Iraq Minister-Plenipotentiary at
Washington,
His Excellency Tahsin al-'Askari, Iraq Minister-Plenipotentiary at Cairo.
His Majesty the King of Sa'udi Arabia
Has appointed to represent the Kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia:
His Excellency Al-Shaikh Yusuf Ya-Sin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
to the Kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia.
(i) The above translation is that of the Arab Office, London (1945). The attention of
the reader is drawn to the fact that the term "Pact", instead of "Covenant", has
been used in various contexts in this book. ED.
56
International Affairs: League of Arab States
His Excellency Khair al-Din al-Zirikli, Councillor of the Sa'udi Arabian
Legation at Cairo.
His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic
Has appointed to represent Lebanon :
His Excellency 'Abd al-Hamid Karami, Prime Minister,
His Excellency Yusuf Salim, Lebanese Minister-Plenipotentiary in Cairo.
His Majesty the King of Egypt
Has appointed to represent Egypt:
His Excellency Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi Pasha, Prime Minister,
His Excellency Muhammad Husain Haikal Pasha, President of the Senate,
His Excellency 'Abd al-Hamid Badawi Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
His Excellency Makram 'Ibaid Pasha, Minister of Finance,
His Excellency Muhammad Hafiz Ramadan Pasha, Minister of Justice,
His Excellency 'Abd al - Razzaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri Bey, Minister of Public
Instruction,
His Excellency 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam Bey, Miniter-Plenipotentiary at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
His Majesty the King of the Yaman
Has Appointed to Represent the Yaman:
Who, after exchange of their credentials granting them plenary power, which
have been found genuine and in perfect order, have agreed upon the following :
Article I
The League of the Arab States shall be composed of the independent Arab States
signatories to this Covenant.
Each independent Arab State shall have the right to adhere to the the League. If
it be desirous of adhesion (to the League), it shall lodge a petition to this effect, to be
deposited with the Permanent Secretariat-General and submitted to the Council at
the first session convened after the lodging of the petition.
Article II
The object of the League shall be to strengthen the ties between the participant
states, to co-ordinate their political programmes in such a way as to effect real col-
laboration between them, to preserve their independence and sovereignty, and to
consider in general the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.
Likewise a further object shall be the close collaboration of the participant states,
in accordance with the regime and conditions prevailing in each (individual) state, in
the following matters:
(i). Economic and financial affairs, comprising trade reciprocity, tariffs,
currency, agricultural and industrial matters.
(2). Communications, comprising railways, roads, aviation, navigation, posts
and telegraphs.
(3). Cultural affairs.
(4). Matters relating to nationality, passports and visas, execution of judge-
ments, and extradition of criminals.
(5). Matters relating to social questions.
(6). Matters relating to public health.
Article III
The League shall have a Council to be composed of representatives of the states
participant in the League. Each state shall have a single vote without regard to the
number of its representatives.
57
The Arab States and the Arab League
The Council's function shall be the realisation of the objects of the League and
to give effect to such agreements as may be concluded between the participant states,
relating to the matters indicated in the previous article and elsewhere.
A further concern of the Council shall be to decide upon methods of collabora-
tion with the international organisations which may, in the future, be created for the
preservation of peace and security and the regulation of economic and social relations.
Article IV
For each subject specified in Article II, a special committee shall be formed in
which the states participant in the League shall be represented. These committees
shall be responsible for formulating the bases, extent, and form of collaboration in
the shape of draft-agreements to be laid before the Council for considertion, prepa-
ratory to their presentation to the afore-mentioned states.
Members representative of the other Arab countries are permitted to participate
in the afore-mentioned committees. The Council shall define the conditions under
which those representatives may participate, and the regulations for representation
Article V
Recourse to force to resolve disputes between two or more League States is inad-
missible. If a difference should arise between them, not pertaining to the independ-
ence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of (any of the) states (concerned), and the
the contending parties have recourse to the Council to settle it, then its decision is
executory and obligatory.
In this eventuality, the contending states shall have no part in the proceedings
and resolutions of the Council.
The Council shall mediate in any dispute which causes apprehension of a
state of war between one of the League States and another, or one not (belonging to
the League), in order to effect reconciliation between the two of them.
Decisions of arbitration and mediation shall be issued by majority opinion.
Article VI
Should aggression by a state against a member state of the League take place or
be apprehended, it is for the state which has suffered, or is threatened with aggression
to demand that the Council be summoned to meet immediately.
The Council shall decide upon the appropriate measures to check this aggression,
and shall issue a decision by unanimous assent. If the aggression emanates from one
of the League States, the view of the aggressor state shall not affect unanimity of
assent.
If aggression should take place in such fashion as to render the injured state's
Government unable to communicate with the Council, its representative at the Coun-
cil may demand that it be convened for the purpose set forth in the fore-going clause.
If it is impossible for the representative to communicate with the League Council,
any of its Member States has the right to demand that it be convened.
Article VH
Decisions of the Council by unanimous assent shall be obligatory on all the states
participant in the League. Decisions of the League by majority (vote) shall be obli-
gatory on those who accept them.
In either case, the decisions of the Council shall be executed in each state in
accordance with its fundamental constitution.
International Affairs: League of Arab States
Article VUI
Each state participant in the League shall respect the existing regime obtaining
in the other League States, regarding it as a (fundamental) right of those states, and
pledges itself not to undertake any action tending to alter that regime.
Article IX
Those Arab States desirous of closer collaboration with each other, and stronger
ties than those specified by this Covenant, have a right to conclude such agreements
between themselves towards the realisation of these objects, as they desire.
Treaties and Agreements previously concluded, or which may be concluded with
any other state, by any state belonging to the League, shall not be obligatory or bind-
ing on the other members.
Article X
Cairo shall be the permanent seat of the League of Arab States. The League
Council may assemble in whatsoever place it appoints.
Article XI
The Council shall normally be convened twice a year, each March and October.
Extraordinary sessions shall be convened whenever occasion demands, on the request
of two of the League States.
Article XII
The League shall have a Permanent Secretariat- General, consisting of a
Secretary-General, Assistant- Secretaries, and an appropriate staff of officials.
The League Council shall appoint the Secretary-General by a two-thirds
majority of the League States. In consultation with the Council, the Secretary-
General shall appoint the Assistant- Secretaries and the principal officials of the
League.
The League Council shall create internal administrative machinery to deal with
the functions of the Secretariat-General and matters of personnel.
The Secretary-General shall hold ambassadorial status, and the Assistant- Secre-
taries the status of Ministers-Plenipotentiary.
The first Secretary-General to the League shall be nominated in an appendix
to this Covenant.
Article XIII
The Secretary-General shall prepare the draft Budget of the League, and submit
it to the Council for approval before the commencement of each financial year.
The Council shall allocate the proportion of the expenses to be borne by each
League State, and can review (the relative proportions in each case) as required.
Article XIV
Members of the League Council, members of its Committees, and those of its
officials specified in the internal administration, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and
immunity during the performance of their duties.
The inviolability of buildings occupied by bureaus of the League shall be ob-
served.
Article XV
The Council shall be convened on the first occasion at the instance of the Head
59
The Arab States and the Arab League
of the Egyptian Government, and subsequently, at the instance of the Secretary-
General.
At each ordinary meeting the representatives of the League States shall preside
over the Council by rotation.
Article XVI
Apart from the conditions defined in this Covenant, a majority opinion will suf-
fice for the Council to make effective decisions on the following subjects:
(i). Matters (relating to) personnel.
(2). Approval of the Budget of the League.
(3). The creation of an internal administration covering the Council,
Committees, and Secretariat-General.
(4). The decision to adjourn the session of a meeting.
Article XVH
The states participant in the League shall deposit with Secretariat-General
texts of all the Treaties and Agreements which they have concluded, or may conclude
with any other state belonging to, or outside the League.
Article XVHI
If any of the League States contemplates withdrawal from the League, it shall
give notice to the Council of its decision to withdraw, a year before it puts the
decision into effect.
The League Council has the right to regard any state not fulfilling the obligations
of this Covenant, as having ceased to belong to the League. This shall be effected by a
decision issued by unanimous assent of the states, excepting the state indicated.
Article XIX
It is permissible by agreement of two-thirds of the League States, to amend this
Covenant, in order, especially, to render the ties between them firmer and closer,
to found an Arab Court of Justice, and to co-ordinate the relations of the League with
the international organisations which may, in future, be created to guarantee peace
and security.
No amendment shall be passed except at the meeting following the meeting at
which the proposal was (originally) presented.
Any state which does not accept the amendment has the right to withdraw on
its becoming effective, without coming under the provisions of the article preceding.
Article XX
This Covenant along with its appendixes shall be ratified in conformity with the
fundamental laws and methods of procedure obtaining in each of the contracting
states.
The articles of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretariat-General, and
the Covenant shall have effect with those who have ratified it, after the elapse of
fifteen days from the date upon which the Secretary-General has received articles of
ratification from four states.
This Covenant was drawn up in Arabic at Cairo, on the 8th of Rabi* II, 1364
(22nd March, 1945), in a single text which shall be preserved in the Secretariat-
General.
A facsimile copy of the original shall be delivered to each of the League States.
60
International Affairs: League of Arab States
Special Appendix Relating to Palestine
Since the close of the last Great War, the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire has
ceased to exist over the Arab countries which were detached from it, including Pales-
tine which became independent, subject to no other state. The Treaty of Lausanne
declared that its fate was the affair of those in it whom it properly concerned, and,
although Palestine was unable to gain control over its own affairs it was only on the
basis of the recognition of its (Palestine's) independence that the Covenant of the
League (of Nations) in the year 1919, ratified the status which it (the League
Covenant) gave it. Its existence and de jure national independence is a matter on
which there is no doubt as there is no doubt about the independence of the other
Arab countries. Therefore, although external manifestations of that independence
have continued to be obscured by over-riding circumstances, it is not admissible that
this should be an impediment to its (Palestine's) participation in the proceedings of
the League Council.
Consequently, the States, signatories to the Covenant of the Arab League, con-
sider (it fitting) that, in view of the special circumstances of Palestine, and until such
time as this country shall enjoy de facto exercise of independence, the League Council
shall take upon itself the responsibility of selecting an Arab delegate from Palestine to
participate in its proceedings.
Special Appendix Relating to Co-operation with the Arab States, Non-
participant in the League Council.
In consideration (of the fact) that the States participant in the League will, both
in council and committee, deal with matters, the benefit and effect of which concerns
the entire Arab world, and since it is its duty to cherish the aspirations of those Arab
countries non-participant in the Council, and to work toward their realisation.
The States, signatories to the Covenant of the Arab League, are, in especial
degree, concerned to instruct the League Council, whenever co-opting these states
to the committees indicated in the Covenant comes under consideration, to col-
laborate with them to the fullest possible extent; and, moreover, to spare no effort to
appreciate their requirements, and comprehend their hopes and aspirations; then to
apply itself to the improvement of their status and security of their future, by all the
political means at its disposal.
Special Appendix Relating to the Appointment of the Secretary-General
to the League.
The States, signatories to this Covenant, concur in the appointment of His
Excellency 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam Bey as Secretary-General to the League of
Arab States.
His appointment shall be for the period of two years. The League Council shall
later define the future constitution of the Secretariat-General.
Statement by the Iraqi Foreign Minister (F. Al-Jamali), Made
Before the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies, Criticizing Secretary-
General ( 'Azzam ) of the Arab League
May 3, 1949 GO
In speaking of the Secretary-General, a distinction should be made between 'Abd
(i ) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text courteously supplied by the
Political Department of the Arab League, Cairo.
61
The Arab States and the Arab League
al-Rahman 'Azzam Pasha, the struggling Arab whom we respect and esteem, and
'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam Pasha, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States,
ar-Rahman 'Azzam Pasha, the struggling Arab whom we respect and esteem, and
'Abd ar-Rahman 'Azzam Pasha, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States,
who is a general secretary employed by (these) Arab States. The personality of 'Az-
zam Pasha the politician could not and should not be absorbed by the personality of
'Azzam Pasha the employee of the League of Arab States. It is understood that the
secretariat of the League, as is the case in similar organizations, should be a general
(administrative) secretariat although it is called "al-Amana (i) (Secretariat). It
should thus keep the records and the registers, communicate to the Member States
the decisions of each of the competent committees provided for in the Pact (of the
Arab League), such as the Cultural Committee, the Economic Committee, etc.
It was necessary that internal regulations for the League should be drawn up on
this basis, namely on a basis which maintains for each of the States the character of a
responsible government within the League and which restricts the Secretariat-Gen-
eral to secretarial functions.
At the second session of the Council of the League, held from November 22 till
December 14, 1945, the Iraqi delegation, having taken note of the draft regulations
which the Secretary-General had prepared, and having found them in conflict with
the responsibilities of the Member States and vesting in the Secretary-General wide
powers which interfered with the powers and responsibilities of the Governments,
submitted a Note in which it explained the bases which should be followed in drawing
up the regulations so that these would not interfere with the responsibilities of the
(said) Governments. The Council of the League accepted (these) bases at the time
and referred them to a sub-committee composed of Messrs. Jamil Mardam Bey,
Salih Jabr and as-Sanhury Pasha. But the Secretary-General took advantage of the
change of the Iraqi Cabinet during the following session of the Council of the League,
and allowed a return to the previous regulations which vest in him wide powers be-
yond those usually possessed by Secretaries-General powers which conflict with
the responsibilities of the Governments themselves, allow the Secretary-General to
interfere with the affairs and policy of the League, and embarrass the policy of the
States concerned without his being responsible either to a people or to a parliament.
For it is the Secretary-General himself and not the States conerned who, by virtue of
these regulations, came to control and dominate the policy of the League. This, in our
view, is the root of all evil, the reason for the confusion and the embarrassment, and
one of the sources of disagreement among the States of the League themselves. This
has made the League a problem in the inter- Arab relations which, before the existence
of the League, were extremely close and sincere. Thus, the regulations referred to
above and their conflict with the spirit and aims of the Pact, were among the main
factors which gave rise to numerous problems among the Arab States within and
without the League.
The Secretary-General has in fact assumed, in accordance with the present regu-
lations, responsibilities which in reality belong to the States of the League and their
Foreign Ministers.
'Azzam Pasha is thus acting as an independent head of State, (2) supreme over
(j) The Arabic term fe al-Amana" is presumably intended to mean in this context "trust,
object of confidence, etc." , although meaning also "Secretariat". A pun is perhaps
intended! ED.
(2) "Head of Government" is presumably meant here. Compare in this respect 'Azzam's
Reply (next document). ED.
62
International Affairs: League of Arab States
the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States, making statements and negotiating with re-
gard to political matters as he himself deems fit, without caring whether or not this
policy satisfies all the Governments of the Arab States by which he is employed.
We have no intention to review here the series of the actions of the Secretariat-
General nor the many statements for which (the Secretary-General) is not held res-
ponsible. Nor do we wish to discuss the questions of its employees and the mode of
their employment, for these are matters of detail with which we are not concerned
here. But we refer in particular, however, to an example of the actions of the Secre-
tariat-General relating to expenditure on the Palestine Volunteers, the fact which com-
pelled the Iraqi Government to address the following memorandum to the Arab
countries:
"The Iraqi Government had, on various occasions and by various means, infor-
med the Secretariat-General that (Iraq's) present financial situation was difficult, and
that the conditions of the Palestine Volunteers on the Iraqi front necessitated the pay-
ment of the amounts allocated to them and that the matter required some serious
attention. But in spite of the resolution of the Political Committee of September 13,
1948, allotting a monthly sum of 20,000 pounds to the Palestine Volunteers on the Ira-
qi front, and the promise of the Secretariat-General itself to rise this sum to 25,000
pounds should the number of the volunteers increase, the Secretariat-General only
paid 15,000 pounds per month, which is below the amount decided upon. This a-
mount itself was not paid at the beginning of every month except after demands (for
payment) and reminders, as if it were a favour to the Palestine refugees or even to the
Iraqi Government itself. The (Iraqi) Legation (i) wishes to point out that the latest
information reaching the Iraqi Government is that the Secretariat-General will com-
pletely stop payment at the end of March. This is notwithstanding the fact that the
amount in fact paid by the Iraqi Government for the Palestine projects is 1,104,000
pounds of which 591,957.379 pounds were paid direct to the Secretariat-General to
be spent on volunteers, the Palestine volunteers in particular.
" This account does not include :-
a What is spent by the Iraqi Government for maintaining its Army in Pales-
tine,
b What is spent by the Iraqi Government on the Palestine refuges in Iraq and
in the region occupied by its forces,
c What is spent on the Palestine refugees and on the hospitals by Iraqi nation-
al associations, such as the United Front and the Red Crescent,
d The losses incurred by the Iraqi Government as a result of the discontinua-
tion of the pumping of oil and the closing of the Haifa pipeline.
"This is estimated at one and a half million pounds up to now, at a time when Iraq
is in the greatest need of money.
"The attitude of the Secretariat-General with regard to expenditure on the Pales-
tine volunteers on the Iraqi front under these circumstances is a matter which calls
for wonderment and surprise. For how could the Secretariat-General justify its
dilatoriness in expenditure on the volunteers on the Iraqi front when it is in fact only
spending on Palestinians who are defending their country in a spot which is being
defended by these fighters most tenaciously. Moreover, the amount paid to the volun-
(i ) Presumably, the memorandum in hand was sent by the Iraqi Government through its
legations in the various Arab States. ED.
63
The Arab States and the Arab League
teers on the Iraqi front does not exceed 100,000 pounds out of an amount of over three
million pounds received by the Secretariat-General. This necessitates an investiga-
tion of the nature of the policy adopted by the Secretariat-General in directing the
expenditure on the fronts insofar as concerns their needs and military importance.
"The Iraqi Government considers that it has a clear right to demand that the
Secretariat-General should continue to spend (money) on the Palestine volunteers on
the Iraqi front until the (solution) of the Palestine question. It also considers that
this is a legitimate right necessitated by the prevailing military conditions, the (gen-
eral) interest and the equitable channelling of the expenditure of the amount received
by the Secretariat- General and out of which Iraq paid the above-mentioned amount.
For apparently the Secretariat-General ought to have made its decisions and direct-
ions more consistent and compatible with reality and with the (general) interest in
apportioning expenditure, instead of allotting to the Iraqi front about one hundred
thousand pounds out of over three million pounds which it in fact received.
"In view of the attitude adopted by the Secretariat-General regarding the question
of expenditure on the volunteers on (the Iraqi) front, and as long as this mentality and
this attitude continue within the Secretariat-General, the Iraqi Government hereby
declares that it will not be able to co-operate with the Secretariat-General regarding
any question whatever unless it (first) pays the amounts due to the Palestine volunt-
eers who are now in fact in the trenches at the front, pending the settlement of the
Palestine question.
"The Iraqi Government, therefore, finds itself compeled to divert henceforward
its contributions to the Arab League (direct) to the Palestine volunteers on its front."
Although the attitude of the Secretary-General with regard to expenditure on
the Palestine volunteers who were in the trenches on the Iraqi front is as stated above,
we have recently read about 'Azzam Pasha's visit to Damascus and about his agree-
ment to continue payment to the Yarmuk Army which is not at the front at present.
We have no objection here to his decision to continue to pay. On the other hand,
would you not agree with me that the stoppage of payments to the volunteers on the
Iraqi front evinces a policy of a particular character ?
Gentlemen,
The Iraqi Government's stand with regard to the League of Arab States may be
summarized by the following points:
a) Complete adherence to the principles of the Pact of the League of Arab States ;
b) Continuous efforts by diplomatic means among the Arab States for reconcil-
ing (their) points of view and unifying (their) efforts;
c) To make the utmost use of Article 9 of the Pact.
d) To demand the reconsideration of the regulations of the League.
The Iraqi Government has in fact contacted the Arab Governments and inform-
ed them of its point of view concerning the Secretariat-General and the necessity of
reconsidering the regulations of the League.
As for the third basis of our foreign policy, this is (to establish) neighbourly
relations. I can thus assure you, gentlemen, that our relations with our neighbours are
natural relations dictated by the geographical situation: our relations with them
should be sincere and lasting, as we are always affected by what affects them, and they
are affected by what affects us. Neighbourliness and co-operation are therefore es-
sential, and we shall be (always) happy to maintain sound and amicable relations with
our neighbours.
International Affairs: League of Arab States
Reply of the Secretary-General of the Arab League to the Iraqi 3
Foreign Minister's Statement before the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies -^
May 14,1949 (i)
EXPLANATION
The statement made by His Excellency Dr. Fadil al-Jamali in the Iraqi Chamber
of Deputies in the morning of May 3, 1949, concerning the foreign policy of Iraq,
contains unfounded allegations and baseless claims. His Excellency has thus spoken
of what he termed the problem of the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab State
and said that the personality of the Secretary-General should not be absorbed by the
personality of the employee who supervises the keeping of records and the communi-
cation of decisions. (He also said) that it should have been necessary for each State to
retain its responsibilities and that the Secretariat-General should be restricted to sec-
retarial functions, but that the Secretary-General had drawn up projects vesting in
the Secretariat-General wide powers which interfere in and conflict with the respon-
sibilities of the Governments. (He further added) that the Government of Iraq had
submitted a Note in this respect, but that the Secretary-General had taken advantage
of the change of the Iraqi Cabinet and maintained his wide powers which enable him
to interfere (in the affairs of the States) without being responsible either to a people
or to a parliament. (It was also said) that in accordance with the regulations he had
drawn up he dominated the responsibilities of the Arab States and their Foreign
Ministers, and that his status was that of a Prime Minister of (one of) the Arab States.
These accusations constitute a transgression unacceptable to reason and unsup-
ported by facts. The function of the Secretary-General in any internaional institution
is not restricted to the supervision of the keeping of records and the communication
of the decisions, but he has to exercise the powers granted to him by the organization
by its pact, regulations and decisions. Before his statement in the Iraqi Chamber of
Deputies, His Excellency the Iraqi Foreign Minister was not known to hold an opin-
ion contrary to this. We have the right to believe that this is also the opinion of his
superior.
(Even if) His Excellency Nuri Pasha (as-Sa'id) were to have a different personal
opinion, in the past or in the future, it is the opinion of the States of the Pact which
matters. And yet, how is it (possible) to persuade the contracting and the successive
Iraqi Governments (2) to maintain their adherence to the opinion of His Excellency,
should he (himself) be outside the government ? And what fault can we (impute) to the
Secretariat-General, when we bear in mind that the powers of the Secretary-General
are in fact less than those of the Secretaries of similar international organizations.
Nevertheless it would perhaps be for the good of His Excellency Nuri Pasha to order
(his) Foreign Ministry to submit to him a comparative ( study ) of the powers of the
Secretaries-General of international organizations so that it may become clear to him
(1 ) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text courteously supplied by the
Political Department of the Arab League, Cairo. The text of the Reply was handed
on May 14, 1949* by the Secretary-General of the Arab League in person to the
Iraqi Chargd d* Affaires in Cairo (A.J. ar-Rawi) . He asked that it be also sent to
the President of the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies and that it be read to the Chamber
and also broadcast. See al-Ahram, May 15, 1949. ED.
(2) i.e. the Government which signed the Pact of the Arab League^ as well as those which
succeeded it. ED.
The Arab States and the Arab League
that those who drew up the Pact and the Internal Regulations of the League of Arab
States were not extravagant.
It is regrettable that the (Iraqi) Foreign Minister should say that " the Secretary-
General took advantage of the change of the Iraqi Government and maintained his
wide powers, etc...". For, in addition to the attack on the successive Iraqi Govern-
ment which (this statement) implies, it is obviously false, because the powers of the
Secretary-General are the result of the resolutions of the States and not their antece-
dents.
The Secretary-General in fact exercises such powers as are derived from the Pact,
the resolutions and the Internal Regulations. All these were unanimously adopted,
and neither the Secretariat-General nor the Council of the League have ever received
any objection concerning them from any Iraqi Government ever since the establish-
ment of the League. Should any Iraqi Government have had anything to complain of,
it should have submitted its complaint in this respect to the Council of the League.
But no such thing has ever happened. In fact, exactly the contrary always happened.
The successive Iraqi Governments used to join the Council of the League in thanking
the Secretariat-General. The minutes of the meetings of the Council and its resolu-
tions dissipate any doubt in this respect.
Needless to say, the Secretary-General is responsible to the Council of the Lea-
gue. It is that Council, therefore, which possesses the right to judge his actions and
to request him to render account of (these) actions. Since the present Iraqi Foreign
Minister was attending the meetings of this Council as a representative of Iraq, and
even presided over its meetings and abided by the regulations which he now pretends
to repudiate, it should have therefore been possible for him, under the circumstances,
to submit to the Council whatever he deemed open to criticism, or necessitating subs-
titution or change. But instead of that he used to acknowledge, together with (the
other) members of the Council, his gratitude to the Secretary-General for his efforts
and for the actions undertaken by him. The Iraqi Foreign Minister knows as much
of this as the other members representing the Arab States. Yet he remembered that
the Secretary-General was not responsible to a people or to a parliament although his
responsibility to the Council of the League and even to all the Arab peoples was evi-
dent. But to attack him in the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies when the Secretary- Gener-
al does not have the right to attend its meetings is unique and not admitted by Cus-
tom or convention as far as the other internaional organizations similar to the League
of Arab States are concerned.
As to the statement of His Excellency the (Foreign) Minister that the Secretary-
General dominates, by virtue of the regulations which he drew up, the responsibilities
of the Arab States and their Foreign Ministers, and that his status is similar to that of
a Prime Minister of an Arab State, this is also clearly a false statement, too. This is in
addition to (the fact) that it constitutes an attack against all the Governments of the
Arab States and their prominent leaders who have participated in the activities of the
Council through all these years and thanked the Secretariat-General for its efforts.
The Secretary-General has not taken any measures, allowed any action or assum-
ed any functions except what was unanimously decided upon by the Council of the
League. He does not possess any powers except those vested in him by the Council,
and has no authority on any Arab Government. His Excellency the (Foreign) Minis-
ter should rather have given one (single) example of the authority which the Secretary
-General assumed by himself or of the powers to which he made a general reference
in his statement. This would have been more becoming than the accusations which
66
International Affairs: League of Arab States
were directed at random or the attacks which lack proof or evidence. In this connec-
tion, many things conflicting with the facts were mentioned in the Iraqi Chamber of
Deputies and appeared in the Iraqi Press on other occasions. It was the duty of the
Foreign Minister to defend the Secretary-General and to clarify the facts concerning
what was being said, as long as the Secretary-General is responsible to the Council of
the League and to the Iraqi Government. But he took no action and preferred to take
part in the allegations by joining himself with these who made (them). It was open to
the Iraqi Governement to bring the Secretary-General before the Council of the
League to render account, had it had anything that called for an account; but just
people should not permit it to join in expressing gratitude to him, as happened at the
meetings of the Council of the League, and then hurl at him false accusations.
If the Secretariat- General of the League of Arab States has continously endea-
voured to raise its international prestige and has paid regard to its outward appear-
ance and relations in order to bring out (the League) in a fitting role as a respectable
international organization, there is nothing in this that it should be blamed for.
But it would be shameful if it were to fade out among the records and the docu-
ments ; at a time when the (Organization) of Latin American States directs all its at-
tention to raising the prestige of its Secretary-General and to having him treated as an
outstanding international figure at the United Nations ; it even insisted that a place
which he would occupy as an observer of its activitiezs, be assigned to him and
succeeded in (its request).
The powers which the Secretary-General has exercised and is exercising with
regard to the affairs of Palestine may perhaps be among the questions which perplex-
ed the mind of some of the Iraqi politicians. These are not the result of the regula-
tions of the League but (the result) of the exigencies of the Palestine question, outside
the scope of the functions of the Secretariat-General. Both the Council of the League
and the Political Committee had entrusted the Secretary-General with the supervision
of the (sub)-Committee of the Financial Experts, the Military Committee in Damasc-
us, and the Palestine Committee in order to implement (the Council's resolutions)
and to act on its behalf in certain cases. This led some of those who were unaware of
the real facts to consider the activities of the Secretary-General in this respect as per-
manent powers (vested in him) by virtue of his office whereas they were temporary
powers dictated by the exigencies of a political, military and humanitarian emergency
in Palestine and elsewhere.
The Council and its Political Committee have likewise adopted several resolu-
tions whereby the Secretary-General was entrusted with matters concerning Libya,
North Africa, Indonesia and other countries, and he was also entrusted with the task
of getting in touch with the States (concerned) on the subject of these matters, to
communicate the views of the Council thereon, and to endeavour to bring them to a
successful conclusion. Certain people thought that the activities, powers, acts and
statements of the Secretary-General were improvised, forgetting that these were all
the result of the decisions of the high authorities who have the power to take such
decisions at the Council of the League or its Political Committee or at the meetings of
the Arab Prime Ministers.
I expect any Iraqi Minister who claims otherwise to submit before the Council of
the League his complaint regarding an action or a statement emanating from the
Secretary-General which was not supported by a resolution (adopted) by the States
of the League. This storm around the powers of the Secretary-General is then unnat-
ural and may conceal (something) which it does not show clearly, particularly since it
is recognized that the platform of criticism in matters relating to the League is the
6?
The Arab States and the Arab League
Council of the League which represents all the Governments (of the League) and not
the Chambers of Deputies in the various Arab countries.
I finally assure the esteemed Iraqi Deputies that all the decisions I rely upon in
my activities and statements and for which I assume responsibility were unanimously
adopted either by the Council (of the League) or by the Political Committee. It is a
disgrace to utter words at random instead of denning the subjects of the complaint,
submitting (such a complaint) to the competent authorities, defining the means of the
reform sought for, and laying it before them for study and discussion in the meeting
place of the Arab States. This is a right of all the States of the League, for they are
entitled, in the event of an urgent necessity, to demand the convening of an extra-
ordinary session for this purpose.
The Iraqis are a noble people who are making sacrifices and struggling for the
sake of unity. A controversy of this nature cannot help them to find the truth and to
proceed towards the achievement of unity, nor is it the method of responsible men.
For the way to (unity) is constructive work within the League. And I have the honour
to invite those responsible to bring me to account within this (League). Yet, should to
these want us to settle accounts within the hearing of the Iraqi people in the Iraqi
Parliament, I put myself (at their disposal) as an Arab who is more concerned about
the satisfaction of Iraq than for his post in the League, and submit to the Iraqi esteem-
ed Chamber of Deputies all the statements and explanations it may require, supported
by the known and the confidential documents.
This is as far as concerns the general points contained in the statement of His
Excellency the Iraqi Foreign Minister. As for the other allegations in the course of
which he dealt with certain actual facts, it would be sufficient to put on record in this
respect certain facts which are supported by figures and documents ; we do not believe
there is room for controversy in this respect under any circumstances whatever.
He said that the Secretariat-General should have paid the expenses of the volun-
eers on the Iraqi front in Palestine, amounting to twenty thousand pounds a month,
tand that the Secretariat-General, in spite of several reminders had only paid fifteen
thousand pounds a month. He followed this by referring to the expenses incurred by
Iraq in the Palestine war, the expenses on the refugees and the losses sustained by the
Iraqi Government as a result of the stoppage of the flow of petrol.
It is no concern of ours to speak of the expenses incurred by Iraq in the Palestine
war, of what she paid to persons and organizations through means other than those of
the League, of the expenses borne by the Iraqi Government for the refugees, and of
the losses it incurred as a result of the stoppage of the flow of petrol, for all these (mat-
ters) concern the Iraqi Government itself. All that could be said in this regard is that
the other Arab Governments have born their share in the Palestine expenses and in
spending on the refugees. Many of their interests were exposed to damage as a result
of the war, as is natural and to be expected. However, what the Iraqi Foreign Minis-
ter mentioned regarding the volunteers on the Iraqi front, on whom the Secretariat-
General should have spent (money), needs clarification.
It is a fact that no resolution was passed by the Political Committee for allotting
twenty thousand pounds to the Palestine Volunteers attached to the Iraqi Command
in Transjordan. For the Committee's resolution of September 12, 1948, concerning
these volunteers, provided that the League should continue to provide supplies for
these fighting Palestinian forces irrespective of whether they were attached to the
Arab armies in Palestine or to the Palestine Government.
Discussions were held with the competent persons of the Iraq headquarters in
Transjordan to the effect that the number of the above volunteers should be one thou-
68
International Affairs: League of Arab States
sand, provided that the salary of each of them should not exceed ten dinars a month.
The Secretariat-General confirmed this by official letters addressed to that command.
After that, the Secretariat-General continued to send monthly sums exceeding this
amount to the Iraqi Command in Amman, in spite of the fact that what it was (in fact)
sending exceeded the actual salary of the above-mentioned forces. This was made at
the request of the command of these forces. For the salaries for the first month after
the formation of these forces amounted to 7,089 Palestine pounds and 217 mils. (/)
The salaries for the second month amounted to 7,075 Palestine pounds and 985 mils,
and for the third month thus amounted to n, 128 Palestine pounds and 984 mils,
while the amounts remitted to the Iraqi Command to meet these salaries during this
period totalled 25,675 Palestine pounds.
The amounts remitted to the Iraqi Command for spending on these forces total-
led, until April 1949, 136,538 Palestine pounds and 415 mils. In the same way, (the
amounts) which reached the Jordanian Government to consolidate the Iraqi-Jordan-
ian front amounted to 347,449 Palestine pounds and 595 mils. This was in addition to
the amounts paid to the refugees in this region and to the hospitals. It is thus clear
that all (the amounts) paid by the Iraqi Government, out of the (amount) due by it
for the relief of Palestine, were spent on that front, and even more than those a-
mounts (was spent).
The statement of the Iraqi Foreign Minister mentioned that the Secretariat-
General) was not paying these amounts except after many reminders. The fact is that
these reminders did not relate to the payment of the amounts decided upon, but to the
increase in these amounts in spite of the agreement reached between the Secretary-
General and Shakir al-Wady Pasha on the necessity of economizing in spending on
those forces. Yet the esteemed (Iraqi) Chamber of Deputies may be surprised to
know that the complaint raised before it by the (Foreign) Minister was not sent to the
Secretariat-General, and that (the Secretariat-General) has no official knowledge of it,
in the same way as it will be surprised (to learn) that (the complaint) was associated
with Iraq's (financial) contribution to the League. This is a complaint which relates
to a function distinct from the functions of the Secretariat-General according to the
resolutions of the Council itself. All there is to it is that the Secretary-Genera] is
entrusted with its supervision as an independent administration outside the League.
Moreover, the Iraqi Governent has not paid its subscriptions to the expenses of the
Secretariat-General for two years, that is to say, before the Arab Armies entered
Palestine. And it still owes over two hundred thousand pounds for the relief of Pales-
tine, that is to say, to the fund of the Committee of Financial Experts which is alloca-
ted to the affairs of the volunteers and other purposes in Palestine.
In addition to the above, this administration has spent in the northern region of
Palestine, namely in the region which was defended by the Iraqi, Jordanian, Syrian
and Lebanese Armies, and for aid to these armies, 67.3%of the total amounts it receiv-
ed from the Arab Governments for spending on the defence of Palestine. The fund
the Committee of Experts still contains, out of these, vast sums and assets.
As for the spending on the Yarmuk Force which is under the responsibility of the
Arab League, and the statement that when the Secretary-General recently visited
Syria he decided to continue spending on these forces, thus taking sides with Syria,
the truth is that nothing of the sort happened. It was (in fact) the contrary that hap-
pened. For upon his visit to Damascus the Secretary-General was accompanied by
( i) A "mil" in Palestine currency is equivalent to i-ioooth of a pound. ED
69
The Arab States and the Arab League
the chairman of the Committee of the Financial Experts for Palestine in order to dis-
cuss the future of the Yarmuk Force which the Secretariat-General had formed, sup-
plied with arms and equipment, and spent(money) on. This force was at first known
under the name of the Army of Delivrance ( i), and the chairman of the above Com-
mittee concluded an agreement with the competent persons of the Syrian Ministry of
National Defence for the formation of a committee for this purpose. (2) (The com-
mittee) was then formed by Rescript (3) No. 277, of April 18,1 949, under the chair-
manship of Taha al-Hashimy Pasha, who was in charge of that force and who had
taken over from Major-General Ismail Safwat Pasha, and from Messrs. Muhammad
Aly Namazy Bey, Brigadier Anwar Muhammad, Lt. -Colonel Shawkat Shuqayr,
Captain 'Abd al-Wehhab Nizam, and Colonel Mahmud al-Hindy, as members.
The above committee met on April 19, 1949, and the meeting was attended by
those whose names were mentioned above, with the exception of Colonel Mahmud
al-Hindy. It was also attended by Major-General 'Abdullah 'Atfa on behalf of the
Commander-m-Chief of the Syrian Army and of the Armed Forces, and Mr. Ahmad
al-Khany as a representative of the Syrian Ministry of Finance.
The discussions covered the fate of the Yarmuk Force and its equipment as well
as the relation between the Arab League and the Syrian Government with regard to
what the Military Committee had received from the Syrian Government (also) with
regard to what this Ministry had received from the Military Committee.
After deliberation the Committee took the following decisions :-
1 The Yarmuk Force shall remain as it is, and spending on it shall continue until
the conclusion of the armistice between the Syrian Government and the Jews.
2 Immediately upon the mere conclusion of the armistice referred to in the pre-
vious clause, gradual demobilization of these forces shall begin in accordance
with the usual military procedure, provided that they are all demobilized by
the end of May 1949, which is the latest date at which the League can meet
those expenses.
3 After the completion of the demobilization of the above-mentioned Force, a
reduced body representing the General Inspectorate, shall be maintained for
supervising the liquidation and for preserving the equipment, arms and supplies
which are stored in depots and which will be withdrawn from the un : ts of the
Yarmuk Force. (The body in question shall be maintained) until such time
as the League shall decide on the fate of such equipment, arms and supplies, provid-
ed that that this body shall be presided over by Lt. Colonel Shawkat Shuqayr.
4 The Committee recommends that the demobilization of the undesirable ele-
ments should start forthwith with a view to reducing expenditure.
5 The question of the settlement of the pending matters between the Syrian Min-
istry of National Defence and the General Inspectorate in connection with the
arms, supplies and equipment delivered by each of them, as well as other mat-
ters is the concern of the League. The liquidation of these (matters) shall be en-
trusted, upon the full completion of the demobilization, to a committee compos-
ed of a representative of the League, a representative of the Inspectorate and a
representative of the Syrian Government.
(1) In Arabic, "Jaysh al-Inqadh". ED.
(2) Presumably) for the purpose of looking after the Yarmuk Force by "supplying it with
arms, equipping it, and spending money on 1'r." ED.
(3) The Arabic term used here is * c qarar". ED.
70
International Affairs: League of Arab States
As to the assertion that certain Arab States had refused to pay their share in
the defence of Palestine, the facts confirmed by figures, show that the Arab States
meant in the statement (of the Iraqi Foreign Minister) have paid their full shares in
that defence. His Excellency the Iraqi Foreign Minister is aware of this, since the
chairman of the Committee of Financial Experts had furnished him with a detailed
statement of what was paid by the Arab States for that purpose. It is worth noting in
this connection that the Iraqi Government is still liable to pay the sum of 208,362.621
Egyptian pounds of its share in the expenses of the defence of Palestine. This is in
addition to what it failed to pay of its subscription to the budget of the Secretariat-
General for the years 1948-1949, i.e. the amount of 84,096 Egyptian pounds. And
this (happened) at a time when the Egyptian and the Saudi-Arabian Governments
paid 74% of the total amounts received by the Secretariat-General and allocatedto the
defence of Palestine, while the remainder was paid by the other five States, including
Iraq.
To conclude, I hope that the following facts be clear :-
First : The Secretariat-General was not under any obligation to spend (money)
on volunteers assisting the Iraq' Army, since the intention was to assist the
weak armies. Nevertheless, in view of the situation in which the Iraqi
Army found itself in the field, and considering the Iraqi Command's
complaint of the shortage in (the Army's) number, the Secretary-General
suggested to His Excellency Nur ad-Din Pasha, the Iraqi Commander, to
supply him with money for the recruitment of a number of Palestinians to
serve under the Iraqi Command. The maximum amount which the Iraqi
Command was asking for at the time was ten thousand pounds a month,
while the sums (in fact) spent on these forces amounted to 136,538.415
Palestine pounds.
Second : The volunteer force attached to the Iraqi Command was employed in sectors
lying between the Iraqi Army and the Jewish forces and was immobilized in
its positions. The League could not therefore employ (this force) during the
fighting as a reserve force and a mobile guerilla, in the same manner in
which it had employed other (forces) at the expense of great sacrifices, when
certain Arab Armies had to be on the defensive while the Egyptian Army was,
(in the meantime), fighting single-handed.
Third : The Secretariat-General does expect the responsible authorities in Iraq to
release it from its obligation concerning the expenditure on these forces and
to show the services which (these forces) rendered (in the fight) against the
Jews and so justify the huge amounts spent on them.
In conclusion, I request the esteemed Iraqi Chamber of Deputies and the es-
teemed representatives of the (Iraqi) people (i) to be sure that any difference between
any Iraqi Minister or Prime Minister and myself will change nothing of my affection
and deep respect for the struggling Iraqi people and the noble Hashimite Family. I
shall never forget that I am an Arab, that I lived and was respected in Iraq, that I
associated with its outstanding leaders, and that I am still proud of their friendship
and comradeship.
Though I may blame considerably the Foreign Minister for his action, yet his
statement was not completely untrue, for it contains a fact which we should always
bear in mind, namely, that our plight in Palestine has not come to an end yet. Let
then everything in which we have been either wrong or right serve as a lesson which
(i) Literally, "nation". ED.
71
The Arab States and the Arab League
will help us to repel the aggression and to achieve a final victory with a view to safe-
guarding the honour of the Arab nation with renascent Iraq, I hope, alway in its van.
And I am none but of (the tribe of) Ghaziyya (i); were it to stray
I would be straying; and were it to be wise I would be wise.
Draft Statute of the Arab Court of Justice Prepared by the Three-
Man Commission Appointed by the Council of the Arab League at its
Twelfth Ordinary Session
April 13, jpjo (2)
Tuesday, July 28, 2015
Arab Unity: Miscellaneous Projects
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